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Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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War of 1812 scholarship has focused primarily on classic military studies of decisive
battles. Likewise, scholarship on the experience of war essentially concentrates on how
killing and combat effected the human psyche. This dissertation pursues a broader
perspective. It examines the impact of the environment on the health of soldiers and
emphasizes everyday conditions and environmental suffering. Veterans’ accounts typically
elevate suffering in camp over combat. A substantive study of soldiers’ responses to daily
environmental conditions demonstrates the importance of health management to the outcome
of the War of 1812. Through case studies of health measures related to frontier conditions,
the use of alcohol to manage morale, the role of rations and food insecurity on the 1814
campaign, and close attention to two military units on either side of the conflict – the British
104th Regiment of Foot and the U.S. 21st Infantry Regiment – this dissertation argues that
daily environmental management was far more important than victories in battle.
The environment may have been the most significant factor in the War of 1812, but that
did not reduce the importance of human agency. An exploration of illness demonstrates that
the best commanders took proactive steps to protect the health of their soldiers. The British

Army used veteran units in intensive combat areas and placed unfit and inexperienced
soldiers in less threatened locations, such as the Maritime provinces of British North
America; moreover, it reduced the size of its forces when the environment could not sustain
large armies. The Americans, on the other hand, promoted officers with the most experience
in frontier warfare and allowed leaders to move freely between militia and regular units to
gain experience. For both sides the management of provisions was central to troop morale,
patriotism, and health. This included generous alcohol rations to mediate harsh climatic
conditions and the horrors of combat. The 1814 campaign in Niagara demonstrates that
success on the battlefield was secondary to and dependent upon an effective logistical system
that provided enough calories for each soldier.
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INTRODUCTION
Lying in bed alone, a young captain was too ill to troop the line. He was destined
to lead armies in Mexico and Florida and become the President of the United States.
However, as the commander of the small Fort Harrison on the Ohio frontier, Captain
Zachary Taylor was outnumbered, most of his soldiers were ill, and he was completely
cut off from reinforcements. To make matters worse, Taylor’s strongest soldiers
remained well despite the fever raging in his company, but they had abandoned their post
to seek survival on their own. The situation was hopeless; however, Taylor continued to
lead.1 He encouraged his soldiers to fight, and he managed to hold Fort Harrison. His
letter recounting the episode shifted from the first-person to the third-person narrative,
and Taylor was surprised by his performance in a terrible situation.2 The military and
political leader of the Shawnee Confederacy, Tecumseh, commanded the force opposing
Taylor. Tecumseh surrounded Fort Harrison, and because of William Hull’s pledge of
extermination it was likely that all the American soldiers would be killed if Fort Harrison
capitulated.3 The hopelessness of brutal frontier warfare situations and a trend towards
massacres between Americans and Native Americans pushed Captain Taylor to defend
his fort with soldiers completely unfit for regular duty.4 Yet the Americans answered the
call, overcame their ailments and injuries, and held off a much larger force. Fighting

1

Zachary Taylor to William Harrison from Fort Harrison 16 September 1812, in John Brannan (Ed.).
Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, During the War with Great Britain
in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15 : With Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of
That Period (Washington City: Printed by Way & Gideon, for the editor, 1823), 62. Short citation will be,
Brannan (Ed.), Official Letters.
2
Ibid.
3
The Proclamation of William Hull to the Inhabitants of Canada from Sandwich, Upper Canada 12 July
1812 in Brannan (Ed.) Official Letters, 31.
4
Taylor to Harrison, in Brannan (Ed.) Official Letters, 62.
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while ill or injured was one of the best demonstrations of personal honor and courage in
part because of the harsh realities of frontier siege warfare. In many ways, soldiers longed
for opportunities to respond in hopeless military encounters, and to overcome sickness
and perform well in battle was the best way to demonstrate character in an Army that was
still connected directly to a Revolutionary tradition of suffering and perseverance.
Like Captain Zachary Taylor, American soldiers and commanders were not
always sure why they survived, and how they succeeded or failed. Like Taylor’s shift
from first- to third-person voice, War of 1812 soldiers often surprised themselves with
their own actions, because the challenges themselves were surprising. It was often harder
to survive the elements than face the enemy. Honorable victory proved the character of
the soldiers on both sides, but battles won or lost mattered a lot less than securing lines of
supply and communication and simply taking the actions necessary to keep soldiers in the
ranks while fighting in the frontier borderlands region between the United States and
British North America. While the environment – specifically its influence on sickness –
was an important factor in the conflict, the actions of soldiers and commanders to
influence their environment mattered more. Officers struggled to keep soldiers in the
ranks, and when they gave soldiers the ability to prove their character by fighting while
ill, injured, or inebriated, they were often rewarded with victories in seemingly hopeless
situations. The War of 1812, regardless of the persistence of nationalistic portrayals and
interpretations, was like all others: cruel and unromantic, and the methods used to gain
victory were often unremarkable. Patriotism was fueled by extra alcohol rations,
battlefield victories lost initiative because of poor national logistics policies, some of the
best soldiers sat in garrison for most of the conflict, and New Englanders bore a
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disproportionate share of a war that their states opposed. An unpopular war was fought in
an extremely challenging environment, where success was often measured more by
logistical policies than courage under fire.
The War of 1812 began with American failures caused largely by the challenges
of environmental management. At the outset of the War of 1812, the British had fewer
soldiers. However, the seat of war in Upper Canada allowed the British 41st Foot to fight
both against the U.S. forces in Michigan and the invasion coming from New York. In the
western campaign, the U.S. army commanded by William Hull had more frontier militia
that could handle remote warfare and logistics as well as heavy cannon moved via Lake
Erie. In New York, Stephen Van Rensselaer had to build a road to move artillery into the
Niagara region. Because of differing capabilities in light infantry tactics and different
environmental challenges, William Hull’s army began its invasion long before
Rensselaer’s army could attack, and the small British 41st Regiment of Foot was able to
fight in both key engagements during summer of 1812: the battles of Detroit and
Queenston Heights. However, the two American losses illustrate one of the most
important themes in the conflict. In Detroit, citing high numbers of soldiers on the sick
list, the highly experienced Revolutionary War veteran William Hull surrendered without
a fight.5 At Queenston Heights, Stephen Van Rensselaer, despite being a political general
with little military experience, fought fiercely until he collapsed due to blood loss
following being wounded in the assault. Hull’s soldiers strove to fight despite illness, but
he surrendered, and he was tried and convicted of cowardice. Van Rensselaer also failed

5

Letter from William Hull to William Eustice from Fort Malden 26 August 1812, in Brannan (Ed.) Official
Letters, 48.
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but fought on despite enfeebling wounds, and thus he preserved his honor.6 It may seem
reasonable to understand Hull’s failure in Detroit based on his losses to illness, but it was
unacceptable to his peers and subordinates because soldiers were expected to persevere,
and officers were expected to adapt to the challenges of illness and environment. The
British strategy exploited the region’s environment, and the battles of Detroit and
Queenston Heights may have been the only major tactical victories that brought strategic
gains in the entire conflict.
The initial failures of the American Army led to an assault by Tecumseh’s
confederation and a British Army commanded by General Henry Procter. Militia officers
like William Henry Harrison, Isaac Shelby, Green Clay, and Duncan McArthur became
the leaders of the Army in Northern Ohio. Following the massacre at Raisin River, the
Americans managed to hold out in sieges at small fortifications.7 The sieges were
difficult but largely successful, and all the commanders had the same problems with high
rates of sickness that William Hull had at Detroit, but they called for their garrisons to
fight rather than surrender. The soldiers and officers weathered the British offensive in
their garrisons until Oliver Hazard Perry’s naval victory gave the Americans control of
Lake Erie.8 The 1813 campaign led by William Henry Harrison experienced some of the
most difficult environmental challenges faced by an Army from Ohio to the Niagara

6

Solomon Van Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown: In the War of 1812 (New York:
Leavitt Crocker & Brewster, 1836), 25-26.
7
For the American Soldier perspective on the Raisin River Massacre see William Atherton, Narrative of
the Suffering & Defeat of the North-Western Army under General Winchester: Massacre of the Prisoners:
Sixteen Months Imprisonment of the Writer and Others with the Indians and British (Frankfort, KY: Printed
for the author by A.G. Hodges, 1842).
8
No one understood the significant role that the control of Lake Erie played more so than William Henry
Harrison. He related the control of the lakes to which Army required the most labor. The American
concentration on siege warfare was significant, but this shifted quickly after Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory.
See William Harrison to John Armstrong from Seneca Town, 4 August 1813, in Brannan (Ed.). Official
Letters, 184.
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region, and his emphasis on light infantry tactics created significant success. From the
outset of the 1813 offensive, Harrison embraced a light infantry supply line that traded
wagons for pack horses and employed local provisioning and naval support.9 Harrison
pushed the allied forces of Tecumseh and Henry Procter back to Niagara through a
constant pursuit until the Battle of the Thames.10 The militia officers also instituted
hygienic policies that kept soldiers off the sick list longer and allowed Harrison’s army to
go deeper into enemy territory.11 Although Harrison won few traditional battlefield
victories, he accomplished the most strategically because the British and Tecumseh
coalition never threatened Michigan and Northern Ohio in a meaningful way again.
Henry Procter remained aggressive even after he lost the environmental advantages, he
previously held when he controlled Lake Erie, and this loss forced his army into a long
and miserable retreat that crippled most of his force. William Henry Harrison’s army
faced the worst environmental challenges when it penetrated the Upper Canadian frontier
border region just when extremely poor rainy weather made the roads impassable for
supply wagons.12 Environmentally conscious light infantry tactics did not win any major

The first reference to the use of pack horses in Harrison’s army was in December of 1812, William Hull’s
army also used pack horses, because it was also capable at light infantry tactics. See Letter from Lieutenant
Colonel John Campbell to Major General William Henry Harrison from Fort Greenbush 23 December
1812, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters, 110-17.
10
Letter from Major General William Henry Harrison to Secretary of War John Armstrong from
Moraviantown, 5 October 1813, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters, 229.
11
General Orders 19th Infantry Regiment 1 August 1813, 19th Infantry Regiment Order Book, Library of
Congress.
12
This region is currently one of the most fruitful environments in North America, and its ability to grow
crops is impressive. During the War of 1812 the region was transitioning from first to second nature, but
the armies destroyed crops at a high rate. The most significant factor in the perception of the region’s
sparseness and parsimony, however, was its roads. The Niagara region was theoretically best supplied by
water. However, the Royal Navy’s presence was limited in North America and the American Navy was a
very modest organization. Although portions of the region were bountiful, poor roads impeded the
movement of supplies for large armies. The other problem during the War of 1812 was the common and
often brutal civil destruction. Campaigns during the French and Indian War were more successful, largely
because Jeffrey Amherst used a counterinsurgency strategy that cultivated positive relationships with the
local population. As a result, Amherst was able to move a much larger army through the same region.
9
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battles for Harrison, but the states and territories he governed were no longer under threat
of a British supported assault.
East of Niagara in 1813, the British continued to win victories, and seasoned
regular American Army commanders fared much worse than Harrison’s invasion. The
largest problem in the Niagara region was the regular officers placed in command, with
Henry Dearborn and James Wilkinson commanding at the highest echelons. Both
commanders relied most heavily upon regular regiments and regular tactics. Winfield
Scott was an exception because he recognized a series of small but essential disasters that
befell the American forces in the Niagara Region.13 A skirmish at Stoney Creek cost the
Americans two captured generals, even if the Americans stopped the British attack. The
complete loss of a detachment led by Colonel Boerstler led to Henry Dearborn’s return to
Washington D.C., suffering from nervous exhaustion.14 Colonel Winfield Scott
recognized the ability to support the efforts of William Henry Harrison. Scott wanted to
complete the defeat of General Henry Procter’s 41st Regiment of Foot, but Wilkinson led
in an “abortive” manner.15 Wilkinson not only withdrew Scott’s support of Harrison, but
he also withdrew all regulars from Fort George on the Canadian side of the Niagara
River. During the 1813 campaign in the Niagara region, America’s greatest victory was
the destruction of a supply depot (and the unjustified burning of public property) at York.
However, Wilkinson nullified his victory by withdrawing his forces from the frontier,
leading to defeats at Crysler’s Farm, Chateauguay, and La Colle Mills. His abject failure

13

Winfield Scott, Winfield, and Timothy D. Johnson (Ed.) Memoirs of Lieut.-General Winfield Scott.
Voices of the Civil War (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2015), 51. Short citation will be,
Memoirs of Winfield Scott.
14
Memoirs of Winfield Scott, 50.
15
Letter from Winfield Scott to James Wilkinson from Fort George 11 October 1813, in Memoirs of
Winfield Scott, 54-55. The term abortive was in Scott’s commentary about the letter.
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at La Colle Mills led to a court-martial and his relief from duty. Wilkinson’s focus on the
campaign toward Montreal failed to stress how William Henry Harrison weakened the
British in Upper Canada. Instead, Wilkinson focused on the capital at York and failed
miserably. Wilkinson preferred to use regulars, and they suffered significantly from
health problems, so much so that Wilkinson never felt he had adequate forces.
Wilkinson’s army suffered far more significantly from “the rainy season” than Harrison’s
army, and Winfield Scott bitterly clashed with Wilkinson because of the lack of emphasis
on “la petite guerre.”16 Scott understood that fighting in North America required a
combination of regular and indirect small wars tactics that emphasized ambushes and
rapid raids on fortifications and supply lines. On the British side, Henry Proctor was in a
much weaker position. The British no longer controlled Lake Erie, and Proctor’s 41st
Foot was cut off from supplies. As General Harrison actively pursued Procter, and the
widespread health afflictions caused by the frontier environment had a larger effect on
weakened British forces in Upper Canada, Wilkinson’s “abortive” campaign meant that a
better led American Army would face off against massive British reinforcements in 1814.
The military dynamic of the War of 1812 changed significantly in 1814. Gordon
Drummond commanded the British Army in that year, and he combined local knowledge
with classic British education and experience fighting the Napoleonic Wars in the
Netherlands, Egypt, and Jamaica. His family settled in Quebec, so Drummond
understood the environmental limitations of Canada better than any previous
commander.17 The initial success of the aggressive strategy of Isaac Brock and Henry
16

Memoirs of Winfield Scott, 56, 51.
Kenneth Stickney, “DRUMMOND, Sir GORDON,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 8,
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed November 8, 2019,
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/drummond_gordon_8E.html.
17
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Procter overstretched the British after the loss of Lake Erie. Drummond, unlike previous
leaders, used the minimum forces necessary to control the Niagara region.18 His operation
employed an economy of force distribution, not in the classic manner of focusing combat
power elsewhere but rather to minimize logistical challenges. His leadership at Chippewa
and Lundy’s Lane led to losses in the frontline fighting but succeeded in cutting off
American supply lines with militia and Native American allies. Drummond traded the
best battlefield tactics for the best long-term petite guerre strategy. After losses at
Lundy’s Lane and Chippewa, he went on the offensive for the sieges at Plattsburgh and
Fort Erie. All the battles fought in the summer of 1814 were American victories, but
Drummond gained the most and took the offensive. With reinforcements from the end of
the Peninsular War, Drummond had more troops than the Americans, but he instead
limited the size of his Army to create a feasible supply system in an isolated frontier
border region. The veterans of hard fighting in Europe were exceptional soldiers but the
veterans also came with the injuries and diseases common in years of combat duty.
Drummond chose a strategy that led to losses on the battlefield, but few leaders gained in
victory what Drummond gained in defeat.
For the United States Army, 1814 was a watershed moment of reform in training
and tactics. General Jacob Brown, with the help of officers like Winfield Scott and James
Miller, focused on training with the Baron von Stueben’s drill manual. Brown’s army
was the best led in the entire conflict, and it showed on the battlefield. Soldiers held up to
the repeated British attacks at Lundy’s Lane, won a smaller battle at Chippewa, and stood

A. M. J. Hyatt, “PROCTER, HENRY,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 6, University of
Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed November 8, 2019,
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/procter_henry_6E.html.
18
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firm in the sieges of Fort Erie and Plattsburgh. The officer performance was exemplary,
with officers leading from the front. James Miller was the only unwounded senior officer
in 1814, and he led three bayonet charges: one at Chippewa, one seizing a British battery
at Lundy’s Lane, and one destroying the British powder magazine at Fort Erie. What
Jacob Brown could not change was contracted logistics that operated outside the military
chain of command.19 The British Army also managed logistics by contract, but Arthur
Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, integrated a British Army officer to serve as
commissary general. Gordon Drummond maintained a Commissary General as well, and
he shaped his strategy around his Commissary General’s ability to provide adequate
sustenance.20 Jacob Brown’s army won its battles but could not keep soldiers in the field
after victories because of high rates of sickness caused by an inadequate supply system.
Overall, victory in battle rarely matched the impact of weather and the
environment. Commanders who embraced more environmentally conscious tactics
gained the most strategically, with or without victories on the battlefield. A petite guerre
strategy preserved logistics but also got the most out of soldiers technically unfit for duty
because of sickness. In the early war years, the British relied on the coalition led by
Tecumseh for sound, light infantry tactics; William Hull surrendered a large army
because of sickness; and another army lost most of its force building a road to transport
artillery to the Niagara River. In the second year, the British environmental advantages in
Upper Canada shifted to the Americans because of the Royal Navy defeat on Lake Erie.

19

Contract logistics means paying a private company to provide supplies. Ideally, contract logistics gains
efficiency and decreases cost; however, military commanders lose control of logistics.
20
Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey, “District General Orders, Niagara Falls 12 October 1814,” in Ernest
Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the Invasion of the Niagara Peninsula by the United States Army,
Commanded by General Jacob Brown, in July and August 1814 (Toronto: Canadian House, 1968).
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The worst environmental conditions in the conflict emerged in 1813, but William Henry
Harrison’s use of a strategy that was not reliant on the poor roads of Upper Canada
completely routed the British Regiment threatening Northern Ohio. In 1814 the American
Army won every battle; however, Gordon Drummond’s emphasis on sending troops only
if he could adequately supply them and his tactic of cutting Americans off from their
supply lines during battle meant the British gained more than the Americans did on the
battlefield. Policies that kept soldiers in the field mattered more than heroics and
battlefield victories.
Another important component of this introductory summary addresses the
composition of forces on both sides of the conflict. The British Army was rigid in many
ways in terms of purchased commissions and an overemphasis on European line order
tactics. However, the Napoleonic Wars made the British more flexible about
commissioning by merit and more open to light infantry strategy. Somewhat
paradoxically, the British Army was both rigid and flexible. The British were, at times,
fixated on inefficient traditions and other times changed significantly based on the
realities of the conflict in North America. The regiment was the most significant structure
in the British Army. The British regiment was as much a family as it was a military unit,
and all training, direct command, and correspondence happened there. This explains the
mixture of adaptation and rigidness, because each regiment was unique, and all the
commanders came out of that system. The British Army also embraced the use of militia
in skirmishing, flanking duties, and other petite guerre tasks. Those militia soldiers also
possessed local knowledge and could return home whenever they were sick or necessary
for the harvest or local security. Their most useful allies throughout the conflict were
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Indigenous peoples. There were no British victories without significant help from tribal
allies. Tecumseh was so revered that he was offered a British Brigadier commission; he
significantly influenced the British victory in Detroit and held off any American invasion
from Northern Ohio while the Royal Navy controlled Lake Erie. At Chippewa and
Lundy’s Lane, militia and Native American troops cut off United States supply lines. The
British lost those battles but gained the most through using the militia and Native
Americans as their best light infantry force.
The American Army was very different, with a unique hierarchy of forces. There
were three types of forces in the United States. At the highest echelon was the regular
armed forces, the second tier was temporary federal volunteer regiments, and state
militias were at the bottom. While the hierarchy was a well-entrenched system, it is
problematic to interpret the hierarchy deterministically. Like the British, each American
regiment was very different, and typically regiments were drawn from the same region.
Also, for officers, service in the militia on the frontier brought combat experience and
rapid promotions. Successful leadership in combat often led to federal recognition of rank
and allowed for a faster path to regular general officer commissions. All that was
required for militia units to transition to volunteer regiments were new uniforms and
equipment. The order books for forward-deployed federal regiments also listed new
recruits coming directly out on the front line in the combat theatre, meaning that soldiers
often transitioned between the different levels of ground service. The hierarchy with
regular units and officer commissions at the top meant that service in the militia and
volunteers could become a path to the highest echelons of command. As such, militia
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officers with service in the frontier typical rose to the highest level of leadership because
militia service was the best path to combat experience before the War of 1812.21
The final topic of this brief overview of the war, before a review of pertinent
literature, focuses on vocabulary. The term “soldier” will be used universally regardless
of the soldier’s role as regular, militia, or volunteer. Soldier is not technically a term for
junior officers; however, when interpreted more generally, a soldier is someone who
fights in a war. This dissertation seeks to understand the War of 1812 experientially, so
viewing all soldiers as fighters regardless of their rank or status in the militia or regular
forces is more sensitive to the experience of all soldiers in a harsh frontier climate. Those
divisions will only be referred to when necessary because the environment did not
distinguish the hierarchies embedded in the institutional cultures of the British and
American armed forces. Both sides varied significantly with the roles of the militia and
regular forces. For officers in the American army those roles were flexible, and most
successful commanders gained experience in frontier militias before the war. Conversely,
the barriers between British regular army units were more defined, and often forces that
transitioned to British Regiments of Foot struggled to attain parity. Native Americans
shared those features as soldiers or warriors, but that dynamic ignores their tribal identity.
Thus, they will be referred to by tribe unless that is impossible to ascertain from the
record. The War of 1812 was not just an operational conflict, it was also about the

21

The exception to this rule would be the younger officers at the outset of the conflict. Josiah Snelling,
Thomas Sidney Jesup, and Winfield Scott were the core group of highly successful regular Army officers,
whose commissions came at the beginning of the War of 1812. Thus, while they contradicted the trend
amongst senior officer they did so because the War of 1812 offered the same level of combat experience to
them as frontier militia experience did in peace time. Memoirs of Winfield Scott; Thomas Sidney Jesup,
Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, Library of Congress.
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experience of people, and “soldier” is the best term to encompass the wide variety of
ways that people served in the conflict.
Current scholarship in multiple fields of study has the potential to inform the
historiographical interpretations of the War of 1812. The University of Maine’s approach
to borderlands scholarship is ideal geographically for exploring the northern theatre of the
War of 1812.22 The multidisciplinary emphasis of borderlands elucidates the conflict
more significantly. Environmental history, the social science of violence, and the socalled “new military history” have the potential to shift the focus of scholarship of the
War of 1812 from a decisive battles approach toward an emphasis on daily management
of soldiers. Canada is a region that is aptly described as “parsimonious,” so supplying
armies was far more difficult and significant than winning battles.23 Likewise, North
American warfare has been understood to be about brutal petite guerre, emphasizing
unlimited but indirect means of defeating opponents, in contrast to how decisive battles
decided conflicts in Europe. The social science of violence is moving away from theories
that elevate combat and killing as the most difficult psychological challenge to embrace
theories that emphasize moral injury and the constant strain of campaigns over combat.
Three seemingly different approaches to the study of violence and environment illustrate
that the day-to-day grind of warfare and campaigning was far more difficult and
significant than when armies clashed openly. In fact, winning battles rarely gained
enough advantages to overcome systemic day-to-day problems. Most importantly,

22

The bulk of the armies served in the northern theater, and most of the fighting occurred there. For most of
1812 and 1813 the other theaters experienced infrequent combat. However, popular memory of the war
tends to focus on the burning of public buildings in Washington and the sensational victory of Andrew
Jackson at New Orleans.
23
Cole Harris, The Reluctant Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before Confederation
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).
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soldiers have been elevating the challenges of daily military service over moments of
crisis and battle since time immemorial, and the experience of war needs to inform both
the “new” military historiography and the operational interpretations of the War of 1812.
In a dissertation that seeks to create a shift in methodological approaches to the
War of 1812, it will be important to first explore the innovative works in other
disciplines. Specifically, David Livingstone Smith is fundamentally altering the way that
scholars approach war and violence to focus on an evolutionary psychological
perspective. His work challenges years of research that defines war and killing as
inhuman and understands human beings as uniquely violent animals.24 As group-based
animals, human beings rarely murder those that they believe are also humans. But
barbarians or individuals that are considered less than human are far more likely to be
brutalized and exterminated like animals.25 Human beings are capable of remarkable
empathy to groups they identify with, while atrocity, systematic ethnic cleansing, and
targeting of civilians often occur against groups that are not considered human beings.
Native Americans were “savages,” Jews in the Second World War were considered
insects worthy of industrialized death through an insecticide, and American soldiers
justified Vietnamese suffering through the excessive use of napalm and defoliants due to
their backward society. Alan Taylor’s argument that the War of 1812 was a “race war” in
which the British utilized barbarian slaves and Native Americans against white frontier
settlements is especially evocative of Smith’s approach to warfare.26 Likewise, John
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Grenier’s work on the unlimited and brutal targeting of noncombatant villages during the
War of 1812 illustrates how useful Smith’s evolutionary approach is to the conflict.
Dehumanization does, however, create much higher rates of psychological impairment.27
It is also important to emphasize how brutality through dehumanization created
high rates of mental illness before the twentieth century. The question of killing as an
emotionally charged psychological event, and the general overemphasis on killing,
combat, and battle ignore how significantly sustained detrimental stress is on an
individual’s health.28 Robert Sapolsky’s work in biological neuroendocrinology has
reoriented any substantive study of stress. As a neurochemical expert, Sapolsky has
illustrated the effect that cortisol, rather than epinephrine (typically understood as
adrenaline), has had on the human body. While epinephrine provides significant energy
under duress, cortisol shuts down every system in the human body that is not
immediately necessary for survival.29 The immune system, reproductive system, and
digestion are all significantly affected by cortisol. Jonathan Shay has argued that
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the continuation of survival response in a nonsurvival environment.30 With the elevation of cortisol levels during stress, the long-term
systems shut down become detrimental to the health of soldiers. Day-to-day stressful
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situations are, therefore, far more damaging to human health than extreme moments like
a battle.
Additionally, Sapolsky described how low socio-economic status, specifically
food insecurity, and the unpredictability of stressors are worse for the health of people
than extreme events. Scholars rarely link hunger caused by challenging logistics on a
frontier with the psychology of warfare, but it was probably the most significant
psychological factor. Likewise, the War of 1812 was a series of small skirmishes that
could occur in any place, which was more stressful than the small group of “decisive”
engagements. Even the most innovative military histories of the experience of war, such
as This Republic of Suffering by Drew Gilpin Faust, have been based upon the dated
stress research of David Grossman.31 The broader literature will be strengthened by
moving military histories on the experience of war away from the Grossman perspective
that exaggerates the emphasis on combat and killing towards the Sapolsky
neuroendocrine perspective that recognizes the deleterious effects of sustained stress.
Jonathan Shay is perhaps the most influential scholar on the experience of soldiers
in warfare from antiquity until the present. His books coined the term “moral injury” that
significantly altered the study of the experience of war. Shay differentiated the types of
killing typical in battle from those done immorally. Atrocity, the targeting of civilians,
and unconscientious leadership were more detrimental to soldier health than killing in
morally justified military situations.32 Systematically, petite guerre in the early nineteenth
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century was unlimited warfare that, by design, targeted civilians, discouraged tribal
fighters via brutality, and, in general, destroyed all public property. William Hull’s call
for a “War of Extermination,” the Raisin River Massacre, the burning of York, and the
partial destruction of Washington D.C. represent a war characterized by moral injury.
When Shay’s work on emotional trauma is understood alongside the general health
decline caused by persistent stress identified by Sapolsky, it becomes clear that the brutal
style of warfare on the North American frontier led to significantly high rates of
sickness.33
Out of western militaries, the Canadian Armed Forces have perhaps the best grasp
on the role that moral injury plays on observers of atrocity who do not personally act
immorally. Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire’s struggle with significant PTSD
occurred not because he committed atrocities. Instead, he suffered psychologically
because the United Nations did not supply forces adequate to stop the Rwandan
Genocide.34 In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the Canadian Armed
Forces have been employed almost universally in peacekeeping roles, yet they still have
struggled extensively with conflict-related mental illness. American prisoners who
directly observed brutality as prisoners produced far more emotional accounts than
descriptions of battles. Likewise, when the American commanders like William Henry
Harrison and Jacob Brown targeted grist mills, the resulting labor and hunger triggered
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significant emotional expressions from British and Canadian observers. Focusing on the
day-to-day small war experiences of soldiers reveals how much more significant the
unlimited approach to petite guerre tactics played on the minds and health of soldiers.
Most soldiers observed what we now call moral injuries directly, but all soldiers feared
brutality because it occurred without predictability.
In the 1980s, when the PTSD diagnosis became formally codified in the
American Psychological Association’s Diagnostics and Statistics Manual Version Four,
major weather events were also officially included as a catalyst for emotional disorder.
Weather brought real sickness in the form of stagnating pools of water, which produced
malaria-carrying insects.35 However, contemporary accounts in Africa reveal the
psychological influence of weather, as it pertains to rain and malaria. In his book What is
the What, Dave Eggers novelized the lived experience of an African refugee. Eggers
described how rain led to physical and psychological burdens for Liberian refugees. In
their emaciated state, the African refugees knew that rain brought dengue fever and,
therefore, brought on depression and hopelessness about the possibility of survival.
Again, unlike the mental predictability of a large battle, the weather was outside of each
soldier’s control and often led to life-threatening illnesses.36 Sapolsky’s descriptions of
recent shifts in stress research illustrate how soldier complaints about the weather were
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more significant psychologically than battle and killing because of the unpredictability
and complete lack of control early nineteenth-century armies had over the weather.
Despite the recent, but not current, overemphasis on singularly stressful events,
stress research was not born in the study of trauma; Hans Selye created the concept in the
study of the common additional health problems that most patients contracted when
admitted to hospitals. Selye recognized a clinical concept of stress by realizing that fear
generated by a hospitalization created a condition he called general adaptation
syndrome.37 Selye became the father of the idea of stress by first understanding
nonviolent day-to-day stressors, yet single incidents of violence became the most
represented source of emotional trauma. The elevation of singular battles in military
history fundamentally masks the realities of stress research, and, more importantly,
ignores soldier accounts that continually emphasize the challenges of camp life over
large-scale violence.
While the work of David Grossman On Killing is trendy and has captured the
broad imagination, it has also overemphasized the act of killing as the most challenging
feature of warfare.38 However, the social science of stress and violence is far more
oriented on the stress concept of persistent stress than singularly extreme events. Day-today understanding of soldier experiences in warfare is an approach to the experience of
war that is far more grounded in stress research then the typical decisive battles approach
to the War of 1812. Daily management is the best approach to understanding the way that
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human beings experienced the War of 1812 and how that shaped its outcome.
Additionally, the “new military history” is shifting the field of military history away from
campaigns and commanders into explorations of social and cultural factors, and this
dissertation’s emphasis on stress research can also strengthen military historiography.39
Another significant but problematic theory that has influenced scholarship on the
experience of warfare was the work of literary scholar Joseph Campbell. While
Campbell’s analysis of the hero’s journey through currently accepted social science
created a model for the work of Jonathan Shay and David Livingston Smith, Campbell’s
psychoanalytical analysis of the “The Hero’s Journey” was built on problematic Freudian
psychology.40 The uncritical elevation of Freudian psychoanalysis as the material neurobiological source of mythology relating to male warrior archetypes was far too grounded
in high-level intellectual theory. It is not difficult to reify the ideas of Freud in seemingly
convincing ways, but the analyses of heroes ignore the ground realities of common
soldiers. The evidence for a prescriptive universal soldier experience is certainly
available, but Campbell’s narrative ignores nuance. Likewise, the work inspired quite a
bit of less competent Freudian psychoanalytical history that has led to the idea that
psychological history is bad history that discourages work based on more sound social
science. Contemporary research, specifically surrounding the theme of psychological
resiliency, illustrates how people react to combat and trauma very differently.41 Moral
injuries, relating to unethical war crimes and genocide, are far more predictive of postconflict psychological problems than a universal heroic journey. From a social
39

Stephen Morillo, with Michael F. Pavkovic, What is Military History? (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 37.
Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
41
Salvator R. Maddi, “On Hardiness and other Pathways to Resilience,” American Psychologist 60, no. 3
(April 2005): 261-62.
40

20

perspective, Campbell’s analysis of heroes at the highest echelons of society is the
biggest problem because mythological heroes ignore most human experience. Campbell’s
influential work on heroes explores exceptional cases and ignores common experience.
The spiritual talisman of elite heroes that create success in battle and post-conflict
atonement is just as easily the result of class and racial privileges that are typically not
available for the ordinary soldiers. Additionally, soldier is becoming a term that applies
to more than male archetypes. The classic heroes approach ignores multiple gender
categories. Still, Campbell’s biologically materialist argument about mythology has
inspired the work of scholars using more sound social science.42 The work of Campbell
set a model for the work of Jonathan Shay and David Livingston Smith, and science is
always changing and developing new avenues for research. Campbell’s work on elite
archetypes through the social science of his era opens the way for a dissertation that
employs up-to-date trauma scholarship to inform our understanding of the daily
experience of ordinary soldiers.
From a historiographical perspective, this dissertation seeks to unite the
outstanding publications of award-winning early American scholars like Alan Taylor and
Nicole Eustace with the work of “new military historians” such as John Grenier and
David Preston. Taylor and Eustace’s books affect broader fields in early American
scholarship, while new military historians are modernizing the technical military
historical approach. However, these works usually do not correspond with one another
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and have made less impact on the operational understanding of warfare. For Grenier’s
The First Way of War, the War of 1812 represented a conflict in which active officers
discounted the contributions of rangers in the Northern theater. Grenier’s subsequent
work transitioned to leaders like Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison, who
better-employed ranger tactics and the militia, but discounted the role of regulars who
originally served in the militia. Grenier’s argument is useful because officers like James
Miller, Jacob Brown, and Eleazer Ripley may have technically been federal officers, but
they held commissions in the militia early in the war. Most successful officers held
federal rank but had militia experience. Grenier changed the way that early American
scholars understood warfare because he placed the principle of unlimited warfare, which
targeted civilians, front and center in small-scale conflicts. Also, Grenier did not sanitize
violence; he explored violence as something that produces racism rather than the notion
that racism engenders brutality.43
Building on a strong foundation of work on Native American warfare, David
Preston constructed an approach to the Battle of Monongahela in 1755 that explores the
battle from an environmental perspective. British officers wasted most of their logistical
resources because of the personal supplies of officers in the preservation of class division
and a fixation on heavy infantry wagons. General Edward Braddock’s army’s loss at
Monongahela occurred because of the mismanagement and harsh environment of North
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America.44 Braddock’s Defeat highlighted how poor management of the environment and
a reluctance to embrace light infantry petite guerre led to abject failures. A poor grasp of
the environment drove sickness due to poor logistics, and light infantry tactics emerged
as a force of foot soldiers more adept at using the environment to their advantage. When
grappling with Preston’s study and the work of other environmental historians such as
Elizabeth Fenn and J. R. McNeil, it is equally important to remember that the best
implementers of petite guerre tactics were also adept at using disease ecology to their
advantages.45 Winfield Scott, a veteran of the War of 1812, was celebrated as a military
genius for his victory in Mexico because his strategy was based significantly on the
disease ecology of yellow fever.46 He gained those insights on small wars as a junior
commander in Upper Canada. Likewise, Jeffrey Amherst’s exploitation of smallpox
blankets through decentralized authority and subordinate initiative coincided with his
formidable skill in moving British armies on the isolated North American frontier.47
Officers who were skilled in managing small wars tactics also excelled at manipulating
the health of their soldiers and the opponents.
Nicole Eustace’s recent monographs on the Revolution and War of 1812 illustrate
the role of emotion and national identity. Eustace explored patriotism through population
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expansion, manhood, civil society, and the destruction of Native Americans. Her
observations on crucial themes related to elite ideas about patriotism are especially
valuable.48 However, her attention to detail, such as the facial expressions of William
Hull during his surrender as argued in his court-martial, are often too removed from the
material realities. Brilliant revelations from an award-winning scholar do much to tell us
what elites thought and less about how that translated to the actions of soldiers and junior
officers. By exploring daily realities with an emphasis on the soldiers’ experience of the
environment, this dissertation will investigate how patriotism happened in the stomachs
of soldiers. Specifically, it investigates how the generous use of liquor increased combat
morale and motivation and how low food rations taxed the minds and bodies of soldiers
to such a degree that the purest love of country could not overcome. Patriotism was a
powerful idea, but it could also be defined by a warm belly – full of liquor – on the
Fourth of July.
Alan Taylor has changed the way scholars understand the war in fundamental
ways, specifically by introducing an environmental argument in his broad monograph on
the northern theatre of the War of 1812. His books also advance a tragic interpretation of
the war that is far closer to the harsh realities experienced daily by soldiers.49 In an article
exploring the problem that environmental historians have seldom embraced social
history, Taylor claims that he is a social historian interested in the environment. By
employing the borderlands approach emphasized at the University of Maine, with a
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closer study of day-to-day environmental experiences, this dissertation will take an
essential step in expanding Taylor’s work. Additionally, Taylor’s scholarship described
the Royal Navy’s use of African American slaves as supplements to marine raids in
Virginia. His book illustrates how the Southern Democratic-Republican strongholds that
supported war politically employed most of their soldiers in defending against slave
revolts.50 Because of the fear of slave revolts, the soldier who fought in the northern
theater came from the states most opposed to the war, and therefore soldiers and junior
officers were far more likely to speak honestly about the harsh realities of the war.
Taylor’s approach will be strengthened significantly with a dissertation that uses day-today specificity to support his shift away from celebratory interpretation.
The military history of the War of 1812, in many ways, exists in a separate realm
from other scholarly breakthroughs. There has been a fair amount of keeping pace with
military historical interpretations of organizational leadership and a shift toward
campaign analyses. The incorporation of social history is well underway, and there are
significant exceptions to the trend toward battle case studies. The best case is John
Grodzinski’s history of the 104th Regiment of Foot.51 His work’s attention to one
regiment illuminates the way that illness influenced the Maritime-recruited regiment, as
well as its skill in employing the tactics of petite guerre. Grodzinski’s excellent account
of the 104th is why building a dissertation on evidence from day-to-day records is so
necessary for the field. Grodzinski’s attention to lower-level regimental sources is
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exceptional, but comprehensive work covering all the regimental order books is needed
to understand the war from the bottom up.
The most troubling aspect of the War of 1812’s military histories relates to the
analysis of brutality. At the highest forums of military history, there is still a welldeveloped “he started it” debate about the burning of cities.52 Reciprocity was the
problem in the War of 1812, so continuing the cycle of blame in contemporary scholarly
publications without contextualizing the actions as morally questionable on both sides is
extremely problematic. In a presentation on his experiences in Vietnam, Tim O’Brien
described his frustration with the people in the village at My Lai. He described his desire
to take out his frustrations out on the local villagers there: “We did not turn our machine
guns on civilians.”53 Understanding the motivations of brutal reciprocity should not also
52
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justify. Any adequately parented toddler knows that one wrong does not justify
retribution. Even if the Raisin River Massacre predated the burning of York, which in
turn predated the burning of Washington, reciprocal brutality is still wrong. Today,
infantry platoon leaders know that they will be incarcerated by acting based on such
logic, and this kind of debate should not guide academic discourse.54 The reciprocity
itself was the cause of most of the brutality, so historical observers must help disengage
from the “who started it” debate. The concept of moral injury should not, as in many
studies on the subject, be overgeneralized because most soldiers feel the hatred of war,
understand the desire to lash out at prisoners or non-combatants, and suppress the
appetite for reciprocity.55 O’Brien’s frustration above with the My Lai massacre
becoming symbolic of the war resulted from his difficulty of overcoming the force of
desire to lash out against the population. The whitewash of the brutality of the War of
1812 as a form of retaliation is based on a flawed assumption that every veteran, soldier,
or militiamen had no moral compass because of the savagery of warfare. Open prejudice
of veterans as non-agents is unmistakable in fashionable society, and the irony of national
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myths of espousing peaceable republican virtue while condoning reciprocal violence
strengthens the idea.
Most of the works on the conflict have been operational military histories or battle
case studies. Donald Graves has made a career of works focused on highly nationalistic
operational military histories. His books celebrate the pre-Confederation military service
in ways that mirror significantly the American “Greatest Generation” approach to World
War II. His work is substantial and accurate but is a part of a long tradition of bugles and
trumpets battle narratives. It rejects new methodology and typically describes battles in
detail with little sense of the impact and the fact the most battles did not generate much in
the way of strategic importance.56 Graves still celebrates the glory of battlefield exploits,
and that is unique in the era of modern military history. However, he excels at technical
military history, uses extensive primary sources, and reaches a broad audience of readers.
His approach to narration is valuable, and “New Military” histories typically only reach
academic audiences. His approach to the readable battle narratives can be strengthened
significantly with studies that use newer approaches.57
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The group of military officers studying the War of 1812 have produced far more
rigorous work but have limitations based upon the process of historical studies and
officer development. Military historians trained in officer service schools typically focus
solely on the Military Decision-Making Process, and as such, concentrate strictly on
operational management.58 The Military Decision-Making Process is a high order process
trained through graduate-level coursework and executed primarily by professional
officers. Scholars from this point of view often overlook problems of day-to-day
management, junior officers, and soldiers. The analyses are above the company level, and
this dissertation seeks to explore the war from the lowest levels possible. Scholarship
focused on operational history is intellectual history, with more attention to big ideas than
material realities.
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The exception to this rule would be Canadian military officers because the strong
militia tradition in Canada is not antagonistic to the institutional culture of the Canadian
military. There has also been a rich tradition of rigorous historians in the ranks of the
Canadian Army. Colonel Ernest Cruikshank has been referred to as the master chronicler
of the war because of his editorial creation of exhaustive documents collections. The field
of study owes so much to Cruikshank regarding the available printed primary sources that
are now searchable, but his scholarship was impressive as well.59 His work in
counterinsurgency is still timely as he often celebrates leaders who shared tribal culture
and treated Native Peoples like equals and allies.60 Cruikshank even made that case to
American historians amid controversy relating to torture in the Philippines.
C. P. Stacy is an even more towering figure in the field of Canadian History in
general. As a veteran officer and historian, Stacy recognized the complexity and
persistence of national myths. He acknowledged the role that loss of Lake Erie played in
the failures of often-criticized Henry Procter. Stacy’s contemporary, Jay McKay
Hitsman, likewise explored the mythology of the Canadian militia.61 In many ways,
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scholars like Donald Graves are a regression toward more nationalistically romantic texts.
With some exceptions, combat veterans like Stacy do not typically romanticize
nationalism and conflict; the field would be strengthened significantly by writers with
firsthand combat experience and without the bias toward high order military operations
processes that are conventional in the writing of field grade officers. Cruikshank and
Hitsman, as well as Stacy, were all scholars ahead of their time, and returning to their
more critical view of nationalism based upon the practical realities of military service
will re-center the field while simultaneously contextualizing the War of 1812 within a
broader impulse toward “New Military History.” Like the works of veteran Canadian
historians, this dissertation seeks to take a veteran’s perspective to understand the conflict
better. Veterans’ viewpoints are too often dismissed by historians, even though personal
experience would be celebrated in other fields of academic study. Scholars acknowledge
literary authors like Tim O’Brien, Ernest Hemmingway, and Joseph Heller for their
truthful accounts of war, yet military veterans are considered too personally invested for
objective military history when they depart from classic operational history.62 The
perspective of a veteran junior officer with an academic historical approach is useful to
add depth to the more nationalistic and Military Decision Process grounded studies.
Celebratory nationalistic accounts ignore the sheer unreality of conflict for soldiers, and
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the manner in which nationalistic texts find the bright side is often dismissive of the
unrelentingly terrible daily experiences of soldiers in the War of 1812.
The last meaningful source of military history lies in the first-person accounts of
soldiers and military commanders that link this dissertation to a broader dialogue about
warfare. The first example is the campaign of William Slim in the China-Burma Theater
in World War II. After an embarrassing defeat, Slim recognized that the overreliance on
conventional tactics using standard roads was the key cause of Allied failure.63 A shift to
irregular jungle warfare tactics coincided with discipline concerning the health of
soldiers.64 In the first campaign, crowded roads hindered the logistics of Slim’s force, and
one of the key additions to traffic was the movement of sick and wounded soldiers.65
Slim faced the biggest problem with malaria; he recognized that these soldiers needed
rest closer to the front line in order to limit deaths in long marches to hospitals and
eliminate massive amounts of road traffic that hindered logistics. Slim also held battalion
commanders responsible for the hygiene of their soldiers by firing any leader that had a
rate of loss greater than five percent from malaria.66 Simple measures, like always
wearing full uniform in searing heat, were measures best controlled by commanders, and
lower rates of sickness improved combat effectiveness.
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The second experience is less about the management of sickness and more about
the role of environment on strategy in petite guerre conflict. Basil Liddel Hart considered
T. E. Lawrence to be among the greatest thinkers in military history.67 The campaign of
T.E. Lawrence as an advisor of Arab Bedouins may seem extremely remote from the War
of 1812, but his philosophy of irregular war is one of the most influential ideas for this
dissertation. In a professional article titled “The Evolution of a Revolt,” Lawrence
described his strategy in terms of mathematics.68 Lawrence described war with three
elements: “one algebraical, one biological, a third psychological.”69 Lawrence understood
war as an extension of metabolism, and he developed a strategy that purposefully gave
his Turkish opponents more terrain then they could control. For Lawrence, planning
natural limitations was based on the principle that was “biological, the breaking point,
life, and death, or better, wear and tear.”70 His philosophy broke war down to the lowest
level of energy management and production. Because Lawrence fought in a remote
desert, he recognized that camels metabolized energy better than motorized vehicles.
Thus he designed a strategy around efficiency. For Lawrence, the use of camels was
frugal and based upon the Bedouin lifestyle. He explained, “We used the smallest force,
in the quickest times, at the farthest place.”71 While sickness was not a key struggle for
Lawrence, his strategy was the most characterized by an understanding of his
environment. When he traded the traditional measure of military success, terrain gained,
for a more feasible metabolic strategy, he represented a genius for warfare in frontier or

67

Basil Liddell Hart, Colonel Lawrence, the Man Behind the Legend (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934).
T. E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1990).
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS68452.
69
Ibid., 7.
70
Ibid., 8-9.
71
Ibid., 15.
68

33

wilderness environments. The quote that best illustrates Lawrence’s understanding of the
human environmental experience of war follows: “The invention of bully-beef has
modified land-war more profoundly than the invention of gunpowder.”72 Lawrence’s
embrace of the metabolic and biological realities of the human body grasped essential
aspects of irregular war, and his strategy of frugality of effort informs any military
environmental analysis. In Lawrence’s case, strategy focused on metabolism did not
necessarily affect soldier health but was the most important path to victory, yet those two
things are nested significantly.
The campaigns of Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman are also useful to
understand the theme of war and the environment in the United States. While War Upon
the Land is a compelling environmental history of the American Civil War, it is also
important to consider the philosophy that created Grant and Sherman’s targeting of the
agro-ecological system of the Confederacy.73 Grant worked directly with War of 1812
veterans during his service in Mexico; he believed that Winfield Scott was the finest
specimen of manhood he had ever encountered.74 In contrast, he directly observed the
informal frontier dress and strategy of Zachary Taylor.75 Taylor praised Grant for his
sharing of hard labor during a harrowing river crossing, and Grant developed a highly
rustic, environmentally pragmatic leadership style. Serving as the quartermaster of the 4th
Infantry Regiment, Grant also worked directly with Thomas Sidney Jesup, whose reforms
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of the Quartermaster Corps came as a result of failures in the War of 1812.76 Sherman
had served as a Lieutenant under the command of Zachary Taylor in the Second
Seminole War.77 However, because Taylor’s predecessor Thomas Sidney Jesup
developed a decentralized strategy, Sherman was responsible for his isolated outpost.
Grant and Sherman’s early development in terms of frontier warfare, under the leadership
of War of 1812 leaders, recognized and grappled with the environmental challenges of
warfare in North America.
It is very important to understand that Grant and Sherman’s use of tactics to
destroy the environment of the American South occurred in a significant progression.
Grant and Sherman first fought conventionally in the western theatre of the Civil War.
While the western campaign occurred in a less developed environment, the Union Army
still employed conventional strategy at the outset. Grant won acclaim at Fort Donelson by
defeating larger entrenched opponents through bold offensive and coordinated naval and
ground artillery. The both served under Winfield Scott’s command, and after the War of
1812 they saw military action in Mexico and the Seminole Wars in Florida. Sherman
fought with the Army of the Potomac and viewed taking supplies from civilians as
unprofessional brutality until the Valley Campaign of Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson.
Sherman moved to the Western Army with Grant; they both changed their perspectives
after the Battle of Shiloh.78 In that encounter they saw the resolve of Southerners and
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called for a peoples’ war that could not differentiate threats from military and civilian
alike. Sherman described the transition toward a more “Indian” style of war. Both were
employing what John Grenier called The First Way of War, only against white opponents.
Grant and Sherman’s tactics did not exist in a vacuum, and they were developed and
employed directly under War of 1812 officers with hard-earned experience.
Another U.S. military leader who excelled at petite guerre and management of
soldier health was the two-time Medal of Honor winner Major General Smedley Butler.
During the neocolonial period, Butler fought in nearly every conflict where U.S. troops
were engaged. Unlike many iconic military leaders, his nom de guerre, “Old Gimlet
Eye,” referred to jaundice from his repeated bouts of malarial fever.79 His experience
with warfare in tropical environments translated into managing a staging camp for U.S.
soldiers during the First World War. Smedley Butler worked mightily to improve the
health and fitness of his soldiers. First, he raided supply warehouses to eliminate the mud
that was causing sickness in his camp.80 Butler also doubled rations and used patriotic
music to improve morale. In fact, because of his increase in available food, Butler “ran
one-million dollars over his ration allowance.”81 Butler was nearly punished for
overspending. However, his commander advocated for him because the rate of sickness
in the camp dropped dramatically. Butler was denied more direct combat experience in
World War I because he indispensibly improved the health and morale of U.S. soldiers
who arrived at a staging camp in France. He received the Army Distinguished Service
medal because his hygenic reforms significantly improved the health of soldiers
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throughout the theatre. A lifetime of experience fighting in wilderness environments
provided extensive experience on the hygenic requirements of soldiers and marines.
Without a post-military career in socialist politics, Smedley Butler would rank in the
forefront of celebrated American military heroes, but he achieved much more by keeping
his Marines healthy than he did with combat heroics.
Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, is perhaps the best example of a leader
that managed sickness and logistics exceptionally during the Napoleonic Wars. Wellesley
began his career in the remote frontier in India, where the isolated environment was
challenging, but inexpensive labor mitigated those challenges.82 In Portugal and Spain,
the British Army struggled significantly with contracted logistics provided by civilian
merchants, and Wellesley made one of his most capable generals his Quartermaster
General.83 In the Peninsular War, Wellesley was known widely for always winning in the
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defensive. Wellesley never outstretched his difficult supply lines, and local allies
supported the British Army with the constant harassment of the French lines of
communication and supply. Wellesley’s tactics relied on a core of well-drilled British
regiments holding the line, with black-coated riflemen serving as skirmishers to limit the
effectiveness of French assaults. Wellesley mastered the combination of skilled and
professional formations assisted by units that excelled in petite guerre, and Butler
matched his efficiency in battle with his capacity as a logistician that kept his troops
healthy and well-fed.
This dissertation employs five case studies that use American, Canadian, and
British sources; two are narrative and three are oriented around topics. One chapter
explores the British 104th Regiment of Foot, while a second concentrates on a company in
the U.S. 21st Infantry Regiment. A third analyzes the public health innovations of the
U.S. commanders who gained experience as frontier militia leaders before being elevated
to generals in the federal army. Two case studies employ a theme-based transnational
approach, the first focusing on the use of alcohol as medicine and the second focusing on
logistics and malnutrition. While this dissertation explores sources from the entire
conflict, most of the chapters focus on the campaign of 1814. Documentary records are
more complete in 1814, the year with the largest volume of soldiers and fighting, and the
period with numerous commanders who were skilled at managing the daily heath of their
soldiers. American commanders before 1814 won few victories, and it is important to
understand that even the limited success gained in 1814 would have been impossible
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without the reform led by officers with high rates of experience fighting in the frontier.
These case studies argue the methodological value of focusing on the daily management
of health. This dissertation maintains that the largest challenge in the conflict was not
battle; rather, it was managing the environment and the health of soldiers. There are cases
where military units won battles but gained nothing because of the environmental
challenges of the War of 1812. Additionally, there is a striking correlation between
commanders who won on the battlefield and their efforts to halt sickness. Military
leadership in battle is often privileged over the challenges of daily morale, rations,
cleanliness, and compassion. Nonetheless, the unromantic elements of war remain the
most important, just as they were during the War of 1812.
From a more explicit methodological perspective, this dissertation employs a
wider array of sources than typically found in the classic historiography of the War of
1812. It combines the correspondence of officers – which is common in operational
military history – with the diaries, courts-martial, and order books that are often used in
social history. As a work within the wider theme of the “experience of war,” this
dissertation is unique for its more explicit connection between soldier experience and
operation and strategic outcomes. The merger of social and operational military historical
approaches is sorely needed in the field of military history. The large volume of bottomup sources in this dissertation is not separate from questions of the broader results;
situating the experience of soldiers within operational outcomes is pivotal in gaining a
more holistic and comprehensive understanding of the War of 1812. Multi-disciplinary
approaches to the social science of violence, environmental history, and “New Military
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History” are combined with source work that employs the types of documents that are
common in both operational and social military history.
The first body chapter, “Managing the Sick List,” focuses solely on U.S. Army
records relating to managing the health of soldiers. It explores how the most successful
U.S. Army officers developed first as militia officers in frontier regions. A focus on
military professionalism with clear delineation of militia and regular status overlooks the
way that combat experience before the War of 1812 occurred in isolated frontier regions.
With combat experience on the frontier, commanders developed skills in managing the
heath of their soldiers. Leaders with frontier experience developed hygienic measures
such as management of human and food waste, the removal of stagnant pools of water,
and quarantine measures. “Filth trenches” rarely make history, but efforts to preserve the
numbers of fit-for-duty soldiers were fundamental to the success of operations in the
Canadian frontier. Officers like James Miller, William Henry Harrison, and Jacob Brown
all began their careers as frontier militia officers, and there is a key correlation between
officers who excelled at public health measures and those who succeeded on the
battlefield. The relationship between frontier public health measures and successful petite
guerre tactics was significant because leaders gained environmental knowledge through
experience. An additional measure that was important to the success of commanders on
both sides was the use and control of alcohol to manage morale.
The next chapter, “The War for Calories,” explores the campaign of 1814 based
upon an understanding of food and logistics. Armies that won battles could not gain
strategic results because the environment in the Upper Canadian frontier made it
impossible to provide sustenance for soldiers. The Americans in 1814 reformed their
40

army and won every major battle, but a contract logistics system with no accountability
made it impossible to continue their invasion of Canada. The British Army, on the other
hand, was at its largest size in 1814 with significant reinforcements following the British
victory in the Peninsular Campaign. Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond accepted the
weakness of his command on an isolated frontier, and he elected to minimize his forces
on the frontier to create a realistic logistics plan. The British innovation on the frontier
created strategic gains in tactical defeats, yet commanders abandoned their gains due to
an institutional fixation on the purchase system in Crimea. Significantly, American
officers from the 1814 campaign reformed the military’s logistics system; this led to
more professionalization and facilitated the mass mobilization of the U.S. Civil War later
in the century.
“Liquor and Soldier Motivation,” the following chapter, focuses solely on the use
of alcohol to manage the morale of soldiers. Alcohol was employed to control combat
and sustain soldier motivation; indeed, it served as a measure of military professionalism.
The typical half-pint daily ration of whiskey or rum was used to fortify the bodies of
soldiers in a harsh environment and to maintain the sustained motivation needed to
manage the drudgery of military campaigning. Before engagements, the ration was
typically a pint of spirits for each soldier. Given that musket fire was inaccurate and
much of the fighting in the War of 1812 was hand to hand, intoxication was not as
inhibiting as it is in modern combat. While soldiers were supplied with enough alcohol to
be constantly intoxicated, they were not allowed to share alcohol or purchase alcohol
locally, because officers sought to control drunkenness. Importantly, alcohol was the
medicine of morale but served as an important insulator from actual medical treatment.
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The fact that military units were full of soldiers that were essentially functional alcoholics
was problematic, but that was not as challenging as the prospect of troops being treated
by physicians who only offered opioids and purgatives that did more harm than good.
The War of 1812 did not have perfect solutions; rather, commanders and soldiers sought
the least bad options. Alcohol represented an imperfect way to manage soldier morale
that was better than any other alternatives. Lastly, the chapter explores the way that
alcohol was used to solidify similarities of white soldiers on both sides but differences
with Native American combatants. Native Americans consumed alcohol in much the
same way that white soldiers did, but the ubiquitous fear of drunken Native Americans
perpetuated racialized ideas regarding the animal nature of North American indigenous
peoples. Alcohol also served as a supplement to calorie loss on a frontier that posed
significant logistical challenges.
Through a series of events and controversies, Captain Joseph Treat led the most
well-documented U.S. infantry company in the War of 1812. Treat’s experiences are the
subject of the next chapter that explores “War at the Company Level.” This unit provides
the focus of the third chapter. What is most interesting in his records is how traditional
combat leadership in battle was considered a reward for the daily suffering in camp. Treat
fought in the 21st Infantry Regiment for most of the War of 1812, yet he was denied
command of his company at the battles of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane because of
lackluster performance in picket duties. Treat suffered sickness and still joined his
regiment but was denied service in his company’s most significant victories. Remarkably,
Treat and his peer company commanders maintained the most thorough fit-for-duty
rosters and ration records in the U.S. Army during the war. The records from the 21st
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infantry connect the highest rates of illness to low rations of food and liquor, and petite
guerre actions.
The last body chapter, “Wasted Opportunities and the 104th Regiment of Foot,” is
a case study of the only British Regiment of Foot recruited in North America during the
War of 1812. This dissertation argues that British military leaders managed the health of
soldiers better than their American counterparts in most instances. However, the
relegation of the New Brunswick-raised 104th Regiment of Foot to garrison duties
illustrates how the hierarchical structure of the British Army failed to utilize the fittest
regiment for the environment of Upper Canada for most of the conflict. The 104th
Regiment of Foot was raised from the New Brunswick Fencibles, and, as from its
beginnings, it excelled at the light infantry tactics most applicable to the War of 1812.
However, in its transition from Fencible to British Regiment of Foot, the 104th was filled
with officers who could purchase commissions but who were too ill for active service.
Minus one small detachment, the 104th remained in the Maritime provinces in garrison
duties until 1814. When it was mobilized, the 104th excelled in the light infantry role of a
flank company. In a war where a couple of small British regiments carried the balance of
the fighting for two years, the 104th Regiment of Foot sat idle in garrison until 1814. In
that year the British Army was at its zenith in North America, following Wellington’s
victories in Spain and Portugal. The 104th Regiment of Foot was, therefore, a wasted
opportunity and is best compared to “foreign” Swiss regiments. The Swiss-raised
regiments were filled with Swiss German officers and with soldiers who hailed from
many locations in Europe, primarily Spain and Portugal. The Canadian-raised regiment
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may have been a British regiment in name, but its marginal provincial status kept it out of
the fighting for most of the War of 1812.
Human beings do not construct monuments to the daily grind like they do to
heroes on battlefields. As the concluding chapter maintains, battle-focused approaches to
combat and military history will never grasp the challenges that soldiers face each day.
The relentless challenges of staying fed, clean and healthy, however, played significant
roles on the outcomes of battles. A focus on the daily experience of soldiers is not just an
exercise in social history; it is essential to understanding operational history as well. The
best military commanders know that keeping soldiers fit-for-duty is the most significant
aspect of leadership, yet the routine efforts to keep soldiers healthy go largely
unremembered. The fact that combat and battlefield victories generate more compelling
stories that reach wider audiences does not make campaigns and commanders’ tactics
more significant to the results of operational history. Officers and soldiers who took
charge of their health and morale performed better both in combat and in the daily effort
required to stay fit-for-duty. The public health decisions of commanders were more far
consequential than the noble efforts of medical professionals. Moreover, effective public
health and logistical policies created the more lasting outcomes, independent of victories
and losses in pitched battle. The unglamorous management of the harsh experiences that
soldiers faced in the camp and on the march crucially shaped the War of 1812’s outcome.
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CHAPTER 1
MANAGING THE SICK LIST
“This little army, worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds and deaths”1

It is first essential to identify what soldiers and commanders did to stay
healthy and keep them on the fit-for-duty roster. While environmental sickness is
undeniable, the actions of leaders mattered, and the best leaders gained experience
with service in the frontier militia. Alan Taylor’s two recent books on the War of
1812 were the first major accounts of the war that emphasize the role of the
environment and sickness on the outcome of the conflict.2 Taylor unequivocally
stated that he is a social historian with sensitivities to environmental history, so he has
only begun a process of environmental interpretation of the War of 1812. Taylor’s
books described how the climate of Upper Canada, specifically the narrow fighting
season and high rates of malaria, prevented the U.S. Army’s ability to occupy Upper
Canada. His approach, while not entirely environmentally determinate, ignores how
the British implemented major institutional changes to absorb invalids, and how much
easier it was for Canadian militiamen to convalesce at home. Also, Taylor’s valuable
shift towards environmental attention did not fully grapple with how the most
successful American commanders, such as Winfield Scott, Duncan McArthur,
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William Henry Harrison, and Jacob Brown, implemented hygienic policies that
safeguarded the health of the men under their command. Sickness was central to the
outcome of the war. However, individuals were often able to overcome their illness,
and successful officers often managed illness with forward-thinking public health
safeguards. Discipline and cleanliness were synonymous, and serviceable uniforms
were fundamental to preventing disease-carrying mosquito bites.
From social scientific and conceptual historiographical perspectives, the
adaptive frontier officers confirm the ideas of psychologist Salvatore Maddi and
historian Kathryn Meier. Maddi’s work on “hardiness” has evolved into the concept
of resilience; “hardiness” and an individual’s sense of control of his health played a
significant result in a positive health outcome.3 Likewise, Meier focuses on “selfcare” where soldiers took charge of their health through occasionally straggling to
secure rest, better food, and hygienic bathing. Too often, historians interpret the
experience of war by soldiers as solely pernicious, and soldiers lose agency. In the
study of veterans’ experiences, Tim O’Brien has been outspoken about the problem
of the “old and terrible lie” in which any effort to find a moral story in an individual’s
struggle in war continually fed into romantic notions of combat.4 While romantic
accounts can be uncritical and problematic, most soldiers overcome the harsh
physical and psychological cost of conflict. The work of Maddi and Meier contradict
O’Brien’s claim that true war stories never have a moral lesson because most veterans
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survive and adapt to their situations.5 The memoir of E. B. Sledge, With the Old
Breed, concluded that he would not end his story with a romantic description of the
beauty of the South Pacific. He noted instead that war was a waste of human beings,
land, and society, yet democracy could not survive without a willingness for service
in combat.6 Sledge’s perspective on the wastage and value of military service in a
democracy offers valuable insight beyond World War II. The health situation in the
War of 1812 was, in many ways, hopeless and largely influenced by forces outside
the control of commanders. The commanders that chose to accept responsibility and
exert control over health and the environment outperformed their peers, however,
thereby confirming the work of Salvatore Maddi long before the development of
professional psychology.
Through the exploration of three themes, it will become clear that the
management of sick soldiers was central to success in the War of 1812. The three
themes are so significantly intertwined that a chronological narrative will be the best
approach to this chapter. The first theme that emerges is how soldiers linked honor to
service while ill or injured. Officers gained accolades and reputation by serving
despite wounds and illness. To date, scholars have linked honor to duels and poor
professionalism in the American Army, but just as often honor encouraged officers to
serve while injured or sick.7 The second theme emerges from regimental level
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hygiene and health policies. Military histories to date have primarily ignored hygienic
procedures, save for criticism of the lack of professionalism of the U.S. Army. The
most overarching theme in the literature is the ways that frontier militia leaders were
far better at managing and taking responsibility of the health of soldiers, and therefore
the militia rather than the regular Army had the best public health policies.
In most cases, scholars connect all professionalism to the reforms of regular
officers like Winfield Scott. However, Scott was an outlier, and frontier militia
officers more often advocated these policies after they received federal acceptance of
their rank. Most generals in the War of 1812 gained a reputation in the militia and
then were made regular officers later. The final sections explore how the culture of
honor and privation merged with the Revolutionary tradition. The British system of
logistics outpaced the fledgling U.S. system, and as such, prevented a significant
number of desertions, as well as freeing up healthy soldiers for combat duties.
Officers who excelled at managing sickness were also effective in managing morale
because the combat motivation and health management were one-in-the-same. Honor
has been used to criticize the U.S. Army, militia, and volunteers when it was a
significant factor in transcending disabilities to fight. And this dynamic occurred on
both sides of the conflict. In Salvadore Maddi’s language, hardiness is impressive but
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suffering for its own sake reflects poor leadership and strategy. Militia officers with
forward-thinking health policies were the only American commanders to achieve
success, so any study of health management calls to questions criticism of citizen
soldiers.
General William Hull’s surrender of Fort Detroit ranks as one of the most
embarrassing defeats in U.S. military history. Historians such as Stephen Rauch and
Alec Gilpin have defended Hull because of high rates of illness inside his army.8
Rauch and Gilpin support Hull’s justification of his surrender because “This little
army, [was] worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds and deaths.”9 However,
this argument problematically views illness as a static concept. They argued that
soldiers were either sick or healthy, and that the sick could not serve in combat.
Gilpin and Rauch’s arguments are significantly contradicted by what Hull’s officers
and soldiers believed that about fighting while ill or injured in the most dramatic
moment of Hull's court-martial, he questioned Brigadier General James Miller about
his unit’s fitness. After a battle to restore Hull’s supply lines, a storm battered
Miller’s regiment and most of his force became ill. When asked if, despite his
sickness, he should have returned to Fort Detroit, Miller stated: “Neither myself nor
men were in as good a situation as we [could have] been in; but we were able to
proceed, and should have proceeded, if we were not ordered back.”10 The memoir of
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an Ohio militiaman supported Miller’s testimony. According to the author, “The
wounded leaped at the idea that they would soon have an opportunity of avenging
their wrongs, and besought the surgeons to report them fit for duty.”11 A key
motivation for soldiers was the identity and status they gained through suffering and
succeeding. The surrender denied the soldiers and men the honor of fighting while
sick, and Hull denied them the opportunity to demonstrate their hardiness. Hull used
sickness like a fixed concept and therefore overlooked incidents when sick soldiers
fought off major attacks – especially inside of fortifications.
During Hull’s court-martial no one failed to recognize that many in the fort
were sick, yet he was still publicly shamed and identified as a coward because of his
surrender. Hull asked a direct question about cowardice and his surrender of Fort
Detroit. With little hesitation, James Miller stated, “Yes! Such an immediate
surrender I think was an indication of a want of courage.”12 No one disagreed with
Hull, because testimony confirmed that ill soldiers filled Fort Detroit. However, his
surrender was unjustified because ill soldiers often defended fortifications in the war.
His daughter later observed the following:
All outward disgrace seemed to have fallen upon his head, yet all were borne
with cheerful equanimity. A soldier, he had been branded as a coward; a
patriot, he was esteemed a traitor; loving the approbation of his fellow men,
he was an object of universal censure; naturally fond of public life, and
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ambitious of public usefulness, he was under a sentence of irrevocable
ostracism.13

James Miller became a lifelong invalid because of the ague, most likely malaria,
which he contracted before Tippecanoe. He fought at Brownstown, Chippewa,
Bridgewater, and Fort Erie. Miller was initially a New Hampshire militia officer, who
excelled at managing health on the frontier. According to Adam Walker, “Every
precaution possible by the humane and generous Col. Miller to preserve the health of
the regiment; himself waded the river, as well as every officer; in many instances
performing the duties of the common soldier.”14 His example, combined with
generous rations of spirits, ensured high morale and combat effectiveness in the 4th
Infantry Regiment.15 Miller, unlike Hull, recognized that morale and health were
linked and there was no more competent officer under fire in the regular army.16
The defense of Fort Harrison from an assault by Native Americans could not
have better represented the expectations made by soldiers and commanders. Zachary
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Taylor’s defense of an isolated and heavily outnumbered Fort Harrison, with a large
party of non-combatants, was remarkably like Hull’s surrender at Detroit. Taylor
claimed that “indeed there were not more than 10 or 15 men able to do a great deal,
the others being sick, or convalescent, and to add to our misfortunes, two of the
stoutest men in the fort, and that I had every confidence in, jumped the picket and left
us.”17 Captain Zachary Taylor, who would later command a larger force in Mexico
and become the President of the United States, stated that he did not feel capable of
defending the fort. Before the siege Taylor was unable to post guard due to the
“unhealthiness of the company,” nor was he able to see to his duties at night because
he “had just recovered from a severe attack of the fever.”18 Native Americans pierced
Taylor’s perimeter and set fire to a blockhouse. The camp was filled with the screams
of the attackers and frightened civilians. Taylor’s “men were very slow in executing
[his] orders,” because of “debility.”19 He managed to maintain his “presence of mind”
and rally the weakened soldiers to use the damaged building as a temporary breast
work.20 Taylor, with no initial hope of success, refused to surrender and allowed his
volunteer soldiers to demonstrate their honor. In his words, “never did men act with
more firmness or desperation.”21 The contemporary language regarding firmness or
infirmity illustrates the individual differences between an individual’s recovery, in
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remarkable similarity to current definitions of hardiness and resilience. The militia
was a significant force on the frontier, and leaders understood that the will and honor
of soldiers could be employed to counteract infirmity.
Colonel Solomon Rensselaer presided over the initial assault across the
Niagara River at the Battle of Queenston Heights and, unlike Hull, he would fail in
the right way. During the period before the battle Rensselaer, like many other
soldiers, described the necessity of working while “suffering under the effects of a
fever.”22 Major Morrison was one of the few officers willing to lead troops across the
Niagara. However, Morrison “suddenly found himself taken too unwell for the
duty.”23 Rensselaer continued to lead while wounded until he succumbed to blood
loss. He described his experience as follows: “Finding myself very much crippled
now, by a number of wounds, and by the loss of blood unable to proceed.”24 As a
Federalist politician Rensselaer sense of honor was based largely in the political
feuding criticized by Joanna Freeman, but honor was not just about duels.25 Honor
caused problems, but it also pushed officers to fight when wounded and ill. And while
Queenston was not a victory, Rensselaer preserved his reputation because he
continued to serve while sick and injured. Failing the right way meant that officers
fought until they could no longer stand, and even in defeat, officers knew that their
honor would have to survive scrutiny. War itself is never ideal, so maximizing the
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positive role of honor, within certain shortcomings, was necessary to inspire soldiers
and officers to acts of courage despite their poor health.
William Henry Harrison grasped the relationship between the frontier and
illness. Until the United States controlled Lake Erie, Harrison’s troops would suffer.
But by retaining Northern Ohio garrisons, the Northwest Army would be able to
exploit a U.S. naval victory. Harrison wrote:
I hope that the period will soon arrive when we shall transfer the Labouring
oar to the enemy, and oblige him to encounter some of the difficulties of
labours and difficulties which we have undergone in waging a defensive
warfare, and protecting our extensive frontier (sic).26

The campaign in the Old Northwest was plagued with sickness, suffering, and
fatigue. United States operations were limited in the winter but did not stop. Ohio
Militia operating out of Fort Harrison went on an offensive to destroy the Prophet’s
town and conducted several petite guerre style ambushes.27 Like at Detroit and
Queenston the weather became a hindrance, rains created swollen rivers, and a brutal
winter storm slowed their march. Despite leaving Fort Harrison with soldiers “all
unfit for duty,” the offensive was successful. Samuel Hopkins praised his men who
had covered over 100 miles “with a naked army of infantry aided only by about fifty
rangers, and spies: all of this done in twenty days – no sigh, no murmur, no
complaint.”28 The militia on the frontier often not only held its own with regulars;
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instead, it outperformed regulars principally by its ability to function while ill,
without supplies, and exposed to terrible weather. Service on the American frontier
gave officers like Harrison the right experiences to command in Upper Canada.
Soldiers at the lower echelons of command were also aware of the inadequate
supply problems and their influence on health. Kentucky militiaman William
Atherton’s Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the North-Western Army Under
General Winchester grasped the problems of frontier supplies as well as leaders like
Harrison. He consistently complained of being forced to eat unsalted meats because
“the roads were almost impassable.”29 The great effort to bring supplies meant that
soldiers were on reduced rations from September until December, and when the men
could secure beef they were “entirely without salt, which has been much against the
health of the men.”30 Atherton observed, ”Butchers got to a beef and kill it, when
lying down and could not get out of the way. This kind of beef, and hickory roots,
was our principal subsistence for a length of time.”31 Because of the lack of salt, the
soldiers had to slaughter cows without being able to preserve the meat, and soldiers
like Atherton believed that fresh meat was less healthy than salted meets. The danger
of Native American assaults also exacerbated the lack of food supplies during the
collecting of local foodstuff. Atherton observed that “Shortly after Our arrival at Fort
Defiance, five of our men who had been gathering plums, were found scalped.”32
After the salt supplies ran out, the soldiers could hunt and eat fresh meat, but the
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squirrel population quickly diminished.33 By December the men were eating pork
without salt, and Atherton noted that ”Many of the men were sick and that sickliness
occasioned by being compelled to eat fresh pork without bread and salt, and from
being exposed to cold and wet.”34 Poor roads led to low supplies, and when soldiers
secured fresh meat, their health declined. Both sides influenced the health of their
enemies through petite guerre tactics that cut off supplies, impaired communication,
and made subsistence very dangerous. Nonetheless, Atherton’s account of suffering
was something he discussed with pride because of its connection with the traditions
of the Revolutionary Army.
What made Atherton especially interesting was that he, unlike many
historians, did not blame his leadership. For Atherton, “It seemed that the very
elements fought against us.”35 He was also proud to have suffered for his country.
Forced to retreat because of low supplies from Camp Three to the camp on Raisin
River, Winchester’s Army’s suffering exceeded Atherton’s power of description: “To
give a detailed account of individual suffering during this march, from camp No. 3 to
the Rapids, would swell this sketch beyond its intended limits.”36 Still, Atherton was
proud of the sufferings he experienced in serving his country. He described how “the
reader can form but little idea unless he had been on the spot, and seen and felt what
we saw and felt.”37
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Atherton’s suffering separated him from non-veterans while connecting his
force to the Revolutionary Army. Even when provided the information, nonveterans
would not comprehend the suffering: “Perhaps facts would be related which the
present generation, who has but little knowledge of things only from report, would
scarcely believe.”38 In the early portions of Atherton’s memoir, the enemy was a
scarce actor, and his sufferings against nature was a badge of honor that he displayed
by language that separated himself from his readers. It is no wonder that because he
was a prisoner after the Raisin River Massacre his determination to continue while
wounded saved him from the tomahawk. Atherton was wounded and marched by his
captors “starving and sick, but he kept on as fast and as far as he could, and when he
could go no farther he laid upon the ground and told them to kill him…but when they
saw his resolution they became attached to him.”39 To still be on his feet, slogging
through snow, after four months of eating unsalted meat, was an achievement that
Atherton used to define his character because to overcome fatigue and illness was the
best example of his virtue. His resolution was not only the best example of his
character; it also saved his life. Soldiers could not control the weather, or whether
they lived or died, but they could control their response to adverse conditions.
Alexander Smythe was a regular army commander who took over the Niagara
region during the winter of 1812-13. Smythe favored regular units while recognizing
that professional soldiers had more significant problems with illness. The summer
campaign season meant that all active service occurred at a heightened risk of
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malaria, while in the winter contagious illness proliferated in cramped winter
quarters. While laboring outdoors in the summer weakened Rensselaer’s force in
Niagara through mosquito-carried illness, Smyth’s soldiers succumbed to “measles
and other diseases” because “they were now in tents, in the month of December.”40
His orders were to invade Canada with 3,000 troops, but illness prevented an
effective marshaling of forces. He was only able to assemble 1,500 troops, and his
intelligence sources indicated that the British issued 2,314 rations to frontier troops.41
Most significant to Smyth was the fact that he “saw that the number of regular troops
was declining rapidly. I knew that on them chiefly I was to depend.”42 Some of the
advantages of the militia were demographic rather than experiential. Typically, militia
units were composed of soldiers drawn from the same region they fought in.43
Therefore, the composition of militia units better prepared them for the environmental
caused illnesses as well as infectious diseases from proximity in camps.44 Smyth
noted that in both instances when he gathered forces for the ordered invasion that “the
regular troops were men in bad health, who could not have stood one day’s march.”45
Still, Smyth recorded that by the industry of officers that the sick men were willing

40

Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters,103.
41
Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, 104.
42
Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, 103.
43
Militia soldiers were also drawn from the same communities and would have already have a
developed immune relationship helping with common communicable camp diseases.
44
Also important was the role of friendship and lifelong connections on the health of militia soldiers.
John Resch has argued that militia soldiers fared much better after the Revolution because their
maintained their connections with their community. Having friends and family to care for militia on
campaign was also a significant factor in their better performance regarding hardiness. See John Resch,
Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early
Republic (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999).
45
Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters,103.

58

even if the officers ultimately decided that an invasion would be folly. Illness was the
chief force that prevented a winter invasion of Canada, and one of Smythe’s chief
problems was an unwillingness to rely on militia units that demography and
experience on the frontier made healthier. The regular units recruited from diverse
locations were far more susceptible to illness.46
At Fort Meigs in northern Ohio, the 19th Infantry Regiment was struggling
with illness at the height of the summer of 1813. At the beginning of July, the post
commander’s adjutant Captain Chums reported eight sick privates with no sick
officers or leaders.47 As the season progressed, illness doubled. A list dated on 31
July 1813 cited one Lieutenant, two Sergeants, one Corporal and twenty Privates on
the sick list.48 General Green Clay commanded the post and was incapacitated,
forcing subordinates to take charge. Like Zachary Taylor, Green Clay was a leader in
the Kentucky Militia, and he was also Revolutionary War veteran. Clay was ill during
a siege, but unlike Taylor, sickness incapacitated Clay. Clay recognized that
subordinates would have to rise to the challenge, stating “the Genl (sic) feels that he
will receive & support of the officers which his ill health may require.”49 The siege
occurred on 11 July, and increased sickness represents both the duration of the
inclement season as well as the influence that siege warfare had on an isolated
garrison. Authors like John Grenier have claimed that The First Way of War evolved
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from experiences with Native Americans, but the War of 1812 illustrates the
continuation of European siege warfare in much smaller scale battles at remote
posts.50 Sieges almost always resulted in high rates of sickness.
Fort Meigs was in danger based on high rates of sickness and injuries, yet
soldiers and officers still chose to fight. Clay, despite his illness, described surrender
as a massacre and to fight as honorable. On 24 July, when sickness rates were
increasing, Clay stated that “to fight is to conquer, to abandon posts is to suffer
disgrace in the most shocking Massacre.”51 Although the British were in Malden,
their control of the lakes meant that “a few hours of fair wind” could bring a British
attacking force to Meigs.52 Despite significant cases of illness in the fort, including
his own, Clay allowed his army to fight and offered them nothing but praise for their
honor and firmness. Clay described his army as follows:
The (G)eneral witnessed an animated zeal in all to discharge their duty if any
testimony were wanted in favor of the soldier like feelings which
persuaded…the wounded and the sick, both officers and men throwing aside
their crutches, and advancing boats to post of danger the general cannot but
express his grateful feelings and thanks to those officers.53

When United States soldiers could cast off their infirmities, they rose to the challenge
and at the siege of Meigs, like that of Fort Harrison, they fought capably while ill.
American War of 1812 soldiers inherited the Revolutionary ideal of fighting in the
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most austere conditions and under the duress of high rates of illness. The sieges at
Fort Harrison and Meigs illustrate that illness did not eliminate sick soldiers from
serving under fire.
The 19th Infantry Regiment’s Order Book continued to illustrate how
commanders were taking charge of their soldiers’ health. The day after Green Clay
praised his soldiers for enduring their illnesses to save Fort Meigs, 8 July, he issued
an order that would help prevent disease. Clay commanded officers to inspect the
cleanliness of the soldiers and the hospitals. The order stated that the “Cleanliness of
the camp as the only possible way in which the health of the troops can be Restored
and when Restored Porsaved Preserved.”54 The order also mandated that “officers
will pay particular attention to the clothing of the men their mend cause them to wash
their clothes and shave twice a week.”55 Before germ theory, U.S. commanders were
calling for cleanliness, and clothing covering the whole body remained the most
effective prevention of malaria until the latter half of the twentieth century. Hygienic
measures were then and are now the best method to avoid illness. Soldiers and
officers could not always control the factors that led to sickness, however, but the
perception of control was extremely important. Importantly, hygienic measures
occurred in tandem with orders for the serviceability of weapons.56 To frontier
leaders, the health of soldiers was as important as functioning weapons. The 8 July
order is exceptional because it called post commanders to “cause the stagnated water
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in the ditches to be immediately drained.”57 While the 19th Infantry was a federal
regiment the regional commanders consisted of Green Clay, Duncan McArthur, and
William Henry Harrison; all were promoted as federal commanders after successes in
leading Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana militia units. In the Old Northwest and Upper
Canada, the fighting season was also the inclement season so clean uniforms, and
filth sinks (trenches to store waste) were as crucial as functioning cannon. Filth sinks
and hygiene policies rarely make it into military histories, but the storied battlefield
commanders of the War of 1812 valued them as much as serviceable weapons.
The frontier militia leader William Henry Harrison also had a challenging job
regarding the sick during his invasion of Upper Canada, following his federal
appointment to Major General. In a letter dated 1 October 1813 the commander of the
1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry complained: “the volunteers of my regiment who
were sick – could not be attended to in the manner – which humanity in other
circumstances would require.”58 He described how thirty-five soldiers from his and
Colonel John Donaldson’s regiment of Kentucky Militia were ordered to Detroit, and
“have been quartered in Genl Hulls house.”59 Donaldson’s militia served with
regulars, but the surgeon assigned to the regulars failed to treat ill militia soldiers. As
such, he had to request Harrison’s orders for his soldiers to receive medical care.
Donaldson’s regiment and the regulars at Detroit were in a position to protect lines of
supply and communications. These soldiers were securing the same blockhouses and
small fortifications, but the regular surgeon’s refusal to treat ill militia illustrated
57
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some of the inherent tensions between citizen and professional soldiers. Even when
two major theatre commanders, Brigadier Duncan McArthur and Major General
William Harrison, began the war leading militia units, animosity still existed between
regular and volunteer units over issues as inoffensive as caring for each other’s
wounded. Much of the irregular fighting required mixed detachments, and rivalries
had the potential to hinder overall health. It is also important to note that the denial of
care to Donaldson’s militia regiment represents unprofessionalism amongst
professional soldiers; unfortunately, much of the worst military professionalism came
out of the regular Army.
Another fall 1813 account, in William Henry Harrison’s Papers, included one
of the most concise but revealing documents about honor and infirmity duirng the
war. A report made by Captain Samuel Hopkins of the 2nd Light Dragoons illustrated
the willingness of regular Army officers to allow service from soldiers that today
would be considered unfit for service. Hopkins described how, because of his
ailments, he was not fit for a commission in the infantry, but he could serve in a
mounted unit. At the time, his cavalry force was being shifted into an infantry
brigade, which compelled Hopkins “to perform duties for which [he was] physically
unfit.”60 The Army immediately granted Hopkins a Captain’s commission at the
beginning of the war. However, Hopkins observed that “knowing my incompetency,
from constitutional infirmity, to undergo the fatigues incident upon a long and
arduous march I resolved not to accept it.”61 Hopkins may not have been fit enough
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for the infantry, but he was still willing to serve in combat, and he was “delighted” to
receive a commission in the cavalry.62 Serving on horseback was “a better situation,”
and he was wisely ordered into recruiting duties when his cavalry unit transitioned to
light infantry.63 It was often impossible for him to serve because his mounted unit
regularly served as light infantry and Hopkins commanded the guard, fatigue
(parties), and police duties of the camp.64 He was able to cross into Canada mounted,
but the unit again diverted to un-mounted infantry following the capture of
Sandwich.65 Hopkins became a liability in combat, so he requested to return to his
duties as a recruiter. He wanted to serve in “some service where I can be more
useful.”66 At the beginning of the war his “friends in Washington” believed that a
constitutionally weak man, with character, could serve in the cavalry, later during the
conflict his service remanded to outpost duties, and in the end, he desired to serve as a
recruiter to be more useful.67 Hopkins received no battle honors, but it is clear that his
unheralded service was helpful and that his character was respected. This illustrates
that the Army was a place where the infirm could find an important role. Hopkins’s
brief accounts reveal that successful officers and soldiers strived to maximize their
service in the War of 1812, based on the realities of their health, and they expended a
great deal of effort to prove their moral hardiness.
William Harrison’s leadership was amplified by the actions of lessor
understood militia officers like Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur. These frontier
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Militia officers would win significant victories and secure esteemed reputations.
Additionally, Isaac Shelby, a commander in his sixties and participating in his third
war, demonstrated unbelievable endurance during extremely difficult marches.
Shelby’s Kentucky militia would stand by his “zeal, and that of his men enabled them
to keep up with the cavalry.”68 Later, at the Battle of Thames, “The venerable
governor of Kentucky was posted, who, at the age of sixty-six, preserves all the rigor
of youth, the ardent zeal, which distinguished him in the revolutionary war, and the
undaunted bravery which manifested at King’s Mountain.”69 Shelby’s age and vigor
add complexity to the surrender of William Hull at Detroit, as would Hull’s family’s
portrayal of him in later life. Hull took solace in laboring on his farm, and veterans in
the early republic often led vigorous lives well into old age. Shelby, who took no
prisoners at the Battle of Kings Mountain, also represented the ruthlessness and vigor
necessary to prevail on the United States southern frontier. The militia may not have
always looked the part of regular soldiers, but militia drawn from the frontier could
march and endure hardships at an equal or greater rate than the regular and volunteer
regiments.
The mixed composition of Harrison’s army often made it hard for contingents
of forces to maintain surgeons on the March. On the same day that Harrison praised
Colonel John Miller, Commander of the 19th Infantry, Miller was afraid that his
orders to move out of Detroit meant that he would not have a surgeon to care for “my
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sick at the present.”70 At Fort Detroit, the artillery unit defending Detroit’s surgeon
cared for Colonel Miller’s infantrymen. John Miller praised the surgeon’s mate
Morrison because he was “very attentive to the sick.”71 However, Morrison was
forced to offer his resignation because of an unspecified conflict with his supervising
physician.72 John Miller still implored Harrison to allow him to retain Morrison, who
he believed would be capable of his regiment’s fast-approaching march into Upper
Canada. In a time when the medical profession was in its infancy, the value judgment
of officers was more important than the recommendations of surgeons. A key aspect
of emotional hardiness is accepting responsibility for health, and officers took as
much or more responsibility for the health of their soldiers than the surgeons and
surgeon’s mates. Constant marching and the necessity of securing outposts stretched
the small numbers of medical professionals in the Northwestern Army to the point
where John Miller wanted to retain capable surgeon’s mates, regardless of the
recommendation of his supervising surgeon. Keeping men fit for the march was more
critical than standard medical procedures; it was the responsibility of every field
commander.
During Harrison’s 1813 invasion of Upper Canada, Duncan McArthur was
left to defend Fort Detroit and Sandwich. Like the previous United States surrender of
the fort, many of the soldiers left in garrison were soldiers unfit for the march into the
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Niagara. He was given “700 effectives” to defend as well as all of the sick.73 Harrison
would later describe how “Illness deprive(d) me of the talents of my adjutant general
colonel Gaines, who was left at Sandwich.”74 Harrison’s victory at Thames and his
capability led to a major shift in tribal loyalty. McArthur observed that the Ottawa,
Potawatomi, Miami, and Kickapoo tribal leaders all agreed “to hold the same
tomahawk with us.”75
Most importantly, this illustrates how petite guerre tactics meant that ill
soldiers were left in blockhouses to enable the impressive marches, like that of
Shelby’s troops, as well as to serve as a supplemental force in a desperate siege. The
infirm were not solely a liability, and the sick list was a dynamic changing document.
Rested soldiers could enable a direct victory like the one at the Battle of Thames.
Managing the sick list could also reduce the medical discharges that could occur
without convalescence, or like Zachary Taylor’s victory at Fort Harrison, infirm
soldiers could rise to the occasion during a defensive action.
Harrison’s previously described observations about labor and the naval
victory of Perry occurred at the Battle of Lake Erie. Harrison left sick troops in rear
fortifications that would have slowed their movement, but they also had ready access
to their supplies without major physical effort. Harrison described the holding at Lake
Erie as follows: “The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats
protected by three gun-boats.”76 The River Thames was on the mouth with tributary
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streams, and the naval support could cover and supply the movement of Harrison’s
troops inland.77 Harrison also listed the mills, which were powered by hydrology and
had standing ponds; this illustrates how the hydrology of the Niagara was ideal for the
malaria-carrying mosquitos. Harrison offered the following description of the
battlefield: “From two to three hundred yards from the river a swamp extends
parallel.”78 He also described local farms, which had animals that could serve as
carriers, thus making the area a vector for the disease. In the passage of rivers and
tributaries, Native Americans would cover the British retreat “to dispute our
passage.”79 The Thames River was an ideal place for soldiers to succumb to illness,
yet the seasoned militia soldiers from Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky were no strangers
to fatiguing illness and participating in “ranging” patrols during the inclement
seasons. They had to take hygienic measures into their own hands to minimize the
negative influences of the environment.
Harrison’s subordinate, Duncan McArthur, received a federal commission as a
Brigadier General after serving as Ohio Militia Colonel in William Hull’s failed
invasion. He had some of the most insightful policies about the management of
illness. The Regimental order book of the 19th Infantry regiment was preserved; it
recorded McArthur’s policies about field sanitation and discipline. An order dated 1
August 1813 called for “a sufficient number of sinks to be dug for the use of their
troops out of the garrison, and at least one hundred and fifty yards from the picketings
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the filth collected in the garrison must be emptied…at least once a day.”80 The
August order principally regulated the cleanliness and health inside United States
camps and fortifications. While the duty of emptying the filth was significant for
health, it also served as a punishment. Soldiers who failed to care for their cleanliness
were “made to the duty of camp colourman and employed in removing the filth for
one week.”81 Soldiers who did not attend to their healthiness performed the duties as
punishment. While cleanliness was again synonymous with discipline, it was also
compatible with discipline with weapons and tactics. Frontier-schooled militia leaders
best understood the unhealthiness of the border region between Northern Ohio and
Upper Canada. Successful leaders were proactive and took great measures to
safeguard the health of their soldiers.
Duncan McArthur not only called for the removal of trash and excrement, he
also sought to eliminate all standing water and venereal threats to the soldiers under
his command. McArthur also ordered the removal of standing water: “By the order of
the commander in chief this will also cause the stagnated water in the ditches to be
immediately drained.”82 This was issued long before stagnated water was associated
with mosquito-carried illnesses. However, humoral theory believed that unhealthy
vapor came from dead plant matter. The policy accidently eliminated mosquitos.
Through trial and error, the frontier militia identified successful measures. The same
order that removed stagnate water also mandated that unused cannons be returned and
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cleaned, but hygiene came before clean and serviceable cannon. Cleaning duties in
the camps have received little attention in military history, but in a war where
sickness reined as the most significant source of casualties, those policies were
central to success and most often developed by frontier militia officers that were
elevated to regular Army general commissions.
The final section of McArthur’s order focused on health, discipline, and the
regulation of camp women. Without any significant descriptions of the rationale for
such an order, McArthur mandated that “any married woman who has abandoned her
husband and be found strolling about the camp or lodging in the tents of other men
shall be drummed out of camp.”83 This punishment was typically the public shaming
common in soldiers unfit for duty, and it was a rarity for a general to threaten civilian
members of the camp, save for a few cases of espionage. McArthur’s emphasis on the
health and cleanliness as well as sexual activities of soldiers’ wives illustrate how the
19th Infantry Regiment was also initiating a measure to prevent venereal diseases.
Women in the camps were linked to disease, rather than promiscuous soldiers, and
the subtle language removing women and filth from the camp was an inexplicit but
obvious measure to limit disease.84
While Harrison's army managed to achieve success north of Lake Erie without
tents and the reports from Fort George were mostly positive, General James
Wilkinson’s force was struggling. Persistent rain became a more significant
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impediment. “The inexorable winds and rains continue to oppose and embarrass our
movements,” Wilkinson noted, because his troops typically embarked from ships.
Harrison, on the other hand, used ships in support while his men marched light and
fast. The shores became quagmires, and British accounts reveal that the roads were
just as bad. General William Slim, in his book Defeat Into Victory, explicitly linked
over-reliance on the road to both poor asymmetric strategy and the elevation of health
problems, because casualties exponentially increased traffic on limited roads.85 More
significantly, Wilkinson’s struggles with the rainy weather did not only hinder
movement and logistics; it also made it difficult to maintain his ranks of effective
fighters. According to Wilkinson, “We have such a fluctuation of sick and well,
between this place (Grenadier Island New York) and Sackett’s Harbor that it is
impossible to say what force we shall move.”86 His soldiers likely suffered from a
combination of malaria and communicable sicknesses driven by tight quarters, as well
as pervasive seasickness among ground soldiers who were unaccustomed to sailing in
rough weather. As the season was closing and Harrison was garrisoning Detroit,
Wilkinson was not even sure if his subordinate Winfield Scott could “be up in
season.”87 One force could operate off roads, and one could not, and Harrison’s
emphasis on irregular petite guerre tactics also helped significantly in reducing rates
of illness. Regulars might have been the best-trained troops, but they also relied on
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roads more than the militia. The season forced Wilkinson into a fight where regulars
were more likely to succumb to illness.
The army left soldiers behind to convalesce, but those soldiers ultimately
returned to the ranks. In a 17 October 1813 letter, Colonel William P. Anderson
described the value of leaving soldiers behind to recover. He stated that the seventy
soldiers left at Put in Bay and the eighty-six left at Fort Meigs “are all now well and
able to march.”88 The use of soldiers to defend rear positions had now increased the
ranks of the 24th Infantry Regiment, and Anderson would request that more officers
be allowed to recuperate at home, especially to protect their homes. Captains Gerry
and Campbell, along with Lieutenant Allison, were all too sick to be effective, and
the commander requested their return home.
Moreover, if sent home they could prevent the enemy from being “able to
Plunder their country” because they would be able to protect their property.89 Plunder
is an overstatement of the common practice of armies subsisting on local crops. When
sent home these soldiers would not be fit to march for “4 months to come” and thus
they could perform more valuable service at home.90 Given the threats to their homes
and families, they were “all too anxious to be dispatched the soonest practicable.”91
Convalescing at home or in rear positions released logistical burdens of forwarddeployed units, as well as providing replacements. Moreover, sometimes soldiers
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convalescing at home could protect their crops from opponents seeking subsistence,
thereby denying supplies to the enemy.
Weather in Niagara was terrible during the fall of 1813 and compounded the
narrow window that the seasonality of malaria fevers provided. Brigadier General
John Armstrong described how difficult it was to move in Niagara. Stating that he
should have already united his force with Wilkinson, he noted that “bad roads, worse
weather and a considerable degree of illness, admonished me against receding further
from a point where my engagements call me.”92 The same would be true of Isaac
Shelby’s foot cavalry. The ever-virile sixty-six-year-old frontiersman and his soldiers
could endure much, but the rain was intolerable. Shelby told his wife that “the
weather is so rack and the roads so deep we cannot travel more than 20 miles a
day.”93 Frontier leadership was superior in leading seasoning soldiers, but there were
limits for even the best of troops. Shelby further told his wife “the Army owing to the
(illegible word) hardiness all have undergone had become very sickly. They dying
more or less, every (wary) day on the march. We have but hardly been supplied.”94
While rain on the campaign is was always distressing for soldiers, the fall of 1813
was unique with not “one clear day—for more than a month which has worn down
the Army.”95 Bad weather meant fatigue and sickness and could pull the most
seasoned formation out of the field. Shelby’s force succumbed long after the regulars
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did because as frontier units they were far more accustomed to operating in inclement
regions. The worst performing officers of the war, William Hull and James
Winchester, both failed to adopt effective public health tactics. Conversely, officers
from the frontier excelled.
Major General Wade Hampton’s 8 November 1813 letter to Wilkinson
catalogues numerous environmental challenges and illnesses. Men had to carry
supplies in the winter weather physically because horses could no longer support
logistics. His subordinate Colonel, Henry Atkinson, was sent forth from the central
supply depot and could “explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible
for me to have brought more than each man could have carried on his back.”96
Hampton’s force would have been “throwing myself on your scanty means,”
therefore “weakening you in your most vulnerable point.”97 Hampton noted that roads
prevented “wheeled carriages during winters but by the employment of pack horses,
if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to keep you from starving.”98 Harrison’s
force embraced light infantry packhorse logistics that did not require roads, but
Wilkinson and Hampton were reactive to conditions rather than adaptive to
predictable problems. East of Niagara in 1813 would not be a campaign where the
Americans could subsist off of the countryside because Hampton “ascertained and
witnessed the plan of the enemy to burn and destroy everything in our advance.”99
Wilkinson’s men, cut off from supplies, were in a dire situation because Hampton’s
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force at a supply depot was highly fatigued and demoralized. Hampton reported that
“Besides the Rawness and sickliness they have endured fatigues equal to a winter
campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen
off.”100 The environment, weather, and fatigue linked illness and poor morale into a
condition as close to battle fatigue as it was to malarial fevers. The reliance on roads
and traditional infantry tactics were Wilkinson and Hampton’s greatest problems.
Major General Jacob Brown’s report on the Battle of Bridgewater, more
commonly known as the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, recorded the honor of serving while
ill and injured. Brown, although recognized for his professionalization of the
Northern Army, started his service in the War of 1812 as General in the Pennsylvania
Militia. By the time of his promotion to a federal Major General, he had extensive
experience on the Buffalo and Niagara frontier. It is problematic that his emphasis on
discipline and subsequent career in the Army overshadow his rise to federal rank
from his service in the militia. Citizen soldiers could be disciplined and well trained.
Three figures merit mentioning. The first was Colonel James Miller, a man that
would become a life-long invalid due to exposure to the Canadian frontier. Miller’s
actions at Lundy’s Lane led to the capture of British cannon and immortalized him as
a congressional Gold Medal winner. However, James Miller constantly struggled with
an intermittent fever. He was called upon to seize the British battery, and his attack
lost the support of the regiment assigned to “menace and amuse” the British
infantry.101 According to Jacob Brown, “In the meantime, colonel Miller, without
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regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object, and carried
the height and the cannon.”102 Likewise, Captains Biddle and Ritchie were singled out
for gallantry because they “were both wounded early in the action, but refused to quit
the field.”103 Brown described how Ritchie “declared he would never leave his piece;
and true to his engagement, fell by its side, covered with wounds.”104 Immediately
after describing the service of two wounded officers, Brown praised his Adjutant
General, colonel Gardner for his “peculiar merit and distinction” for serving while
sick.105 Gardner, “though ill, was on horseback, and did all in his power.”106 To serve
while ill was synonymous with serving while injured, and honor and gallantry was
self-possession regardless of an individual’s health. Miller provides perhaps the best
example because his service, despite persistent illness, corresponded with his
consistent heroism. Also, Miller’s lifelong convalescence illustrated his ability to
overcome disabling illness during battle.
At the outset of the campaign of 1814, officers sought a campaign that would
defend the character of the U.S. Army. Major General Brown said that “if we gained
nothing else” in an invasion of Canada but “restore the tarnished military character of
the country,” through the reform of the Northern Army.107 Thomas Sidney Jesup,
Major of the 25th Infantry and chief of Army logistics during the Mexican American
War, observed Brown’s emphasis on honor and character about the environment.
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According to Jesup, Brown “added most emphatically ‘we go’ – ‘nothing but the
elements shall stop us,’” because illness and the environment was the most
challenging opponent on the Upper Canadian frontier.108 Jesup described how
essential character and firmness were in combat at the Battle of Chippewa: “Relying
on the firmness and excellent discipline of his troops, the Major determined to
advance and try the effect of the Bayonet.”109 Jesup began to inject his character into
the story but omitted his place in the battle by slashing through his initial text, to
emphasize the courage of American soldiers: “The Major put himself in front and the
charge made, but the enemy general did not wait and receive the bayonet.”110
Character and firmness were the keys to success, even if a military victory was
impossible because of Upper Canada’s environment.
While Jesup would become better known for his work as Quartermaster
General, his service as the commander of an infantry regiment was significant. At the
Battle of Bridgewater Jesup was incapacitated for a time, but he quickly returned to
duty. In his description of the injury, he exhibited a significant shift to the third
person, which is common in trauma writing: “Major Jesup soon after (Winfield Scott
was wounded) Received a violent contusion on the great by a piece of shell, or
perhaps the stock of a Musket, which brought him to the ground.”111 With courage
and necessity, Jesup regained his consciousness and continued leading: “In a few
moments however he rose and returned to his command, which had temporarily
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devolved on Captain Murdock.” 112 The battle raged for hours with repeated British
efforts to overtake the American position, and that took a toll on the injured Jesup.
“The Major though suffering severely from his wound joined his (General Ripley's)
line,” and after removing the wounded they retired to the camp at Chippewa.113 Jesup
began the war as a Lieutenant, and by his actions while wounded at Bridgewater he
gained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The Battle of Lundy’s Lane would not be the
last time Jesup continued serving while injured. During siege warfare and battles
following Bridgewater Jesup had two “horses shot under him” and received as many
as three wounds.114 Jesup recorded his march from Buffalo to Fort Erie as follows:
“Major Jesup was at this time suffering severely from his wounds: but the movement
he was able to leave, he had volunteered for such duties as possess the physical
capacity to perform.”115 He would be wounded again only to return to Fort Erie where
he continued to fight and lead troops. Jesup described his efforts despite “having three
wounds open and his right arm in a sling, and being in consequence unable to perform
active duty yet believing his presence with his corps would have a good effect upon
the service, he volunteered to join the Army at Fort Erie.”116 Jesup’s actions
underpinned Jacob Brown’s observation that the campaign of 1814 was about
regaining the honor of the U.S. Army, and his repeated efforts to return to duty
despite wounds illustrate how individuals demonstrated their character by fighting in
spite of injury or health problems.
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Brown’s emphasis on honorable performance and extensive drilling of his
soldiers occurred in concert with measures ensuring good hygiene. In the company
records of Charles Proctor’s unit, orders called for cleanliness and personal hygiene.
Like the innovations of the forces in Harrison’s Army, Jacob Brown’s Northern Army
adopted strict hygiene policies. The letters of general officers are available, but there
are few records from general orders to junior officers. Charles Proctor’s company
order book is rare because, in addition to the personnel tracking and muster records
common in company-level documents, he also recorded lower-level orders. Proctor’s
order book illustrates that from the very beginning of Jacob Brown’s command, he
worked to preserve the health of his men. In a 23 January 1814 order Brown
emphasized that “more attention to the health & comfort of the soldiers will be
expected from many Gentlemen who have the honor of Caring. Our ranks must not be
thinned in camp or Quarters the Gallant Soldiers must not perish ingloriously in filth
& wretchedness.”117 Proctor’s book also recorded Winfield Scott’s calls for the
reading and implementation of the drill book of Baron Von Steuben, and hygiene was
an extension of soldierly discipline, even if cleaning of filth and policing the camp
has never influenced the war’s historiography.118
Following the campaign of 1814, Proctor recorded the most in-depth coverage
of the scale of efforts taken to maintain order and cleanliness because those policies
were particularly effective in the tight winter quarters. A platoon-sized force, which
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was at the time comparable for to an entire company’s fit-for-duty roster, comprised
of “A Sergeant, a Corpl & 20 Privates [who]will be detailed for the police.”119 While
poor weather and other broader environmental factors were the cause of the high rates
of sickness, officers in Brown’s Army were expected to preserve the health of their
men via attention to cleanliness and discipline. Proctor's order book further recorded
that “it will be the duty of their officers indefatigably to attend to the preservation &
Cleanliness & order throughout the cantonment & its vicinity.”120 These hygienic
regulations in the winter occurred in concert with uniform serviceability during the
inclement season, and with a more general movement towards discipline. Excellent
drill and tactics were worthless when illness claimed the lives of soldiers, and it is
important to note that the campaign that brought U.S. victories at Chippewa,
Bridgewater, and Fort Erie occurred simultaneously with an emphasis on better
hygienic standards. Leaders who excelled on the battlefield also excelled at managing
illness and valued both roles equally.
Major General Jacob Brown is well known for his reliance on Winfield Scott
for discipline and tactics. However, Brown also entrusted Brigadier General Scott to
care for the health of the soldiers on a challenging frontier. In a carefully crafted letter
with several corrections in prose, Brown outlined his expectations on Scott: “The
particular command up this Frontier devolves upon you, during my absence.
Assumed it unnecessary, to give you detailed instructions, as well understand the
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situation of the country, in which you are placed.”121 The situation of the country was
what Brown articulated as the key challenge to his most trusted subordinate during
his absence: “Without in which placed will & with will do every thing for that
country, & for the health & honor of the forces placed under your command, that can
reasonably be expected of an officer with the means you have in your power.”122
Health and honor were preserved in unity because the frontier border region between
the United States and British North America offered significant obstacles to the health
of armies. However, the best commanders believed that they could influence the
health of their men, and these officers typically gained experience with soldiers’
health by serving in frontier-based militias.
At the close of military operations in the war, Major General Brown resented
that the efforts of his men to survive combat and the elements with honor received a
lack of support and recognition. Brown reminded Secretary of War John Armstrong
that the soldier’s life was characterized by of “privation, hardship, & danger,” yet the
Northern Army’s sufferings were not acknowledged.123 The army was failing because
they could not be adequately supplied. For Brown, “Honor & rewards must follow
distinguished gallantry & good conduct, or the nation will command the military men
she breeds, & her wealth & population will avail her but little, against a foe so well
understands this subject.”124 Brown’s Army overcame both the enemy and the
inclement climate of the Niagara frontier but suffered the most by the lack of support
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from their countrymen. In a letter to the Governor of New York, Brown made it clear
that his forces had overcome illness and danger only to suffer from a lack of supplies:
“My gallant little Army has so far done its duty and been blest with the smiles of
Providence; but unless it can receive efficient aid, there is cause to be alarmed for its
ultimate safety.”125 The bitterness that his officers felt came from their ability to
overcome illness, injury, and death on the battlefield, only to have their campaign
limited by a lack of support. Jesup captured their frustration best with his criticism of
the military’s logistics: “It is madness in the extreme to attempt to carry on war with
such a system.”126 Brown was succeeding in an unwinnable campaign in an inclement
region, yet without adequate support, his years of experiences on the frontier were for
naught.
Conclusion: A Problematic Revolutionary Heritage

A great deal of scholarship has cataloged the U.S. Army’s failings in the War
of 1812, yet few historians recognize that the failures of 1812 were also the result of
embedded mores that related to America's revolutionary experiences. These mores are
still celebrated extensively regarding the American Revolution. Suffering privations
and wearing the clothing off the backs of soldiers was embedded into the culture of
the Army during the early national period. However, invading and occupying Canada
was different than outlasting the British Army during the Revolution. The assumption
that privations were the quintessential military experience during the war, rather than
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a problem to overcome through logistical competence, limited the operational
capacity of the American Army. Focus on a lack of professionalism, including a
forced reliance on less disciplined militia, ignores the fact that frontier militia officers
rose to the highest ranks in the regular army, primarily because they possessed greater
talents regarding logistics and public health. In the backwoods of Upper Canada
discipline learned on parade grounds was less valuable than frontier experience and
petite guerre tactics. Frontier sufferings did not have to be significantly worse due to
poor logistics. The War of 1812 was most often waged for the loyalty of
borderlanders and late loyalists of questionable resolve, and preserving the health of
soldiers was central to morale.
The Revolutionary comparison also existed in memoirs of private soldiers like
William Atherton and Adam Walker. The theme of nakedness and hunger linked the
lives of soldiers to their Revolutionary forefathers. When cut off from supplies at Fort
Defiance, for example, William Atherton described the privations of the early
national army on a rugged frontier: “We now saw nothing but hunger, and cold, and
nakedness, staring us in the face.”127 Atherton poignantly described his sufferings:
“Though many years have rolled by since the events transpired, the impression they
made upon my mind is almost as fresh as ever.” His privations were not only
traumatic – they also connected him explicitly to the sufferings of the Revolutionary
Army.128 Adam Walker described the lack of provisions for five days following the
wounded at the Battle of Tippecanoe: “The weather was freezing cold, and our
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wounds which had been not been dressed for two days past, became stiff and
extremely painful.”129 Descriptions of traumatic injuries, hunger, and exposure to the
elements were both the cathartic processing of trauma in third-person writing, but
also served as a badge of honor. Atherton’s determination saved his life, even in the
face of unspeakable atrocities. He “was starving and sick (and shot in the shoulder),
but he kept on as fast and as far as he could, and when he could go no farther he laid
down upon the ground and told them to kill him…when they saw his resolution they
became attached to him.” Remarkably, he survived.130 Atherton’s preface clearly
states the objective of his narrative: “it is hoped that what has been said will be
sufficient to give the youthful reader some idea of what that ‘Spartan band’ were
called to endure. To the old Men of our country these things, perhaps will not be
new.”131 The experiences of illness, privation, and wounds were badges of honor,
even if they did not represent the most viable military strategies.
Isaac Shelby, who commanded a contingent of Kentucky backwoodsmen, was
perhaps the best example of how privation and suffering linked War of 1812 soldiers
to a cherished revolutionary experience. Early in an un-dated address to “Friends and
fellow citizens,” Governor Shelby described how he and they were “schooled in the
rough school of the revolution.”132 As an older man in Kentucky whose papers had
several newspaper circulars cut out for anti-bilious remedies, service in the war
seemed to aid Shelby’s health. In his description of the march to Ohio, he asked
William Powell to tell his wife “let her know that I am quite hearty. – I never enjoyed
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better health – and the arduous duties that incessantly press upon me, regain all my
energies.”133 As a French and Indian War, Revolutionary War, and War of 1812
veteran, he described a kind of happiness that came with suffering for one’s country:
“I am in good health. The duties I have to perform requires my whole exertions I
sometimes am greatly fatigued, nothing but the affection of serving my beloved could
bear me up under the task I have to perform.”134 Hardiness and endurance was an
acculturated aspect of serving on the frontier. As he noted, “The weather is so rack
and the roads so deep we cannot travel more than 20 miles a day.”135 His men –
suffering by exposure to adverse weather conditions and mosquito-carried illnesses –
were still marching as hard and as far as horses. To suffer and endure were in keeping
with the Revolutionary tradition, yet in an invasion, even Shelby’s hardy men
succumbed to illness and weather.
Frontier-based militia leaders may have been the best officers regarding
managing sickness, fatigue and behaving honorably under duress. However, the
Revolutionary tradition of suffering and endurance predisposed the American Army
to suffer far more than necessary in the context of a poor logistical system. Scholars
to date study honor as a force that trumped professionalism when serving in the face
of illness and a harsh environment was perhaps the best feature of the early national
United States armed forces. This tendency to suffer privations with pride also sapped
combat efficiency that could have been improved by systematic efforts for
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professional logistics. In many ways, the War of 1812 is another case in a long story
of an army carrying the lessons from a previous conflict into a less suitable stage.
Outlasting an opponent by bearing hardship and adversity may have worked in the
Revolution, but it was a flawed mentality to shape the invasion and occupation of an
isolated frontier.
Sickness illustrates how the day-to-day slog of soldiering and fighting on an
isolated frontier more resembled the harsh combat and ironies of twentieth-century
warfare. A strong sense of honor and the quest to burnish their reputations meant that
soldiers remembered the war differently. Men like William Henry Harrison, James
Miller, Jacob Brown, and Winfield Scott all emerged as American heroes because of
their battlefield exploits, yet their hygienic policies were as essential as courage under
fire for battlefield success. Even the brash Indian fighter Andrew Jackson’s hygienic
policies have been praised by the U.S. Army’s medical command’s official history as
more forward-thinking than medical professionals such as Benjamin Rush.136
Recovering the mundane consistency of preserving health and enduring illness better
captures the nature of the War of 1812 than the battle and campaign case studies that
have dominated historical memory. The digging of filth trenches and episodes of
soldiers marching hard despite injury and illness need to be remembered. The young
Captain Zachary Taylor, who would later become an American president, defended a
fort when he could barely perform his duties. That demonstrates an unromantic,
uncelebrated, and ordinary sort of courage that is in many ways more remarkable than
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studies of battles. One of the most significant changes in contemporary analyses of
warfare, often shaped by the soldiers themselves, is the way in which war is defined
by small moments of courage. These were often permeated by boredom and drudgery,
and in many instances were perceived as worse than combat. A study of illness
reveals that the War of 1812 was as monotonous and frustrating as any modern
conflict; it illustrates that ordinary courage was defined by men marching in storms,
suffering from fevers, and fighting while ill or injured for honor and survival. The
next chapter continues an approach to survival through the supply of calories and
logistics. It focuses on the 1814 campaigns, during which Jacob Brown’s reforms of
the U.S. Army were unsuccessful because of poor logistics and the British traded
combat power for a feasible supply system. British commanders gained more in
battlefield losses because they limited the size of their army, and therefore they could
supply more calories to their soldiers. They lost the battles but won the war for
calories.
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CHAPTER 2
THE WAR FOR CALORIES
“It is madness in the extreme to attempt to carry on war with such a system”1

The previous chapter emphasized the entire War of 1812 from the
perspectives of American commanders, with a heavier concentration on the first two
years. This chapter will focus on the last year of the conflict: 1814. It was a year of
significant transition in the war, and oddly enough it is year most remembered for the
burning of Washington. While “The Star-Spangled Banner” emphasizes American
spirit in the face of losses incurred during the British offensive in the Chesapeake, in
the Upper Canada the U.S. Northern Army won every major engagement. The
principal confrontations started with a minor engagement at the Chippewa and a
major battle at Lundy’s Lane. Both were fought in the summer, near the falls at
Niagara, and both were U.S. victories. However, the Americans were unable to press
the advantage of their victories with a firm presence in Upper Canada. After Lundy’s
Lane the Americans defended their gains in the British siege of Fort Erie, and the
siege at Plattsburgh occurred in the fall of 1814. The Americans were able to defeat
the British in battle during the summer and hold them off in the fall. The British had
the advantage in troops, but the reinforcements came from combat weary Napoleonic
War veterans who struggled in the rough frontier border region. This chapter seeks to
answer why the American victories ultimately gained very little in the final year of
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the conflict; it concludes that they won the battles but lost the war for calories, and
thus gained little from their victories.
After the Niagara Campaign of 1814, victories at Bridgewater, Chippewa, and
Fort Erie strengthened the poor reputation of the U.S. Army. Following the War of
1812, American commanders remained embittered by the lack of support they
received during their only successful invasion of Canada. The title quote from
Thomas Sidney Jesup, an officer who was a junior Lieutenant at the beginning of the
war, but who would go on to lead a regiment at Bridgewater (Lundy’s Lane),
represented the Northern Army’s chief concern. The quote cited the madness of
having control of provisions in the hands of private contractors: “Either the
contractors should be dismissed, or they should be made amenable to military
tribunals.”2 The American regular Army redeemed itself regarding tactical
competence and courage under fire, but it suffered after its victories. The
commanding officer of the Northern Army, Major General Jacob Brown, and the
force’s most decorated officer, Brigadier General James Miller, exchanged letters that
described the neglected Army for years. While they highlighted deficiencies
regarding material support, they also lamented the country’s lack of awareness of the
American Army’s victory at Bridgewater – the British claimed victory at Lundy’s
Lane after sleeping on the field.3 The U.S. forces drove the British from the field and
covered their officers in the glory they all romantically sought. However, provisions,
wounded and ill soldiers, and a lack of naval support forced them to pull back to Fort
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Erie. The Army suffered more deaths from lack of support and illness than it did
under fire. The only force in the northern theatre that brought glory and honor to the
U.S. deprived those courageous soldiers of their lives and their health, and the
commanding officers expressed bitterness about their lack of support.
While the Americans saw only their problems, Lieutenant-General Gordon
Drummond also struggled in 1814. Following Wellington’s victories in Spain, the
British Army finally had a large corps of regular British Regiments of Foot; yet
Drummond could not supply his growing force on the Upper Canadian frontier.
Although Drummond had the forces necessary to gain the upper hand, he could not
provide provisions enough to maintain his force’s health: “Although I should have
wished it, I am apprehensive I shall not have it in my power to forward any further
reinforcements to the Right Division.”4 Drummond had enough troops to defeat the
Americans on the Upper Canadian frontier. However, he could not feed them, “for
the inability of the Commissariat to supply Provisions.”5 Furthermore, Drummond
“dread[ed] their failing in due supplies to those already ordered there.”6 However,
while Americans felt betrayed by their people because of smuggling, the British
failed to make moral judgments, and instead grasped the way that the environment
limited armies on such a remote frontier. While Lisa Brady’s groundbreaking work
on the American Civil War recognized how generals Ulysses Grant and William
Sherman targeted the agro-ecological system of the south, British generals in the War

4

Letter from Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond to Lieutenant George Prevost from Kingston 15
July 1814 in, William Wood, Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, Vol III, Part 1
(Toronto: Champlain Historical Society, 1920), 131. Hereafter Select British Documents.
5
Letter from Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond to Lieutenant George Prevost from Kingston 15
July 1814 in, Wood, Select British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 131.
6
Letter from Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond to Lieutenant George Prevost from Kingston 15
July 1814 in, Wood, Select British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 131.

91

of 1812 already knew the inherent weaknesses of commanding armies in such remote
environs.7
Americans finally achieved tactical victories in pitched battles, but the British
employed petit guerre light infantry tactics against the U.S. Army to separate the
Americans from their supplies and disrupt their communications. In a letter from
Major General Phineas Riall to Drummond, Riall described how winning the unsung
small fight to hinder supply lines secured victory for the British by separating the
Americans from their sustenance: “I propose tomorrow to take up a more advanced
Position at the 12 Mile Creek, for the purpose of favoring some Parties of Militia &
Indians.”8 The British used local fighters, who were masters of irregular tactics, to
harass the supplies and communications of their opponents. The force of militia and
Native American allies separated the U.S. Army from its supplies by being “pushed
forward with a view to gain information of the enemys (sic) movements & prevent his
receiving supplies from the country.”9 General Riall’s discussion of denying the
American army subsistence from the countryside recognized that the crops grown in
the summer of 1814 would aid the American advance into Upper Canada. The British
finally had a larger force of regular regiments than the Americans. But recognizing
that the region was too hard to supply, they cleverly reduced the size of their force
and instead allowed the Americans to be the aggressors while they targeted their
supply lines. In short, the British lost the battles but won the campaign by winning the
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small fights. They hindered American supply lines and thereby forced U.S.
withdrawals after victories in battle.
Major General Jacob Brown used moving language to describe how sickness
deprived his army of the gains they earned through blood and honor. Describing his
force’s rehabilitation of the American army’s reputation, he stated; “They had often
bled and triumphed, and he believed that they would prefer to die in the blaze of their
glory than live dishonored by captivity or defeat.”10 Despite his victories at Chippewa
and Bridgewater, as well as a later triumph at Fort Erie, his army still faded away
because of illness in such a harsh and isolated climate. He noted:
As the daily casualties were thinning the ranks, and the constant fatigues and
exposure inflicting those that escape the fire of the enemy, the commanding
General determined without loss of time to make one great effort to save the
suffering remains of a force, that appeared to be neglected by a country for
which it had devoted itself.11

Brown could not understand how his men, who had proved their honor on the field of
battle, could be lost to illness from a lack of adequate logistical support. In fact, the
angst regarding the contradiction between the Northern Army’s performance in the
field and their lack of enough support, and the subsequent higher losses to illness,
were believed to occur as the result of a conspiracy. Brown stated the following in
his narrative: “It should not be concealed that it appeared at this period to the army of
Niagara and its commander that, there was a conspiracy planned for its destruction,
and that this opinion, however, uninformed, tended to render it more desperate.”12
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With such poor support for their honorable service, many of the men who were not
sick deserted, and the battlefield gains were lost to illness and a stressful
environment. Brown’s language represented the moral perspective of U.S. Army
officers who failed to grasp how they could influence their environment and exploit
the supply weaknesses of their enemy. While the British had to rely on local allies to
perform petite guerre tactics, the Americans used North American soldiers as
regulars. They excelled on the battlefield but were not effective at isolating their
opponents from their supply lines.
A great irony of the campaign on the Niagara in 1814 was that of the officer
who, uninjured and in outstanding health, nevertheless became a lifelong invalid.
James Miller described his almost miraculous lack of wounds during the duration of
the war. His letter from Fort Erie after earning his fourth Congressional Gold Medal
for destroying the British siege batteries states, “I escaped again unhurt.”13 Miller’s
lack of injuries was no small matter – during the campaign very few officers to
escaped either ill health or injury. He observed, “I can say that every Major save one,
every Lt. Col, every Colonel who was here when I came and has remained here, has
been killed or wounded, and I am now the only general officer, out of seven that has
escaped.”14 But Miller’s service in a poorly supplied Army was ultimately more
detrimental to his health. Survival and being unwounded was often more harmful to
health; James Miller was unhurt, yet he became a permanent invalid after the war was
over. Coping with a paucity of supplies and exposure to enemy attacks from all
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directions meant that Miller was consistently exposed to stress, camp illness, and
seasonal fevers. In 1814, Miller led bayonet charges at Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane.
He also destroyed the power magazine at the siege of Fort Erie, yet the British use of
petite guerre likely was more detrimental to his health than any wounds than he might
have received in combat. The American army would win the Battle of Lundy’s Lane,
by bold action seizing British guns, then repeatedly holding off charges by British
Regulars. However, they had to give up the classic military tactic of holding the field
of battle because militia and Native Americans cut off their food supplies.

The Battle of Lundy’s Lane
Major Sidney Jesup described his service despite wounds received at
Bridgewater (Lundy’s Lane) and the Siege of Fort Erie. Jesup penned his unpublished
memoir during his subsequent convalescence. During the battle, Jesup was knocked
out after receiving “a violent contusion” from an unknown source.15 Jesup was hit “by
a piece of shell, or perhaps the stock of a Musket, which brought him to the
ground.”16 Left on the ground for dead, Jesup revived and continued to repulse
British assaults on the American position, an action that brought a promotion to
Lieutenant Colonel.17 He remained in a sick bed until his regiment moved to secure
Fort Erie. In September, despite his wounds, Jesup moved to Fort Erie to motivate his
soldiers. Using the third-person voice, he stated that “Major Jesup was at this time
suffering severely from his wounds: but the movement he was able to leave, he had
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volunteered for such duties as possess the physical capacity to perform.”18 The loss of
officers and men was already so severe that a wounded officer was frequently used to
preside over a sieged garrison. But it would only get worse. Jessup was wounded
again in the siege, but he returned because of the soldiers’ moral and high rates of
sickness. He stated that “Major Jesup having three wounds open and his right arm in a
sling, and being in consequence unable to perform active duty yet believing his
presence with his corps would have a good effect upon the service, he volunteered to
join the Army at Fort Erie.”19 Jesup was unable to perform his duties; nonetheless, he
became a symbol of resilience by coping with increasingly unmotivated and ill
soldiers. The character of the Americans often resulted in battlefield victories, but this
dynamic could not overcome the environmental challenges.
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Figure 2 Used with permission of the West Point History Department
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While the American Army emphasized virtue, the British Army emphasized
tactics and structural changes. Major General Riall recognized the non-linear aspect
of the war and adjusted his operational approach appropriately. He noted: “If I
advance from this I leave the Country in my rear perfectly exposed to the enemys
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(sic) advance from Queenston”20 The British again sacrificed the pitched battle to win
the small war, light infantry fight of controlling supply lines and provisioning their
force. Riall would later secure a decisive battle at Lundy’s Lane, but he recognized
the most dangerous of possible actions would be the enemy disrupting his lines of
supply and communications. The 1814 campaign was a war for calories, one in which
the U.S. won battles because the British had to check their aggressiveness and limit
their forces to maintain supply lines. While American initiative created tactical
battlefield victories, those victories achieved very little to shape decisive and
meaningful strategic gains because of the difficulty of supplying troops that operated
in the captured territory.
Lieutenant General Drummond reduced his force significantly preceding the
Battle of Lundy’s Lane, and that reduction was fundamental to him achieving a better
result in defeat than the Americans gained in victory. Drummond was forced to order
all the camp women out of his forward locations. Such action significantly increased
illnesses – women served as nurses, but they also mended uniforms, and damaged
uniforms meant exposed skin, which in turn led to mosquito bites.21
More directly associated with combat power, Drummond also had to release
militiamen to secure the harvest. Drummond praised the militia as follows: “I have
the honor to transmit the enclosed Representation relative to the necessity of the
Sedentary Militia being permitted to return home to save their produce from being
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totally lost to the country.”22 His release of the militia to their homes just days before
the Battle of Lundy’s Lane could have been disastrous. However, they secured their
crops and rushed to the fight. According to Drummond, “The zeal, loyalty, and
bravery with which the Militia of this part of the Province have come forward to
cooperate with his Majesty’s Troops in the expulsion of the Enemy, and their
conspicuous gallantry, in this, and in the Action of the 5th Instant (the Battle of
Chippewa), claim my warmest thanks.”23 The British technically lost in regard to
tactical victory but won the light infantry long game of cutting off their enemy’s
supply lines with a militia that gladly returned to the fight after being released to their
homes. The Americans gained a moral victory, yet they were forced to withdraw.
Major General Brown was helpless. It took him some time to return to duty
after Bridgewater, and he was absent while his army slowly disintegrated due to a
lack of support. Brown had to seek a pass from the hospital because its proximity to
the front made it impossible for him to exercise. He stated: “Having been almost
recovered from my wounds, and being considerably unwell, and somewhat reduced
by confinement, and the want of exercise.”24 Personal inactivity and the suffering of
his force weighed heavily on Brown, who observed: “My gallant little Army has so
far done its duty and been blest with the smiles of Providence; but unless it can
receive efficient aid, there is cause to be alarmed for its ultimate safety.”25 Jesup
made clear Brown’s intentions. Major General Brown said that “if we gained nothing
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else” in an invasion of Canada, then Brown’s army “restore(d) the tarnished military
character of the country. “26 The soldiers and officers were acting honorably, but the
force was already succumbing to the environment when British reinforcements
arrived. Brown described British reinforcements: “I can but be very anxious for the
ultimate fate of this Army…the (British) Reinforcements arriving from Europe will I
fear give them the means” to destroy his force that “left by that country to Struggle
alone within sight and within hearing.”27 Brown’s command won all their battles but
could not keep the soldiers and officers from the sickness that usurped their honorable
conduct under fire. The fighting in Upper Canada during 1814 was a campaign of
passion versus system. And while passion carried the field, system prevailed in all the
longer-term objectives.
Food supplies and weather, in addition to British reinforcements, prevented
the Americans from moving on Montreal. Secretary Armstrong recognized that the
chief obstacle towards defeating the British in their center was provision. Armstrong
stated, “I believe too, that if you are not in condition to eat your way to Montreal
directly, the better policy for us will be to carry the war westward.”28 The U.S.
Army’s official history still criticizes American officers for not capturing Montreal
because they lacked an understanding of the parsimonious frontier that made
supplying armies extremely difficult.29
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To make the difficult environment worse, the weather deteriorated
dramatically in the fall of 1814. This prevented naval support from the U.S. Navy,
and it provided the environment for the spread of illness in the ranks on both sides of
the conflict. Brown wrote the Secretary of War, “As Genl Gaines informed me that
the Commodore was confined to his bed with a fever, and as he did not know when
the fleet would sail.”30 Chauncey’s fever never made it onto the recent bicentennial
banners on Wellington Street in Ottawa, but it saved the British at the same time that
Brown’s force won their most significant victory at Bridgewater. Nor has the light
infantry “side” battle that cut U.S. soldiers from their supply lines been adequately
recognized. This loss of naval support and constant harassment of their rear meant
that Major General Brown had to focus on the western frontier. As Brown observed,
“I have thought it proper to change my position, with a view to other objects.”31
However, severe weather at Fort Erie provided the Americans an opportunity for
victory. British strategy exploited the weather, while Americans basically believed
virtue could overcome any obstacle. After Lundy’s Lane, the British laid siege to the
American Northern army at Fort Erie, but the tactical reforms of Jacob Brown
continued to result in U.S. victories. The British lost the petite guerre raids that
preceded the siege, but the streamline army of Gordon Drummond maintained his
strategic advantages.
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Fort Erie
The British Army’s attempt to retake Fort Erie faltered despite its best efforts
to destroy American sources of supply. American tactical acumen gained more in this
campaign than at Lundy’s Lane, but mainly because their supply lines were more
secure. Drummond first tried to destroy depots at Black Rock and Buffalo. Low
calories could have trumped patriotism if the U.S. lost its supply depots. According to
Drummond, “had this Service been Effected as I sanguinely expected the Enemy’s
Force shut up in Fort Erie would have compelled by want to Provisions, either to
come out and fight the Division under my Command or have surrendered to it.”32 The
British attempted to separate the U.S. fort from its source of nutrition, but could not
succeed in their siege after losing the light infantry fight. Drummond better
recognized the weaknesses in his force as a result of exposure to a harsh environment.
Like General Brown’s force, General Drummond’s army was struggling more
with illness than battlefield losses. Drummond stated that his force “has a very
formidable appearance on Paper.”33 While the British went on the offensive in the
1814 campaign, they struggled to keep soldiers fit for duty. They managed the high
incidence of illness by shifting their regiments from combat to garrison duties. As
Drummond described the heath of his regulars, “I regret however to be obliged to
observe that the inefficient State & composition of many of the Regiments are such as
to detract greatly from the confidence which their numbers might otherwise
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inspire.”34 Combat experience in the harsh frontier environment produced veterans,
but also significantly diminished the health of his force.
The British excelled at shifting troops to keep regiments with high rates of
sickness in garrison roles. Drummond described his relocation of forces: “It is my
intention to write what I have leisure more fully on this Subject & also as soon as
circumstances will permit to send down to Kingston Several Corps at present on this
Frontier & which are wholly unfit for Service in the Field.”35 The early American
republic maintained many regiments in the South on garrison duty to defend against
potential attacks and slave uprisings. Southern regiments could have traded their
garrison roles with American regiments with extensive combat duty. The British
Army shifted its troops around and utilized Veterans’ Battalions that were composed
primarily of invalids. The fact that long-serving regiments struggled to maintain their
force fit for duty meant that Drummond’s high rates of reinforcements from the
Peninsular War were not necessarily an increase in his combat power.36 He could not
relocate the forces fast enough to influence the outcome at Fort Erie.
As stated previously, the weather was limiting the health of American units so
significantly that officers like Jesup had to serve while injured. The British, in
bivouac and far from their supply lines, suffered more. Izard noted that “We have
received but five shots or shells from the Enemy within then (sic) last two days. Many
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deserters come in, who state that they expect that the enemys (sic) supply is
exhausted, but they expect to be supplied within a short time.”37 However, the supply
problems only worsened. Izard indicated that “The Weather with us has been very
tempestuous & rainy, for some days. Knowing that the Enemy were without tents, or
covering of any kind to shield them from the wet & learning from the Deserters that
came in, that they suffered much.”38 Despite a long siege that wounded most of the
officers, and the illnesses that ran rampant in the miserable weather, the U.S.
Northern Army regarded the poor weather as an opportunity. Izard employed petite
guerre harassing raids to “trouble their camp.”39 Izard’s objective was to worsen the
morale caused by low supplies and poor weather, and he measured his success by an
increase in the rate of British deserters. Izard celebrated his harassing attacks as
follows: “We effected our object, kept the enemy up all night, killed & wounded
several of them, & obtained twenty deserters.”40 These deserters pushed for further
offensive actions.
The foul weather cut both ways, but most often hurt the bivouacking soldiers
on the offensive more than sheltered soldiers engaged in defending fortifications.
Izard’s harassing attack produced deserters that encouraged him to order more
aggressive action.41 The weather was not something the young U.S. Army could
control, but it was something that commanders could and often did exploit. At first
the American force delayed the attack due to “The extreme badness of the weather.”42
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The endeavor to destroy the batteries would be one of the most impressive actions of
the campaign, with Miller yet again remaining the uninjured hero of another
battlefield. The high casualties among officers meant that it took time for the
recovering Brown to realize that Miller had still led the principal action, as well as to
appreciate the significance of the victory.43 Miller’s force led the siege, and “they did
not lose less than a thousand men.” 44 However, this was a bloody battle that cost
them the life of General Davis and disabled General Porter, who was “Highly
wounded in the hand.”45 The weather and environment that limited the American
advance to Niagara – rather than north to Lake Champlain on the Richelieu River –
were also devastating to the newly reinforced British army.
Even the victory at Fort Erie would have been impossible without the
reinforcement of General Izard’s contingent that had previously focused on Lower
Canada. On 10 September 1814, Brown described how his force had become smaller.
Brown observed that “My total effective force does not much exceed two thousand
men; perhaps I may be able to fight, in position, twenty-five hundred.”46 A quarter of
his force at Fort Erie was made up of invalids who could only secure the fortress, but
Brown used every available soldier. Both armies were much more formidable on
paper, and the Americans had the advantage of defense of garrison, where their
spirited approach could push soldiers to endure solitary engagements. When General
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Brown ordered the attack on the enemy, Jesup led the garrison. Jesup’s command
consisted of “with the 25th about one hundred and fifty strong, and the artillery and
invalids,” whose orders were, “to protect the fort and camp, and cover the retreat of
the army should it be repulsed.”47 General Brown’s force in Niagara had won honors
and high accolades because they maximized the use of ill soldiers, but this still could
only keep a fraction of soldiers in the ranks.
Brown’s force could win battles, but they could not secure consistent supplies
of provisions. Thomas Sidney Jesup provided the best account of this lack of support.
A subsequent review of company order books proves that high incidents of illness
correlated with periods of low rations. The officers complained about a system of
logistics in a war where disease, brought on by fatigue and malnutrition, took more
soldiers out of the field than the enemy, yet that system was entirely outside the
authority and chain of command of military officers. Jesup knew this system well
before his command of a regiment in Niagara; he had previously spent his own
money to secure clothing for recently acquired prisoners of General Henry Proctor
because they were “literally naked.”48 When Jesup acted principally as a
quartermaster as he awaited his release back to the line via a prisoner exchange, he
would do anything in his power to support soldiers. However, the victors of
Chippewa and Bridgewater did not receive adequate provisions. For Jesup, a lack of
provisions made it impossible for the Northern Army to remain on the offensive after
their victories. Jesup stated that “It is madness in the extreme to attempt to carry on
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war with such a system. either the contractors should be dismissed, or they should be
made amenable to military tribunals.”49 This condemnation recognized how Brown’s
army remained supreme on the battlefield while being crippled by contract
logisticians who were under no formal military authority. Jesup wanted to engage
every logistical contractor from the “humblest Bullock driver or salesmen” to “the
agent who accompanies the army,” and in general to subject every camp follower
from “the whole tribe from the principal, wheresoever (sic) he may reside” to military
legal authority.50 Still, Jesup was a man of honor who, while seeing the future in
bleak terms due to a lack of support, would return to duty despite injuries. Jesup
wrote that “Our little band still holds out at Fort Erie: I shall join them tomorrow,
though my right arm is still in a sling.”51
The command of General Izard experienced fewer battles and is far more
informative to the nature of a conflict whose isolated frontier was more formidable
than the enemy. Izard’s campaign must be taken more seriously because it challenges
a significant theme within command and control military historiography. Historians
from Wesley Turner to Richard V. Barbuto have argued that the United States should
have focused on capturing the Canadian capital at Montreal.52 The object of Brown’s
campaign was to destroy forts in the rear of such a campaign and then to support
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Izard’s effort to achieve those results. However, it was not logistically feasible. John
Armstrong and Izard recognized the impossibility of carrying a successful campaign
along the Champlain River. Armstrong observed that “on the project of taking post on
the St. Lawrence, there is a great drawback, from the difficulty we shall find in
subsisting, and if occasion should arise, in supporting it.”53 The U.S. Army’s chief
desire was to capture Montreal; however, the environment was forcing them to
consolidate their gains on the Niagara peninsula. Secretary of War John Armstrong
bluntly wrote the following to General Izard: “It is very distinctly my opinion, that it
has become good policy on our part, to carry the war as far to the westward as
possible, particularly while we have an ascendency on the lakes.”54 Victories could be
won, but the parsimonious frontier meant that they could not be held, and Americans
were struggling to use the light infantry tactic of targeting enemy supply lines that the
British employed. The American army would cling to moral pronouncements
regarding the cause of their logistical woes, while the British were better at
recognizing how frontier isolation influenced the outcome.
General Drummond recognized he could not always gain long-term results
because of environmental restrictions. Major General Brown’s victory at Fort Erie
ultimately required an evacuation – because of the weather, not because of the light
infantry targeting his lines of supply and communications. Drummond noted the
“precipitation with which it has been marked, such as Provisions left on the ground,
some Camp Equipage burnt (for which I consider they had not carriage).”55 This

53

Armstrong to Izard from Washington 12 August 1814, Izard Correspondence, 70.
Armstrong to Izard from Washington 12 August 1814, Izard Correspondence, 70.
55
Letter from Drummond to Prevost from Niagara 18 October 1814, in Wood, Select British
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 219.
54

108

retreat became a significant source of British supplies by capturing a ship that
“contained fresh meat, Bread, and Spirits for at least a Brigade—.”56 The abject
retreat after victory occurred because of muddy roads rather than a British attack.
Drummond recognized the environmental cause of the American withdrawal, and
Brown’s “feeling the difficulties of his situation, and the impossibility of the even the
Common Wagon of the country much less Guns through such Roads.”57 The
Americans could not supply a fort in Upper Canada once the roads became muddy
and wagons could no longer use the roads. In addition to recognizing environmental
restrictions, Drummond also connected low supplies of food to high rates of illness in
his most isolated fortifications.
The same muddy roads made it impossible to supply positions west of
Niagara, and whole regiments were taken out solely by illness following low supplies.
Today, non-battle losses are still higher than combat losses, but soldiers have far
lower rates of loss to sickness. Modern medicine received far too much credit because
it is widely known that contemporary combat arms soldiers avoid medical care;
therefore, it is most likely that today’s American soldier rarely succumbs to illness
simply because they are well fed. Regiments became less effective the farther they
were from their supply lines. Drummond stated that “There is so much disease in the
103d and that Corps is in every other respect so useless and inefficient.”58 The frontier
was a more significant challenge for General Drummond, and regiments in the wrong
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location became sickly because of roads that were “Impassible” for logistics.59 The
loss of the 103rd Regiment of Foot had little to do with enemy action; they simply
occupied an outpost that was too difficult to provision adequately in a parsimonious
place. However, while the British struggled to supply their troops and suffered similar
privations, all the Americans could observe were the supplies provided to the British
by their countrymen.60
To make matters worse for the Americans, New England was the chief
supplier of provisions to the British Army in Lower Canada. The Northern Army’s
muster rolls illustrate that although New England opposed the war, its private soldiers
were almost exclusively from New England. Smuggling supplies from New England
to the British Army was a particularly onerous betrayal.61 Jacob Brown and Jesup’s

59

Letter from Drummond to Prevost From Niagara 23 October 1814, in Wood, Select British
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 228.
60
This is a unique claim of this dissertation; however, the careful regimentally oriented work of John
Grodzinski verifies the logistical struggles of the British to supply line infantry units. Additionally
Alan Taylor points to General Izard as a source of the problem in stating that “smuggling doubly
dammed the American war effort,” in The Civil War of 1812, but his work on the Internal Enemy later
identified that most U.S. troops in the northern campaign were from New England where smuggling
was prevalent. See John Grodzinski, The 104th (New Brunswick) Regiment of Foot in the War of 1812
(Fredericton, New Brunswick: Goose Lane Editions, 2014); Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812:
American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies (New York: Random House,
2010), 277; and The Internal Enemy: Slavery and the War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2013).
61
Most of the company order books preserved for the northern campaign list soldiers from New
England. The American Southern states typically fought with Andrew Jackson’s force but also had to
maintain troops at home to prevent potential slave uprising. Also, there are few company-level records,
and among the short serving and less politically connected junior officers, it is possible that New
Englanders were merely more literate. For example, the Order book of Captain Byrd C. Williams has
the least information found in company records. Only a clothing record included information on death
and discharges. The shared record book for Captains John McRae and John Standard’s company also
have very few reports, and the Virginian accounts of junior officers are the sparsest records; this
should not discount the performance of New Englanders. Specifically, the town of Hillsborough, New
Hampshire was home to so many of the war’s top performing officers. The following account from a
letter from Benjamin Price to Major John McNeil illustrates the contradictions between campaign
principally fought by New Englanders and mainly opposed politically by New Englanders: “You were
fortunate in having the command of the 11th Regt. – Captn. Crooked has dutifully upheld himself &
also the brave Col. Miller – you are all from the county of Hillsborough.” See Byrd C. Williams,
Company order book for the Company of Captain Byrd C. Williams, Record Group 98, Records of the
United States Army commands, 1784-1821, Records of units, Infantry, 1789-1815 20th Infantry

110

accounts level indirect criticisms, but Izard’s proximity to the Saint Lawrence River
where most smuggling occurred allowed him to describe the Northern army’s
betrayal. Izard maintained that “From the St. Lawrence to the ocean an open
disregard prevails for the laws prohibiting intercourse with the enemy.”62 He
described the specifics of U.S. supplies that helped the British: “The road to St. Regis
is covered with droves of cattle, and the river with rafts, destined for the enemy.”63
Worse, the American revenue officers were aware but did nothing to prevent the
smuggling.64 Neither the Americans nor the British could subsist on the frontier
without significant logistical support, and according to American officers, smugglers
were outperforming the fledgling U.S. logistical system. Izard maintained that “Were
it not for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would soon be suffering from
famine, or their government be subjected to enormous expense for their
maintenance.”65 Izard was first to occupy troops with harassing the British supply
lines as well as cordoning off American smuggling routes, though without success.
Every resource mattered, and the British were significantly hindered by the length of
their supply lines. Smuggling was thus not a benign activity; it was fundamental to
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the outcome of the conflict. The New England smugglers made it possible for the
British to survive on a frontier that the American Northern Army was forced to
abandon.66
Izard and Brown were both tasked with leading forces left in ruins by the
failures of General Wilkinson. From the beginning of the campaign, the problems
were almost solely due to providing provisions. Brown had more success turning
green troops into skilled fighters, but he had Winfield Scott, Thomas Jesup, James
Miller, and several other regimental commanders who drilled their troops intensely.67
The Quartermaster Department was the most significant problem in the force, and
while Brown secured battlefield honors, Izard was unable to overcome his logistical
issues well enough to even field a fighting force – save for the small action at Sandy
Creek – until his reinforcement of Fort Erie. Izard’s supply problems are significant
because at first the plan centered on capturing Montreal, even though it was
impossible to supply his force adequately at French Mills.
After Wilkinson’s relief, the Northern Army stationed at French Mills
threatened Montreal, but the 1813 campaign had been a failure terminating at
Chrysler’s Farm, and the army was too large to supply on the frontier. When Izard
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took command, he immediately communicated to the Secretary of War that he was
“greatly disappointed, both in their number and quality” of his troops.68 First, he
maintained that he had improperly trained regular troops. Izard wrote that “With very
few exceptions (and those confined to companies) they are deficient in all the
requisites of regular soldiers.”69 Brown had excellent operational commanders, but
Izard did not. Even worse, most of his troops were ill due to poor supplies. Izard
described the dire situation: “Their clothing and equipment are in a wretched state, –
their proficiency in field manoeuvres, and even the rudiments of exercise, is
lamentably small, – and an undue proportion of them are on the sick list.”70 The most
damaging issue was that in addition to the loss of ill-trained soldiers, his veterans
were the largest group of indisposed troops. He described his raw recruits as follows:
“Of those who appear under arms, a very great number are unfit to take the field, in
consequence of indispositions contracted in the last movement to the Lacole.”71
Izzard immediately recognized the alarming dearth of supplies and the lack of
discipline among his troops. Even the most well-trained forces would have struggled
mightily without supplies and with most of their ranks indisposed by illness. While
Izard did not connect this lack of morale and combat readiness to illness and low
supplies, the correlation occurred too frequently for that relationship to be
insignificant.
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In two subsequent letters, he recognized the nature of the petit guerre conflict,
as well as how the poor health policies of Wilkinson had denied him of his best
troops. In a 9 May 1814 letter to Secretary Armstrong, he observed how poor supplies
of pay and clothing were limiting both his Dragoon Cavalry and Riflemen, two
detachments essential to effective small war tactics. The riflemen were without pay
and “several desertions have taken place from these two corps since my arrival” while
“the dragoons are without clothing; their arms, with scarcely an exception, unfit for
use.”72 Poor supplies sapped him of superior forces for rapid harassment and
fortifying his lines of communications, precisely when the British were implementing
measures to secure their own. Armstrong maintained after the British victory,
partially won by the excellent light Canadian Voltigeurs, that “he will be compelled
to hazard a battle in defence of his communications.”73 However, the difficult
operations would have to be spearheaded by new recruits, because poor health policy
and low supplies had eliminated a large portion of the seasoned regulars. The
Secretary of War replied that “It is matter of serious regret that, in our oldest corps, an
attention to police and a knowledge of duty are yet very deficient.”74 Izard would
have to do more than Wilkinson without his veterans, because most of them remained
on the sick list after the Battle of Lacolle Mills.
A series of letters from General Izard and John Armstrong dated 8 May is
extremely telling. Armstrong emphatically repeated his concerns about troops lacking
proper clothing. Armstrong pointed out that “The report you make of the troops is

72

Izard to Armstrong from Plattsburgh 9 May 1814, Izard Correspondence, 4.
Armstrong to Izard from DC 28 April 1814, Izard Correspondence, 5.
74
Armstrong to Izard from DC 28 April 1814, Izard Correspondence, 6.
73

114

painful…Of clothing, there has been the most detestable abuses.”75 To make matters
worse, Izard’s troops had been exposed to a disease that George Washington’s
Continentals took pains to eliminate a generation earlier, and British leaders in the
Seven Years War were known to manipulate. Izard reported that “The senior hospital
surgeon reported to me yesterday, that a case of small pox has occurred in the
cantonment.”76 There was no hiding the disdain that Izard felt about a complete lack
of preparedness for a disease with a well-known cure. Izard described the efforts to
stop the spread: “Every precaution is taking to prevent infection – and there not being
any kine (sic) pox matter in this part of the country, an express has been sent to
Albany for the purpose of procuring some. It is unfortunate that this was not done by
the proper department some weeks ago.”77 The Army’s logistics system struggled to
provide the supplies to stop the diseases of previous wars, and the bodies of America
soldiers suffered. It is not surprising that many soldiers faced courts-martial for
desertion to seek care at home, or how the lack of adequate medical supplies, clothes,
and food made Izard’s force inactive for most of 1814.78
While the Americans felt betrayed by their people, the British viewed their
problems as driven by the harsh environment. Although Upper Canada was a distant
campaign of the Napoleonic Wars, this was still the Army of Wellington, and as such
it exploited the light infantry tactics that excelled at management of isolated frontier
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supply lines. Light infantry is often understood in terms of the soldier’s load, but it
emerged as a force that excelled at foraging and being supplied solely by pack horses.
The frontier militia on both sides of the conflict were the forces that excelled the most
at light infantry tactics, and while they rarely received laurels, such tactics often had
the most impact on the outcome. The early American army’s institutional culture,
however, emphasized character and patriotism. And while that did much to inspire
soldiers during battle, it achieved fewer results in sustained motivation during longterm privation. The American philosophy on nature was based on morality, and in
crisis, soldiers could endure much. Yet over time that motivation diminished. The
British approached nature more pragmatically and were thus able to achieve much
with fewer direct military engagements. The practical, light infantry-based
operational strategy was able to achieve more through a sustained system than the
Americans could achieve through impressive performance in combat.
The 1814 campaign should also illustrate how military tactics are a
representation of practical natural philosophy that is often divergent among elite
intellectuals, best outlined in the work of William Cronon.79 Likewise, ideas like
natural philosophy or moral patriotism were met with real-world circumstances.
Nationalism in American units helped to win battles, but the system that embraced
environmental realities nullified their gains. The environment, like most of the
geographical and environmental histories of Canada, was “parsimonious,” and that
meant that smaller lighter forces were the best troops for long-term gains. The critical
action at Lundy’s Lane was won on the field, yet the campaign was abandoned
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because militia cut the Americans off from their supply lines. The British also had the
wisdom to release their militia to their homes in order to simplify supply challenges,
only to have those militiamen return when needed most. Drummond accepted a
smaller force that he could supply rather than fully employing his large contingent of
reinforcements. The Americans achieved what they sought to do at the outset of the
campaign: increase the reputation of the American Army through courage in battle.
However, the U.S. Army’s inability to gain lasting advantage from their victories, and
the simultaneous attack on Washington D.C., led to little collective understanding of
their achievements. The British commanders are often seen in history as conventional
thinkers who overemphasized heavy infantry in pitched battles, but during the
summer of 1814 they more readily embraced a light infantry approach, The
Americans, on the other hand, focused on carrying fields of action.
Ironically, the British Army of the free-thinking Duke of Wellington returned
to a system with ill-trained aristocratic officers with enough wealth to purchase their
commissions and learned very little from the conflict.80 The adaptive light infantry of
the War of 1812 and of the Peninsular War would primarily be abandoned for parade
soldiers and inexperienced officers. In America, conversely, a veteran of the 1814
campaign, Winfield Scott, would reform the army officer’s corps and make West
Point into a first-class merit-based institution.81 The less well-studied father of
American army logistics, Thomas Sidney Jesup, leveraged his frustrations during the
80
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1814 campaign into his development of a capable logistical system. The American
Army would later dominate a much more significant Mexican force, mainly because
of the experience that officers such as Scott and Jesup gained in Upper Canada. On
the opposing side, however, the British victory would lead to the famous charge of
the light brigade in 1854 during the Crimean War. Jesup’s environmental lessons
were transferred to the generals that excelled in the U.S. Civil War. The next chapter
explores the role of liquor on combat motivation. Soldiers needed alcohol to fortify
them for both combat and the experience of harsh nature. Morale in the War of 1812
was about ideas, but it was also about what filled the stomachs of soldiers.
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CHAPTER 3
LIQUOR AND SOLDIER MOTIVATION
“But fighting is not the part of a soldier’s life”1

Exceptional scholarly works by early American historians on the War of 1812
have recently emerged. As previously discussed, Nicole Eustace and Alan Taylor’s
books have covered the issues of patriotism and soldier motivation as well as military
professionalism.2 Nicole Eustace’s intellectual approach to the history of emotion and
patriotism does much to capture what elite print cultural sources believed about
patriotism.3 Nationalism dominates the Canadian interpretation morale during the
War of 1812, both in the work of scholars like Donald Graves who glorify British
victories.4 Also Canadian nationalism complicates interpretation because the defense
of the border was fundamental to creating a Canadian nation-state. The defense of
Canada from a larger American Army in the War of 1812 has, from the inception of
the Canadian national Confederation, has been central to Canadian patriotic identity.5
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Canadian technical military historians from the time of C. P. Stacey repeatedly
reemphasize the challenge of defending the border between American and Canada
and the competence of British and Canadian military leaders.6 This heroic memory of
the defense rarely recognizes a key feature of that defense. Much of Canada was an
extremely inhospitable place in environmental terms, even if parsimony has been a
central theme in the historical-geographical studies of the country.7 In reality, soldiers
on both sides required stiff drinks to cope with the emotional challenges presented by
the frontier border region of Upper Canada. A close study of the whiskey ration
during the War of 1812 will illustrate that patriotism may have influenced the minds
of elites, but it also occurred in the stomachs of soldiers, whose officers often
excelled at inspiring their soldiers through raised rations. Liquor was not always a
source of poor professionalism because the use of alcohol encouraged patriotism and
soldier motivation.
An examination of the use of alcohol helps to merge the historiography of the
War of 1812 with John Keegan's paradigm-shifting The Face of Battle, as well as to
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add nuance to the arguments of Taylor and Eustace.8 John Keegan’s work challenged
the idea of understanding warfare purely logically by exploring the emotional
experiences of soldiers and the fog of war. Fatigue was the chief complaint of soldiers
fighting in the War of 1812, and increased liquor rations were the best remedy. Rather
than Keegan’s emphasis on alcohol consumption before battles, something unique
was happening in North America where alcohol served as protection from nature and
fatigue. Proper alcohol use was not a form of drunkenness; instead it was a remedy.
The use of a depressant to treat fatigue offers many insights into the soldiers’
experience of war in the Early Republic and casts light on psychological conditions
like shell shock, Battle Fatigue, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Additionally, by
recognizing the environmental struggle and adaptation of the British Army and
Canadian Militia, the War of 1812 can be better connected to a Canadian national
identity based upon overcoming a harsh, parsimonious environment.9 Most
importantly, examining the use of whiskey elucidates the experience of morale and
patriotism among ordinary soldiers.
John Lynn best describes service motivation in terms of three key themes:
motivation to join the military, sustained motivation, and combat motivation.10 White
and Native American alcohol use was one tool to manage both sustained and combat
motivation. Sustained motivation applies to the difficulties of managing camp life, as
well as marching and exposure to the elements. Combat motivation pertains to
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discipline under fire, including the horrors of battle. Native American use of alcohol
to manage motivation was used rhetorically to dehumanize them.11 The daily liquor
ration for whites was thought to be helpful to improve their health. However, Native
American alcohol use was considered detrimental to their health. White soldiers
typically received a pint of liquor before a battle to manage their morale, yet for white
observers, Native Americans were not capable of handling their animal lust when
drinking alcohol during a battle.12 Officers were only criticized for alcohol use if it
affected their performance, while the white soldier drunken escapades were
considered “frolics.”13 Alcohol was considered a tool managed by whites, but
something that unleashed the purported animal tendencies in Native Americans.14 The
brutality of the conflict would, therefore, be profoundly shaped by the use of alcohol.
While historians often criticize U.S. Army officers for unprofessionalism, their use of
the liquor ration often showed their capability of managing sustained motivation.
The best War of 1812 example of a leader with exceptional performance who
motivated soldiers with alcohol was James Miller. Miller, who rose from the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General and received four Congressional Gold
Medals for heroism, also excelled at managing the morale and inspiring patriotism in
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his soldiers.15 For the soldiers of the Fourth Infantry Regiment, merely arriving at the
battlefields of Northern Ohio, Michigan Territory, and Upper Canada represented the
most significant challenge. Serving as a private, Adam Walker described ascending
the Wabash River. “We daily obliged (sic) to wade the river, and haul the boats after
us over the rapids,” he noted, and the force was quickly stricken with “the fever, and
ague.”16 The morale could have dropped significantly if not for “the humane and
generous Col. Miller” who “in many instances perform(ed) the duties of the common
soldier.”17 Walker praised the inspirational leader’s example, but also illustrated how
central whiskey was to the maintenance of troop morale. He wrote that the soldiers of
the Fourth Infantry Regiment gained “an evening’s respite” through “an extra glass of
whiskey, bestowed by the liberality of our commander.” After the generous ration,
Walker described how alcohol helped improve the regiment’s sustained motivation:
“the unmost harmony and good humor prevailed—no contention—no murmuring—
all cheerfully performed their duty.”18 While the frontier environment may cripple a
unit through sickness, whiskey served as a method to maintain the spirits of soldiers.
Miller was also generous after battles. His detachment received 2,000 rations
following a battle at the village of Maguaga (the United States called this the Battle of
Brownstown), and he returned to Fort Detroit with 896 rations of whiskey.19 This
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supplement was necessary after a battle and a storm that debilitated and “fatigued” his
soldiers.20 Miller understood the role of alcohol for both the sustained and combat
motivation of his soldiers.
British officers also recognized the need for liquor rations on the frontier. In a
brigade order that limited liquor rations for soldiers placed in barracks during the
winter, the order also called for distributing rum to active soldiers. In an adjutant
order, Edward Baynes described the need for alcohol in frontier posts. Soldiers
“occupying Frontier Piquets(sic), and such detachments as may occupy posts of
Observation, and Stations not affording the Comfort and accommodation of Regular
Barracks, or be employed in the charge of Convoy of Stores, who are to continue
to receive Rum.”21 Even efforts to limit drunkenness had to incorporate the value of
liquor rations for active frontier service. The King’s Regiment, 2nd Battalion 8th
Regiment of Foot, justified the loss of two elite grenadiers to desertion, by noting an
increased alcohol ration to raise morale. Phineas Riall described their sickness
because of the hardships with the frontier environment. Riall connected sickness to
place and environment in a March 1814 letter to Gordon Drummond: “The Men are
Sick of the Place, tired & disgusted with the constant labor to which they see no end
& have got sulky and dissatisfied.”22 Because of their presence “in that cursed fort” at
Niagara, the soldiers “receive a Ration of Spirits which the others do not,” yet
desertions and high illness rates were still problems. Both sides of the conflict sought
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to sustain morale and fortify the constitutions of soldiers using distilled spirits; at the
same time, they tried to limit intoxication. While the King’s 8th Regiment struggled
despite receiving a liquor ration, other accounts demonstrate increased combat
effectiveness attributed to a well-timed liquor ration.
In another account, the lack of whiskey corresponded with high rates of
illness. Thomas G. Ridout described many incapacitated soldiers at Saint David’s,
Near Montreal, in October 1813. The force in garrison guard duties at Saint David’s
was “ruined by petty affairs.”23 In an August 1813 letter to a family member, Ridout
described a rise of illness due to low alcohol rations: “The Army have been these two
days out of whiskey. There is great deal of ague among the men.”24 Low coat supplies
were a problem but not an immediate one in August, but the most pressing supply
issue was the lack of liquor. In John Lynn’s classification, alcohol was a vital aspect
of maintaining both sustained and combat motivation. Double rations of alcohol were
typically issued in combat, but Ridout’s letter indicates how daily rations managed
the health and sustained the motivation of soldiers for all daily duties.25
In 1814 the rum ration was again employed to manage the sustained
motivations of soldiers isolated in the frontier environment. Returning to the subject
of the King’s Regiment’s struggles, Major General Gordon Drummond made it very
clear that it was the result of environmental challenges. Storms kept Drummond away
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from forward positions, via the Royal Navy transport, so the 8th Regiment suffered
severely because of “excessively severe” weather. The lack of good weather removed
eliminated supplies and led to sickness. Gordon Drummond forwarded the
recommendation of the regimental surgeon, to remove the King’s Regiment, to
George Prevost: “I am sorry to report to Your Excellency, that sickness is prevalent in
the King’s regiment, principally ague and dysentery; and the Senior Medical Officer
of the Regiment recommends their immediate removal from Niagara.”26 In addition to
the King’s Regiment, sickness also incapacitated the 103rd Regiment of Foot. In 1814
Drummond stated that “There is so much disease in the 103rd, and that corps is in
every other respect useless and inefficient, and there is so much occasion of
an efficient Regiment in the neighborhood of Burlington.”27 However, in 1814, the
naturally poor weather also hindered the American advance. Drummond may have
struggled on the frontier, but he understood that the environment hindered the U.S.
Army as well. In a letter to George Prevost, Drummond stated that “The Weather
being uncommonly Severe, and not being in possession of any information relative to
the situation of the Enemy’s Main Body…It is evident that he has abandoned all ideas
of offensive operations against this frontier.”28 Alcohol was the mechanism to
manage sustained motivation, but the environment overwhelmed the ability of both
forces to keep soldiers in the field. However, in 1814 Drummond and the British
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Army seemed to grasp these challenges better than their opponents in the American
Army.
Spirits on the American frontier helped soldiers endure the environment at a
time when nature was considered dangerous, rather than restorative.29 Generous
whiskey rations often made a difference in the outcome of battles and coincided with
John Lynn’s definition of combat motivation. When leaving an untenable
fortification, Major G. D. Young had to attack an enemy position via a night march.
Recognizing the need to fortify his soldier for the evening march, Young “ordered the
men to be furnished with two days rations of provisions with double rations of
whiskey.”30 Twentieth-century ideals of sober military professionalism may dismiss
such rations before a major operation. However, Young’s force achieved great
success. Young described the effective night maneuver in a brief narrative of the
“Affair at Saint Regis” as follows: “At 11 at night, we marched with the utmost
silence, that we might give little alarm as possible.”31 A double ration of whiskey was
a full pint a day, but a silent night movement could not have demonstrated more
poise. Young described how “we entered the place without even being heard by the
Indians’ dogs.”32 For the British, the only difference was the favoring of rum over
frontier whiskey, save for when they had captured American stores. On the march to
Queenston Heights, Private Byfield Shadrach nonchalantly described the issue of
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rum: “A noggin of rum was given to each man. We then move on for the field of
action.”33 In a time when nature and frontiers were frightening, alcohol could serve as
an essential source of liquid courage. Moreover, drinking alcohol rather than pursing
sobriety facilitated poise. When circumstances prevented the distribution of whiskey,
commanders could justify their losses on the field of battle honorably.
After the British defeat at the Battle of Lake Erie, Captain Robert Heriot’s
Court-Martial revealed a low rate of spirits in his force, as well as the value of the
liquor ration during a battle on the remote frontier lake. Lieutenant Thomas Clark
revealed that Captain Barclay’s flagship went without liquor for two weeks before the
battle. At Barclay’s Court Martial Clark testified that “We might have had a Weeks at
half Allowance of Provisions but not of Spirits they were preserved for the Action,
and all consumed that day, we had none served out for several days before.”34 Even
after the judicious retention of liquor for combat, the lack of a provision of spirits
before the action contributed to the outcome. Barclay lost the battle but fought
bravely and used alcohol the right way to preserve morale. After a defeat on a
movement from Fort George to Beaver Dams, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Boerstler
justified his failure because an attack on his supply wagons separated his men from
their whiskey. His soldiers “had marched eleven miles that morning without
refreshment; they had fought three hours, the weather very warm, and consequently
the troops were much exhausted.”35 He described mounting casualties by “skulking”
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Native Americans, yet the capture of whiskey was their most significant loss.36
Boerstler’s narrative described his willingness to fight, but not against intoxicated
Native Americans. As he noted, “The commanding officer thought of ordering them a
ration of whiskey, but some Indians getting in our rear and commencing a fire there
was not time.”37 With high casualties and low morale, Boerstler was forced to
surrender his force. Boerstler led a small detachment, but his defeat coincided with
other losses and led to the resignation of Henry Dearborn and transition to the inept
commander Major James Wilkinson. Without alcohol, it was challenging to maintain
combat motivation over the long battle at Beaver Dams. The loss of Boerstler’s force
was a part of a series of actions in 1813 that led to a near nervous breakdown of
Major General Henry Dearborn and was one of many unsuccessful battles in the
Niagara region.38
The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, near Niagara Falls, was the most significant
American victory in the northern theater of the War of 1812. Yet it went mostly
uncelebrated. The American forces returned to their camp, rather than retaining the
field of battle, so both sides claimed victory. The U.S. Army maintained their
positions and captured the British guns, in the face of repeated charges from the
British Army, which had been strengthened by veteran regiment arriving in North
America from the Peninsular Campaign against Napoleon. The attacks were so severe
that James Miller and Eleazer Ripley were the only general officers still standing.
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Afterward, General Ripley was subject to a Court of Inquiry. The court represented a
formal challenge to his reputation because he ordered his army to withdraw to their
camp. General Ripley had to retire his force because they had fought all day without
anything to drink. Ripley described the need to leave the field for sustenance: “An
interval not to exceed three-quarters of an hour, ensued; during which, all was
darkness and silence; scarce interrupted by a breath of air. The men had neither water
nor whiskey to refresh themselves, after the fatigue they endured."39 While it is not
wise to dismiss dehydration, the whiskey ration was more consistently employed to
prevent fatigued soldiers from breakdown during and after combat. Again, the British
use of Native Americans with the addition of light infantry-style militiamen stopped
the issue of a whiskey ration at a critical moment in the outcome of the battle. All
sides understood the value of the whiskey ration, but the British commanders’ use of
petite guerre tactics gave them a significant military advantage because they
consistently separated the Americans from their liquor.
Colonel Henry Leavenworth took command of his regiment after the injury of
Winfield Scott At Lundy’s Lane. Leavenworth described how issuing rations were
outside of Ripley’s control: “To refresh the men on the field would be hazardous in
the extreme, and we were liable to be flanked on our left, and cut off from our camp
at Chippewa.”40 While holding a field was no longer necessary to claim victory, the
U.S. Army’s landmark victory in Niagara was tarnished by a movement back to camp
to refresh soldiers. While these soldiers received meals, water, and whiskey in camp,
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drinking alcohol was most commonly linked to combat motivation. Holding the field
would not have been useful if the Army’s morale collapsed.
The connection between the lack of whiskey and poor performance on the
battlefield is significant. However, some of the most compelling accounts of whiskey
and the War of 1812 were the moments when sharing spirits transcended the conflict
and created friendship amongst opponents. Soldiers from differing sides periodically
commiserated with one another through the medium of shared spirits. When Byfield
Shadrach came across a barefoot and frostbitten American soldier, he elected to
provide “some rum” and a pair of shoes. The unnamed prisoner “said he did not
expect to be so treated, if he was taken prisoner, and wept.”41 Rum served a medium
to help the U.S. soldier recover from his mistreatment by other British troops and
exposure to the elements because both sides contended with the same harsh
environment. During the British raid at Black Rock, in Buffalo New York, alcohol
rapidly transitioned from a tense standoff into drinks amongst friends. U.S. Private
James Sloan later wrote that “being unwell I stayed at Dr. Hawley’s tavern all night,”
and his interaction with British soldiers was initially very tense.42 Sloan noted that
“Sergeant Kelly now spoke to me in kinder tone and asked for liquor. I presented him
with a demi-john of excellent cherry bounce.”43 The mixture of fruit and liquor not
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only eased the tensions, but it also served as a mental break for men that typically
tried to kill one another. It was also a drink that required a fusion of fruit with liquor
and spices and would have created a far more familiar representation of home and
family. Sloan described the generous sharing of alcohol as follows: “After filling their
canteens and taking a few hearty swigs, in which I joined them, we were now on the
best of terms, and it was agreed I should remain and go to bed again as the most
secure place.”44 When Kelly died of minor wounds on a march from Amherstburg,
Sloan memorialized his new friend: “His wound done bad on the road, and poor
Kelley was laid in the dust.”45 Cherry bounce or rum could also serve as a kind offer
from one opponent to another, in a war where both capitals of Washington and York
were destroyed in anger. Compassionately sharing liquor reveals how soldiers on both
sides suffered in much the same ways and were willing to see similarities in their
opponents. It shows that the management of sustained combat motivation through
alcohol transcended the sides of the conflict; however, later analyses will illustrate
how this compassion did not transcend race.
Perhaps the best lens to understand how British and U.S. commanders defined
the professional use of alcohol to combat a brutal wilderness were instances of misuse
of alcohol. Most accounts describe the abuse of alcohol by Native Americans and
serve as accounts illustrating difference and otherness. These descriptions are less
valuable as historical observation of lived experiences, and more as the definition of
what fell out of the realm of proper use of alcohol. This next section will first
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describe the few documented instances of alcohol abuse by white soldiers, then
catalog how the definition of tribal drinking enhanced the sense of otherness in a
progressively brutal conflict. The accounts of improper alcohol use did not advocate
for abstinence, or even what today would be considered sobriety. Alcohol was a tool
for the management of health and morale, but the same drinking was considered
misuse when Native Americans were concerned.
The abuse of alcohol was described as childish only when attributed to white
soldiers. Frolics were punishable but in ways harmless events that received
punishment without the high moral judgment reserved for others. Private William
Harris was charged and convicted for “Rioting” for striking a fellow soldier and
breaking “the window of a citizen.”46 Private William Brown was guilty of desertion
because during a frolic, but faced lenient punishment because “he is very fond of
liquor which is his only flaw.”47 Instead of being punished for desertion, Brown was
convicted for Absence Without Leave (AWOL), because he was a great soldier when
not intoxicated. Thomas Perkins was a more significant case that was dealt with as a
hilarious drunken escapade because of his combat record. Perkins went “crazy” and
drank too much following combat service as a gunboat commander on Lake Erie.
When asked “whether Perkins is man apt to frolic?” Reuben Merrill answered as
follows: “He drinks a great deal and appears kind of crazy.” Perkins had twice
sounded an alarm in Burlington which resulted in the “seducing two soldiers of the
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U.S. Army from their duties.”48 The serious charge of inducing soldiers to mutiny
could have cost him his life, yet Perkins was not executed because of his independent
combat action and tendency towards drunken frivolity. Typically, a soldier who was
absent without leave and induced other soldiers to desert could be executed.
However, the court only denied Perkins access to alcohol by placing him on hard
labor without his whiskey ration because it concluded his actions were frivolous.
Soldiers abusing alcohol were described in playful terminology, while white authors
described Native Americans like animals.
The British likewise dealt with disciplinary problems related to drunkenness
as a result of frivolity and mischief. In an 1812 district order Major Thomas Evans
restricted soldier’s recreation to eliminate drunken frolics. In his general orders,
Evans referred to “the disorderly and intoxicated state of the soldiers of the line
during the five last days, he is under the necessity of ordering that except servants no
soldier shall, until further orders, be permitted to leave his quarters.”49 Soldiers were
not expected to regulate their behavior when intoxicated as long as they caused no
problems. Soldiers could not purchase spirits from locals, in addition to the generous
ration, “so long as the enemy may think proper to threaten the safety of the
frontier.”50 Soldiers were expected to drink when commanders allowed the alcohol,
but citizens were not permitted to provide additional spirits. Evans further described
the prohibition on soldiers acquiring there own alcohol: “The Major-General has
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thought proper to forbid persons on the line of defense between Niagara and Fort Erie
from selling Spirits except by license and under such restrictions as may be conducive
to the good of His Majesty’s service.”51 Officers punished soldiers for purchasing the
alcohol; soldiers were expected to drink when provided the means of more spirits
through double rations. When a drunken militiaman, listed as Private Chambray, beat
up an invalid, he was criticized but unpunished because the officer of the guard was
expected to prevent drunk soldiers from rioting. The standard ration was more than
four drinks, as defined by the typical alcohol concentration of one beer, and a double
ration was eight and a half drinks. Adjutant General Edward Baynes offered a
problematic account of drunkenness. Which was “less worthy credit, on the part
of Cambray, because it is proved, that he was much in Liquor and the Man with
whom he fought, is a Wounded Invalid, deprived of the use of one of his Arms.”52
Soldiers were expected to have drunken escapades, and since Cambray was on a post,
he was criticized and not punished. However, similar behavior by officers was
deemed unbecoming, and excessive drinking by Native Americans was synonymous
with animal behavior.
Officers drank improperly when observers described their use of alcohol as
free or excessive. Alcohol was a tool that was both necessary and could be overused.
During the invasion of Lower Canada led by Major General James Wilkinson,
contemporaries criticized General Wade Hampton because excessive alcohol use
limited his ability. His subordinate, Colonel Robert Purdy, criticized Hampton's
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performance: “As a reference to the orders issued by him will show, mark very
strongly the capriciousness of his conduct and the total want of steadiness in his
intentions.”53 Hampton gained his position through previous high performance, yet in
1813 alcohol significantly influenced his performance. Colonel Purdy observed that
“Such has been the General’s conduct on some occasions that I have, in common with
other officers, been induced to believe that he was under the influence of a too free
use of spirituous liquors.”54 General Hampton’s poor performance was directly
related not to normal alcohol use, but the excessive use of spirits. A gill was a half a
pint and was the daily ration, so it would not take much more to lead to poor
decisions. Due to different roles, rations useful to manage soldier motivations could
significantly affect officers’ decision making.
The divergence of officer and soldier expectations on alcohol use was present
in the writing of British Major Thomas Evans. At the Battle of Queenston Heights,
Evans resorted to freeing soldiers arrested for behavior caused by drunkenness
because of the “imminence and magnitude of the danger.”55 Still, Evans was
reluctant, but the circumstances of an American invasion meant that soldiers needed
to be free from alcohol-related crimes based upon combat necessity. In an October
1812 letter, Evans described his leniency due to combat necessity: “I hesitated not
assuming the responsibility of liberating all the 49th prisoners, on the specious plea of
their offense proceeding from too free indulgence in drink.”56 The soldiers were
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released to the more trying circumstance of battle as “proof of their loyalty and
courage, which they were assured would be severely tested.”57 The line between legal
and criminal drunkenness was situational, and courage under fire could erase the
problems associated with the free use of alcohol. Still, the line between the proper and
improper use of alcohol had much to do with the individual’s rank because an officer
who consumed similar amounts of alcohol delivered to soldiers was prone to poor
decision making. Dimming one’s wits was useful before plunging a bayonet into an
opponent but was a detriment to skillful command under fire.
Since American alliances with Native Americans rarely occurred during the
hostilities, it may follow that the British muted criticism of their Native American
allies. However, the British description of the alcohol consumption of their allies was
significantly harsh. Lieutenant Colonel J. Harvey, Major General Drummond’s
adjutant, gave specific instructions not allowing captured alcohol to fall into the
hands of Native Americans. Harvey ordered Major General Phineas Riall to “use your
best exertions, and require all under your command to do the same, in restraining the
savage propensities of the Indian warriors, and to give protection to the persons and
property of such Inhabitants as may remain in their Houses.”58 The British, like most
Europeans in North America, believed that Native Americans could not contain their
savageness, and alcohol made it impossible for less human allies to restrain their
passions.59 Jon Harvey stated that “All liquors should be destroyed, to prevent its
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falling into the hands of the Indians or Troops.”60 The denial of captured liquor to
troops was used to prevent drunken unprofessionalism amongst white soldiers, but in
the case of Native Americans, it was employed to restrain “savage propensities.”
Whites attributed brutality in the conflict to inebriated Native Americans.
Major General Gordon Drummond reported that “the Indians who advanced with M
General Riall’s force on the Morning of the 18th (December 1813) had committed
great excesses (in consequence of intoxication) and had burnt the greatest part of the
Houses in Lewiston.”61 Officers often dismissed the brutality of conflict characterized
by growing examples of reciprocal violence because of intoxication. When Shawnee
warriors executed wounded U.S. prisoners of war at Raisin River, Captain William
Hamilton Merritt attributed the tragic event to intoxicated Native Americans. Merritt
stated that “Some of the wounded were left in the house near the action. The Indians
are getting drunk and brutally massacred them in cold blood; although the officers of
the department exert themselves in an extraordinary manner to prevent it.”62 British
officers had difficulty “controlling” their allies, yet they found it impossible to
restrain the brutality of inebriated tribal allies. American prisoner William Atherton
observed, “It has been said, and perhaps with due regard to truth, that many of the
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Indians engaged in this dreadful havoc, were under the influence of rum.”63 American
accounts of the War of 1812 illustrate that the Northwestern Army burned and
pillaged multiple tribal villages immediately after the outset of hostilities.64 Rather
than recognizing the reciprocity of tribal attacks, like at Raisin River, U.S. and British
accounts portrayed Native American alcohol use as animal and savage, even though
most soldiers were provided liquor before battles and might well have been equally
intoxicated.
The Raisin River massacre, in the Michigan Territory, tempered the views of
Americans, especially American prisoners of war. When left in the custody of Native
Americans, American prisoners had the highest anxiety level when their captors were
consuming alcohol. William Atherton’s account of captivity observed the Raisin
River Massacre from a wounded prisoner’s perspective. He noted, “They were
supplied with it by the British, and when under its influence were more savage than
savages.”65 Atherton leveled blame on the British officers using the same logic of the
British that Native Americans could never contain their savage nature while
intoxicated. When captured, Atherton was highly disappointed that he was not held
by the British as a prisoner. At Fort Malden, Atherton observed that “I saw that the
Indians were drunk. Here my fears were again alarmed—being in the midst of a
savage camp.”66 After witnessing the Raisin River massacre firsthand, Atherton
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arrived in a camp with intoxicated Native Americans heightened his fears, and he
further expressed his beliefs on the temperament of inebriated Native Americans. The
“lusts” of Native Americans were not containable when under the influence of
alcohol; Atherton saw “the blood scores fresh upon them—and under the influence of
strong drink! While the Indians kept sober I had some hope of protection.”67 From the
perspective of the British and American accounts, alcohol use led to courage in battle
or dysfunctional frivolity in white soldiers, but alcohol made Native American
passions unrestrainable and led to brutal savagery. However, from the American
perspective, British Army officers exploited Native American savageness by
intentionally providing allies with excessive amounts of spirits. There were proper
and improper uses of alcohol by both armies, and Native American use of alcohol
served to strengthen ideas about the right and wrong way to consume it.68
David Livingston Smith’s recent survey of dehumanization emphasized the
role of language used to describe opponents as animals.69 Contemporary descriptions
of Native American alcohol use often used racially charged animal comparisons.
After a drinking “spree,” Atherton’s life was in danger from the supposed uncheck
bloodlust of his captors.70 As Atherton described his fear, “I now felt myself in
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danger, for one of them attempted to take my life; I escaped because he was drunk
and could not get me. That night the squaws hid me out in the woods behind a log in
the snow.”71 Every moment of intoxication was unbearable for Atherton because he
believed Native Americans would revert to their animal nature, but he also thought it
made it easier to outsmart them. Atherton described his narrow survival: “The Indians
were lying about round the fires like hounds after a hard chase; the whiskey was
dying in them, and they were sleepy and sick.”72 With the help of women he was able
to ward off the brutal advances of his captors consistently. The British also believed
that Native Americans brutalized American prisoners. As previously mentioned,
Byfield Shadrach significantly restored the morale of an American prisoner by
providing rum and fresh shoes, but Shadrach was also implored to prevent Native
American brutality. After providing rum for the unnamed American prisoner,
Shadrach observed the emotional response: “He said he did not expect to be so
treated.”73 Americans described British officers who incited the brutality of savages,
yet when British men in the ranks captured U.S. soldiers there was more cordiality.
U.S. soldiers felt safe with British soldiers as captors; however, when held by Native
Americans, they felt imperiled, and the U.S. often linked attacks on prisoners to the
orders of British officers.
Some accounts described extraordinary efforts to prevent wounded American
soldiers from capture by intoxicated Native Americans. Major Isaac Roach struggled
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to keep his friend Captain McChesney from bleeding to death while hiding him from
Kahnawake warriors. Roach stated that “My time was occupied in attending to my
friend McChesney whose wound was very painful, as the ball passed through the
wrist joint and cut off the blood vessel, when he was shot being near me.”74 Roach’s
tourniquet was unable to stop the bleeding, but his most difficult challenge was
keeping his dying friend away from drunken Native Americans. Roach “barricaded
the door and armed with McChesney's sword I watched him all night, at one time I
expected the Indians to break into our room, as they were in the house.”75 His
elevated fears of losing McChesney occurred because they “were surrounded by
savages intoxicated by the liquor found in our wagons,” therefore, Roach believed
that the Native Americans could not restrain their animal tendencies.76 Under fire,
Roach employed his musicians to carry “the wounded to the rear, to prevent their
falling into the hands of the enemy.”77 During the Battle of Beaver dams much effort
was made to prevent their execution by Native Americans because they were
intoxicated, but despite surrendering to the British, the British transferred Roach’s
troops to Native American captors. Despite Roach’s efforts, he stated that “Nearly all
of our wounded were killed that night.”78 McChesney would fight with Roach in the
future. It was thus likely that Native Americans would execute soldiers who could not
keep pace on the march. The American fear of Native American atrocity was
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heightened significantly when Native Americans used intoxication in much the same
way white soldiers managed combat and sustained motivation.
While American prisoners had the most to fear, some of the worst descriptions
of Native American “savage” behavior came from their allies. In a letter from
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Dewar to Colonel Henry Proctor, Dewar described the
mistreatment of “A poor Canadian of the name Denault (sic)” whose horse was
senselessly killed by Native American allies.79 When Denault “found the horse
yesterday in the Town mounted by two Indians, he seized it, and they struck him, but
procuring assistance, and the Indians finding themselves compell’d(sic) submit, they
ran their swords thro’ the Animals body.”80 The senseless brutality to a civilian and a
defenseless animal had occurred “perhaps forty or fifty” times.81 Dewar’s description
of Native American “brutality” confirmed British expectations because they were
intoxicated. Dewar stated that “what aggravates the evil is that liquor is again sold
here to Soldiers, from whom the Indians procure it.”82 British officers serving with
Native Americans worked to limit alcohol use by their allies. The Indian department
records repeated requests for Native Americans to use alcohol appropriately, outside
of proximity with their opponents. William Claus described a give and take between
the Seven Nations and the Indian department. Like white soldiers, “Desiré (of the La
Cloche) complains that the change of climate made some sickness and that makes
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them think of going back, not the enemy.”83 The ill Native Americans requested the
same medicine that white soldiers used, yet for whites, Native Americans could not
contain their lusts near their enemies. Claus responded, “Brothers! I thank you and
will tell your father. You still hold him by the hand. The liquor you ask for you shall
get, but I hope you will take’t very cautiously so near the enemy.”84 Drinking to
excess was something that Europeans did before battles, and would do so until the
Somme in the First World War, yet the Native American allies were believed not to
be able to control themselves when under the influence of strong drink. 85
William Claus would further illustrate the contradictions between white and
Native American drinking. When describing the Chippewa as “Western Indians,” he
reflected on their motivations: “A few nights ago they spoke of going, but it appears
they did it only as an excuse for asking for some liquor.”86 White men drank liquor to
help endure combat, the harsh environment, and military camp life. However, whites
described Native American alcohol use as an expression of animal lust, thereby
reifying existing ideas about difference. Native Americans performed the unheralded
light infantry tasks that helped preserve the British North American provinces.
However, whenever Native Americans used alcohol in much in the same manner than
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British and Americans units, they were considered animals with unrestrainable lusts.
The realities of warfare in the early nineteenth century mean that alcohol was
necessary for both combat and sustained motivation, yet Native American alcohol use
magnified perceived differences between races.
It is most surprising that a thorough review of the War of 1812 alcohol records
reveals that alcohol often improved combat effectiveness, probably as a result of a
placebo effect. Perhaps soldiers performed better because they believed alcohol
helped them, and something like ice cream could have done the same thing to help
soldiers manage stress. However, veterans who endure repeated terrible experiences
do not seek counseling and group therapy for ice cream addiction, but they struggle
significantly with alcoholism. Principally because trauma survivors typically can fall
asleep more easily after becoming intoxicated, only the dehydrating effects of alcohol
lead to poor overall sleep. Poor sleep, however, is sleep. Alcohol significantly affects
the places in the brain influenced by trauma in the short term, while causing systemic
and irreversible long-term problems. Judging any soldier’s combat experience on the
North American frontier from a long-term perspective is problematic, and placing
contemporary definitions of drunkenness on them is similarly flawed. John Keegan
describes more problems with alcohol use at the Somme in 1917 than at the battle of
Waterloo in 1815.87 In a preindustrial society soldiers did not operate complex
machinery. Sobriety was not required to operate early nineteenth-century weapons,
but many soldiers were so malnourished, and any calories were valuable, regardless
of long-term problems. If alcoholism prevented medical treatment with purgatives
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and opiates, then it was ultimately better. The use of alcohol was not the best option,
it was not even a good option, but it was an acceptable one. Survival in wilderness
warfare during the War of 1812 was not about reaching an ideal solution; it was about
the least bad options. Soldiers and officers recognized the least bad outcomes by
getting the most out of generous rations of alcohol.
In his famed work, “The Trouble with Wilderness,” William Cronon
cataloged the problems of preserving sacred nature versus more ordinary
landscapes.88 Likewise, scholars like Roderick Nash have elevated ideas about nature
posited by intellectual elites, disconnected from day-to-day practical experience in the
wilderness.89 Soldiers of the War of 1812 experienced the frontier and wilderness
environment in a way that challenges such sacrosanct and restorative ideas about
nature. The use of whiskey and rum to fortify the bodies of soldiers for fatiguing
wilderness marches, the occupation of isolated outposts, and for morale in frontier
battles represent critical insights into how early nineteenth-century people were
interacting with a wilderness that was far more dangerous than invigorating. The
soldier experience with nature in the War of 1812 required the consistent use of
alcohol to prevent desertion and preserve morale. Likewise, intellectual studies of
war-related trauma indicate that the most significant predictor of PTSD (behind being
physically injured), is the perception of being in a dangerous place. As such, the
ubiquitous descriptions of fatigue caused by the environment in the War of 1812, as
well as the temporary efficacy of alcohol, offer a powerful example in a longer story
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about war and psychology. The field of trauma is dominated by work exploring the
emotional burden of killing, while soldiers report the challenges of fighting in harsh
environments as far more mentally taxing. Examining how the frontier environment
affected the health of soldiers opens questions about the emergence of a natural
philosophy that worshiped the unspoiled wild. Pragmatic participants in the northern
campaign of the War of 1812 required alcohol to endure the ravages of nature. The
liquor ration also illustrates how soldiers and officers made the most of their limited
resources. Ideas about patriotism were significant but were secondary to material
factors such as generous rations of whiskey and rum during the crises of frontier
combat and prolonged exposure to a harsh wilderness environment.
Furthermore, alcohol use solidified the sense of racial difference, while
sometimes uniting soldiers in a way that transcended the conflict. One of the worst
things a contemporary white man could do was allow Native Americans access to
large quantities of alcohol. Additionally, soldiers on both sides often bonded with one
another by sharing alcohol. For white soldiers, the enemy often suffered the same
hardships as themselves, and alcohol was a method of mutual commiseration. This
shared humanity, however, was not extended to Native American combatants.
Moreover, when Native Americans used alcohol in the same manner as
whites, they were described as animals. During the War of 1812, whites most often
attributed atrocities to free use of alcohol by Native Americans. The day-to-day liquor
ration has made little impact on the historiography of the War of 1812, but this
chapter illustrates just how central it was to the soldier’s daily experience, as well as
heightening the sense of racial difference. It is easy to assume that the liquor ration
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was antithetical to good order and discipline, but it dramatically illustrates just how
painful the daily experience of combat was for the common soldier during the War of
1812. It is easier to condescend rather than understand why soldiers consumed half a
pint of whiskey once a day, but the liquor ration offers vital insights into how soldiers
overcame the daily drudgery of frontier service and combat. Likewise, the use of
alcohol as a desperate but often necessary means to preserve morale integrates with
the next chapter’s focus on the role of nutrition and food insecurity. Like the use of
alcohol to maintain morale, it also important to note that hunger and food insecurity
are far more damaging psychologically, as well as to health in general, than combat.
Understanding the War of 1812 from company level documents further illustrates the
challenges of soldier motivation.
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CHAPTER 4
WARFARE AT THE COMPANY LEVEL:
JOSEPH TREAT AND HIS UNIT’S WAR AGAINST NATURE

While the previous two chapters have focused on topics such as hunger and
alcohol, this chapter explores the War of 1812 from U.S. company-level records.
Company-level leadership has not yet had a major influence on the War of 1812’s
historiography. In an era when soldiers’ accounts were written by a small number of
men whose education and ability to publish manuscripts set them apart from the
typical rank and file, company-level sources consisted primarily of order books that
recorded rations, present for duty rosters, clothing records, and muster rolls. Most
soldiers could not remain on the company rolls past their first maneuver. Company
records provide better insight into the nature of a war in which, no matter how
experienced a regiment became on paper, illness and day-to-day losses meant that the
rolls were persistently filled with new recruits. The American army of that period has
typically been considered inept and unprofessional.1 Moreover, operational history
tends to ignore environmental factors. However, analyzing the war from the company
level reveals how difficult it was for commanders to retain seasoned veterans because
of the unique ecological challenges of the Upper Canadian frontier.
Reconstruction of the history of any single company in the War of 1812 is
extremely challenging, because company-level records are sparse, pragmatic
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documents. There are few narrative descriptions, yet the day-to-day details of men in
or out of the ranks, food supplies, and muster records provide the best sense of the
significant non-battle influences on the larger conflict. Company records are the best
records of what soldiers did because they provide data on how they died, how many
were fit-for-duty, what they ate, their professions before the war, and what type of
fighting was typical for them. What soldiers did strengthens our understanding of
what officers reported in dispatches. And more importantly, they emphasize the
difficulty of merely surviving camp life and campaigning. Like soldiers in the
twentieth century, who often stressed how the daily dullness of military service
outweighs moments of terror in battles, the company level records during the War of
1812 extend our understanding of the daily grind of soldiering.
A close study of Joseph Treat’s leadership as a company commander in the
21st Infantry Regiment provides an in-depth look at one unit in the War of 1812.
Given his court-martial, memoir, and detailed company order book, Joseph Treat was
one of the most carefully studied junior officers from the conflict. His two order
books are arguably the most detailed company-level documents relating to the War of
1812. After being honorably acquitted of General Jacob Brown’s accusations about
his alleged negligence at the Battle of Chippewa, Treat remained in Brown’s Army.
However, Treat was denied participation in some of the U.S. Army’s most significant
victories at the Battle of Bridgewater/Lundy’s Lane and the siege of Fort Erie. Treat’s
denial of command during his regiment’s finest battles led him to publish The
Vindication of Captain Joseph Treat against the Atrocious Calumny Comprehended
in Major General Brown’s Official Report of the Battle of Chippeway. The rich
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sources covering Treat’s company reveal the complexity of a conflict that was fought
using innovative and challenging light infantry tactics, and they show that the
Northern Army’s service on a distant frontier meant that illness was a more
formidable challenge than battles with the enemy. In short, a close analysis of Captain
Treat’s company illustrates that the War of 1812 was a messy, complicated, and
controversial conflict in which New Englanders played a significant role despite the
political opposition of their Federalist states. Tragically, while New England states
periodically served as the primary suppliers of the British army through smuggling,
their regular soldiers suffered from malnutrition and fell ill.2 This betrayal meant that
New Englanders were more likely to describe the harsher side of war, even as they
sought the romantic battlefield glory commonly desired by joining an army in
wartime.
As a field of academic history, the War of 1812 has largely escaped the
advances of the “New Military History,” and it is generally lacking in social history.
Alan Taylor’s two recent books have won both great acclaim and the author’s second
Pulitzer Prize, and have helped to create a social history of the conflict. Taylor’s
approach lacks an attention to the nuances of military institutional culture.3 Military
histories of the War of 1812 have focused almost solely on tactics, and on battle and
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campaign analyses, with a smaller emphasis on matters of logistics and day-to-day
operations. A company-level study of the conflict provides much-needed insight into
the center of balance of the conflict and challenges both fields of inquiry. The War of
1812 was a frontier conflict; battlefield victories were rarely decisive. The socialhistorical field has elevated soldier suffering and officer incompetence without
grappling with human agency, perseverance, and camaraderie gained through
suffering. Soldiers and officers were happy to suffer if it led to battlefield laurels. The
soldiers in Joseph Treat’s Company maintained a reasonable degree of health because
their commander adapted to the climate. After Treat’s removal, however, the
company’s losses increased significantly. An approach that investigates the health of
soldiers and the operational management of health should help unite these two
seemingly irreconcilable approaches to the conflict.
Historians have described soldiers’ experiences in the war, yet the role of
junior officers lacks a thorough analysis. Three accounts of highly successful junior
officers reveal that Joseph Treat was a promising and able young officer, whose
previous promotion to Captain was the best proof of his courage and capacity. This
lack of scholarly emphasis on company-level leadership is disheartening because of
officers like Josiah Snelling, who started the war as a Captain but finished as a
Colonel, and Thomas Sidney Jesup, who began the conflict as a Lieutenant and
finished as a Lieutenant Colonel in Command of Regiment.4 Additionally, Captain
Zachary Taylor distinguished himself as a Captain while in command of Fort

Thomas Sidney Jesup, Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, Library of Congress. Josiah Snelling “The
Journal of Josiah Snelling,” Minnesota Historical Society, 1938.
4
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Harrison, and began a career that led eventually to the White House.5 Snelling and
Jesup became regimental commanders for similar reasons; Snelling emerged as the
strongest captain in the Fourth Infantry Regiment during both Tippecanoe and the
Battle of Brownstown. Leading the vanguard of the attack at Brownstown, or the
village of Maguaga, Snelling was central to the only victory during William Hull's
disastrous campaign that culminated in his surrender at Detroit.6 After being captured
as a Lieutenant, Jesup gained the rank of Brigade Major. He was released from
captivity without being exchanged and therefore could not serve as a combatant. As
such he emerged as the chief logistician of William Henry Harrison’s campaign in the
Old Northwest. After taking command of his regiment at the Battle of
Bridgewater/Lundy’s Lane, the Army promoted Jesup to Lieutenant Colonel.7 Taylor,
while not commanding a regiment during the war, led a small, isolated force of
mostly ill soldiers against a large contingent of Shawnee tribesman. Although he was
so sick that he could not even remain awake for the entire siege of fewer than thirtysix hours, Taylor somehow managed to hold his fortification against several attacks.8
These three accounts of junior officers are the most extreme examples of Captains
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gaining high status in the war. For most, being mentioned in dispatches was the
highest measure of performance.
During the War of 1812, the U.S. Army granted two principal awards that
officers could receive. The first was a Congressional Gold Medal, an award primarily
reserved for the commanders of battlefield victories, but which at times was given to
subordinate officers whose bravery led to a victory. The second award was the Brevet
promotion for temporary rank during the conflict, which, during the War of 1812
when the Army was struggling to fill its ranks, often led to permanent promotions.
Because there were only two formal means of promoting or awarding officers, junior
officers typically could expect at best to be mentioned positively in the dispatches
describing a battle. The most certain way to make it into dispatches was to die or
become severely wounded, yet officers were also singled out for competence,
bravery, or serving under fire while unfit for duty.9
Another less well-known path to gain a reputation in dispatches was in the
manner that officers cared for soldiers. Typically, this resulted from empathy, but to
some degree, these were novel public health policies. Although of a higher ranking
than Snelling’s Regimental Commander, James Miller singled himself out by the care
of his soldier’s blisters during the march from New England to Ohio.10 While there is
little evidence of Snelling positively influencing soldier health during the war, his
journal of command at Fort Snelling illustrated how the growth of healthy crops
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outweighed the benefits of drills and maneuvers.11 Similarly, Jesup distinguished
himself at Fort Harrison by paying for clothing for recaptured prisoners from his own
income.12 The junior officers in Treat’s regiment were particularly effective at
adapting to the environmental challenges and reducing casualties. Treat and his
officer contemporaries, such as James Miller, Josiah Snelling, and Thomas Sidney
Jesup, excelled at managing soldier health.
Campaigning in Canada was not possible for much of the winter, so the
fighting season occurred when logistics became more difficult, and illness was more
problematic. Wagons were impossible on muddy roads, so supplies were transported
via the soldier’s load, the use of packhorses, and by subsisting off the countryside.13
While most of the historiographical research on malaria has been focused on
southern climates, in the north winter forced armies to fight during the most virulent
seasons.14 The regulars, who were the most disciplined soldiers on campaign, suffered
higher rates of communicable camp-based sicknesses because regular regiments
recruited soldiers from more diverse locations than militia units drawn from specific
communities.15 As a result, regular soldiers suffered illness and were often unfit for
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duty within weeks of joining their regiment. No early modern publisher would
produce a memoir of a soldier who took ill after his first forced march, or during his
first weeks in a military camp, which accounts for the scarcity for accounts and
makes company-level muster records so crucial for an accurate understanding what
the war was like for soldiers and junior officers.
The 21st Infantry Regiment fought in every battle in the Buffalo-based
Niagara campaign of the War of 1812. Joseph Treat started as a lieutenant in his
regiment and moved up to the rank of Captain before the 1814 campaign. Treat was
promoted and singled out for praise by his commanding officer for his service at the
Battle of Chrysler’s Farm.16 While Treat was not an officer of the acclaim of Thomas
Jesup or Josiah Snelling, promotion in the US Army was typically an award for
bravery. An exploration of Treat’s court-martial reveals that his soldiers and noncommissioned officers supported their leader. Even with the wellspring of
information available concerning Joseph Treat, he does not appear in written records
before he assumed command of his company. His leadership only technically covered
the Battle of Chippewa because he was formally in command; he was held as a
prisoner of Jacob Brown after the battle. Treat’s order book described the day-to-day
experiences of the company in great detail. Unfortunately for Treat, his years of quiet
unrecorded professionalism have next to no explanation, yet his worst day as a
commander has been meticulously preserved. His order book and self-defensive
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manuscript do, however, provide extraordinary evidence into day-to-day operations
and the struggle against the environment to keep soldiers healthy and in the ranks.
They also illuminate the role that small-scale skirmishes played on the outcome of the
War of 1812.

New Englanders Suffering in Republican Conflict

First, it is essential to illustrate that New Englanders served in the regular
units of the U.S. Army more than southerners. The U.S. National Archives holds an
extensive collection of War of 1812 era muster records, and these sources reveal the
dominance of New England-based soldiers in the Army’s rolls.17 The prevalence of
New England accounts could be attributed to higher rates of literacy. Short serving
junior officers may have been more literate in New England, and the work of J. C. A.
Stagg has proven that the elites were not the principal group making up the officer
corps.18 For example, the order book of Virginian Captain Byrd C. Williams has the
least information found in company records. He merely had a clothing record that
recorded deaths and discharges in margins.19 The shared record book for Captains
John McRae and John Standard’s company also has very few reports, and the
Virginian accounts of junior officers are the sparsest records.20
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The scant records of Virginian junior officers stand in contrast to more
extensive records kept by New England-based officers. Alan Taylor’s recent Pulitzer
Prize-winning book, The Internal Enemy, catalogues how British naval raids
employed freed slaves to threaten Virginian plantations.21 These naval raids
supported slave uprisings that threatened southern states, requiring a large contingent
of southern regiments remitted to garrison duties. Southern-dominated DemocraticRepublicans championed a war and believed the invasion of Canada would be a
“Mere matter of marching,” yet southern states could only field a few troops for
service outside of the region.22
New England opposition to the war did not preclude them from feats of
heroism. A private dialogue about the performance of officers from Hillsborough,
New Hampshire, is particularly revealing of the contribution of New England-based
regular Army regiments. The following account, from a letter sent from Benjamin
Price to Major John McNeil, illustrates the contradictions between campaigns
principally fought by New Englanders and opposed politically by New Englanders.
McNeil stated that “You were fortunate in having the command of the 11th Regt.—
Captn. Crooked has dutifully upheld himself & also the brave Col. (James) Miller—

1821, Records of Units, Infantry, 1789-1815 20th Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington D.C., Entry 231.
21
Taylor, The Internal Enemy. This also is a good example of the central paradox of American history
argued by Edmund Morgan in American Slavery, American Freedom. Southern Republicans called for
a war with Great Britain but were too busy subjugated chattel property. See Edmund Morgan,
American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1975).
22
Henry Stephens Randall. The Life of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. 3, (New York: Derby & Jackson, 1858),
368. Gordon S Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Cambridge:
Oxford University Press, 2009).

158

you are all from the county of Hillsborough.”23 During Treat’s detainment, New
Englanders like John McNeil, James Miller, and Henry Leavenworth distinguished
themselves at the Battle of Bridgewater/Lundy’s Lane. Treat suffered and was injured
in service but was denied the honor of leading troops in his regiment’s most
consequential victory, missing out on the laurels that would have justified his daily
frustrating experiences as a New England army officer in the War of 1812.
Order books are often incomplete working documents prone to omissions, but
the records of Treat’s fellow company commanders help paint a clearer picture of
what his Maine-based company endured. The order books of the 21st Infantry
Regiment are extremely telling documents. Like most U.S. military order books, they
did not start actively measuring present for duty data through morning reports until
1814, but these practical documents reveal a great deal about the nature of the
conflict. The number of illnesses is significantly higher than those of soldiers
wounded in combat. Captains Lemuel Bradford, Morrill Marston, and Charles Proctor
all had companies in the same regiment as Treat, and their records provide extensive
data describing both the present for duty totals as well as the soldiers who were sick
and absent. In their documents the sickness occurred after an action or battle, and
after a period of low rations. In an aggregated list of one hundred and three deaths,
seventy-four soldiers died of illnesses: nineteen “of fever,” sixteen “unknown,” two
of “Consumption,” one of dysentery, and thirty-six unspecified (one of whom died in
captivity), as well Private Stocy Thompson, who died of “insanity” on 5 October
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1813.24 It is important to note briefly that Thompson’s death occurred in conjunction
with most of the fever deaths, and the fatiguing illnesses were sometimes hard to
separate from psychoses. The 21st Infantry fought at Queenston Heights, Chrysler’s
Farm, Chippewa, Bridgewater, and the Siege at Fort Erie, yet lost twenty-nine
soldiers to wounds.25 Twenty-nine in the bloodiest battle of the war was less than half
of the number of soldiers lost to illness. As a regiment fielded from Queenston
Heights to Fort Erie, the 21st Regiment’s battlefield deaths could have easily
overtaken illness, making it especially tragic that men who had survived so much
fighting died due to disease. For the duration of the conflict, the aggregate company
records illustrate how the 21st Regiment lost the sum of a company’s strength to
deaths and had roughly seventy-two percent of those deaths attributed to sickness.
The aggregate regimental losses of seventy-four soldiers to illness matched the
number of privates present for duty, which numbered in the mid-thirties for each
company. Bradford’s company had the highest numbers of soldiers in the regiment,
with sixty-one privates present for duty at their first engagement at Queenston; this
was more significant than the sixty-two present for duty in the same company after
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the war ended in January 1815.26 The environment claimed far more lives than the
British coalition of regulars, Canadian militias, and Native American warriors.
Sickness also influenced the present for duty numbers by placing men in
hospitals. Charles Proctor, another commander from Captain Treat’s Regiment, had
forty-one soldiers in hospitals during 1814, most of them in the fall when his present
for duty numbers were in the twenties.27 Seventeen hospitalizations occurred after a
period of low rations. Soldiers joined for battlefield heroics but instead suffered death
and disability due to low rations and high rates of sickness.28 Lemuel Bradford
recorded forty-eight soldiers in hospital, and though many of them occurred in
October of 1814 when there were many documented cases of illness, there are no
descriptions of why the soldiers were in the hospital.29 However, this corresponded
with high rains that hindered logistics and led to low rations. Mosquito-carried
illnesses debilitated soldiers, but soldiers were incapacitated after weather hindered
logistics. Of the forty-one dead listed in Proctor’s book, only two were killed in
action. The remaining thirty-nine deaths due to illness were far more extensive than
his present for duty soldiers. Appropriately, Proctor’s book includes one of the most
significant quotations regarding the nature of war experienced by men in the 21st
Regiment. More than a year before Jacob Brown’s Command Major orders, he stated:
“Our ranks must not be thinned in camp or Quarters the Gallant Soldiers must not
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perish ingloriously in filth & wretchedness.”30 No matter how the 21st Regiment
demonstrated repeated gallantry on the battlefield, they suffered more from the harsh
environment and lack of supplies.
Many soldiers incapacitated by illness were present with their companies, but
unfit for duty. Of the previously listed causes of deaths, some have individual
descriptions next to the soldiers’ muster data, stating that they died “on the march.”
Charles Proctor recorded Privates John Lewis and Oliver Fletcher as having died “On
the March” in an unknown location to describe two of his otherwise unspecified
deaths.31 While some died, many soldiers were left at garrisons on the line of march.
Lemuel Bradford listed Daniel Lane and Sylvester Ahord as both being left at
Greenbush as one example of soldiers who could not march and were left at the safest
possible location.32 The War of 1812 would bring the 21st Regiment many battlefield
heroics, but that provided little solace to men left on the road to die or to be captured
by the enemy. Joseph Treat’s company recorded twenty-five soldiers sick and present
in July of 1814, nineteen of which occurred during the Battle of Bridgewater.33 Only
forty-five were listed as present for duty before the battle, which was close to half of
the company’s force.34 For example, Bradford had seventeen soldiers sick for much
of September 1814 at Fort Erie, leaving him twenty-five to twenty-six privates
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present for duty.35 Although the U.S. forces prevailed through highly successful
attacks against the British powder magazine, Major Thomas Sidney Jesup – himself
wounded with his arm in a sling – commanded the defense of the fort with the
invalids and a small group of uninjured soldiers. The victory was achieved, under
significant duress caused by high rates of sickness.36 The sick served actively in
defense of fortifications.
The records of the 21st Infantry indicate that the regiment with the most
battlefield experience lost most of its soldiers to poor health and low supplies.37 High
turnover rates were the nature of the war fought by New Englanders and by the
Mainers in Joseph Treat’s company. The data from the other companies are useful
because they provide a significant period before Treat’s assumption of command in
1814. Captain Treat was in the regiment before his order books because the
regimental commander testified to his service under fire at Chrysler’s Farm.38 His
previous commander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. Upham, testified to his service “as an
attentive and vigilant officer” after witnessing Treat’s “gallant conduct at Chrysler’s
Field.”39 Based on the dates of his order book and Upham’s character testimony, it is
evident Treat had advanced in the ranks based on his service in the campaigns of
1813. Moreover, his order book provides ample evidence that he was well-liked by
his company.
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An Exceptional Document
Treat’s order book is among the most detailed among the War of 1812
documents in the National Archives. His attentiveness to details relating to how many
of his soldiers were present and how many absent because of sickness occur are
unmatched in other documents.40 Most records also have one master muster roll for
the entire company for the duration of the command, but Treat updated his book
periodically with new waves of enlistments, transfers, and losses.41 It is fortunate for
Maine history that the company in the regular army composed most significantly of
men from Maine had the most meticulous officer, and it is even more fortunate for
historians that Treat was subject to such a significant controversy.42 These nuanced
differences may seem like small matters, but it meant that the information available
from Treat’s company provided greater details about the lives of soldiers.
Company order books tend to be incredibly monotonous and practical sources.
They primarily chronicle enlistment records, daily and monthly reports on soldiers
present for duty, clothing records, and returns on provisions. They also include lists of
deaths, soldiers absent at hospitals, and troops on furlough. It is challenging to
determine the signal through the noise of all the data present in such working
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documents. However, one section reveals a difference in Treat’s leadership
philosophy. Three furloughs were unique when compared to the wider U.S. Army.
Of the three leaves that stand out, two involved Mainers. These records
consist of two soldiers recovering from injuries and another permanently disabled and
at home while drawing his pay for the duration of his enlistment due to a major
wound. Corporal Othaniel Cross lost an arm and he receive his pay while Furloughed
ay home in Portsmouth from 14 July 1814 to 13 June 1817. Cross’s pension records
placed him in Massachusetts from 1843 to 1863.43 It was rare for enlisted soldiers to
survive amputations, but officers typically experienced better outcomes. Othaniel
received immediate support from his unit that continued to the second half of the
nineteenth century. Normally soldiers in his position would be discharged with a
recommended pension, but in Treat’s company Cross received his pay for the
duration of his enlistment due to his sacrifice at York. Major General Jacob Brown
approved the furlough. Treat also furloughed two other soldiers to Bangor. Joseph
Kasey and Stephen Parmiten were both “unfit for duty” and allowed leave in Bangor
and rejoined their company in June 1814.44 Both soldiers were unfit without reference
to a wound, which universally meant illness, and both soldiers returned to duty after
convalescing at home. Officers were typically allowed the privilege of convalescing
at home, but U.S. court-martial records overflow with cases of soldiers charged with
desertions because they sought care from their families after commanders denied

43

Treat, Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol I, 61-2,
Othaniel Cross, Ledgers of Payments, 1818-1872, to U.S. Pensioners Under Acts of 1818 Through
1858 From Records of the Office of the Third Auditor of the Treasury, 1818-1872 (National Archives
Microfilm Publication T718, 23 rolls); Records of the Accounting Officers of the Department of the
Treasury, Record Group 217; National Archives, Washington, D.C. accessed from Ancestry.com. U.S.
Pensioners, 1818-1872 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc., 2007.
44
Treat, Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol I, 61-62.

165

them furloughs.45 Close attention to data in two meticulous books reveals how
exceptional Treat was compared with other American company commanders. The
policy was astute, because units fighting in Upper Canada rarely had adequate
medical stores and provisions. Transporting soldiers home to convalesce with their
families and trusted caregivers thus freed up resources that were always in short
supply.
Treat understood that soldiers healed better at home, and his soldiers stayed fit
while he was in command. Having served while ill and lame after falling off a horse
was a critical feature of Joseph Treat’s defense at his court-martial, as well as a
source of his bitterness at not having shared in the glories of his regiment and
company. He shared the day-to-day drudgery, inadequate rations, and illness, but was
denied the laurels of battles at Bridgewater and Fort Erie. Even after being relieved at
Chippewa, he carried a musket as a private until his Regimental commander gave him
a platoon to command. Suffering on campaign created the most significant loss and
had the most profound effect on the soldiers, but battlefield glory was what they
sought to remember and record. Treat’s line of reasoning was that he had suffered the
drudgery. He had marched into Upper Canada despite a doctor ruling that he was
unfit for the march, and he deserved to command his company in battle. Battles were
a terrible reward for serving in an environment that was even more horrible and
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challenging than the enemy. Other accounts on both sides of the conflict illustrate
how serving wounded or ill was a great honor.46 Officers, who more often
convalesced at home with family on furloughs, were considered a class by themselves
when serving ill, injured, or lame.
By all accounts, Captain Treat was lame and sick due to a fall from a horse,
yet he chose to lead his company in its movement into Upper Canada. At Treat’s
court-martial, Dr. Everett, the surgeon of the 21st Infantry, testified that in June Treat
was “thrown from his horse.” According to Everett, Captain Treat was “bruised in
several places, especially on his leg: I attended him, and recollect that he was very
lame, and had a tumor on his leg, which unfitted him for duty.”47 Still, Treat chose to
lead his men “against the advice of Dr. Allen and myself.”48 Treat’s tumor, which
was most likely an infection, illustrated how injuries often turned into illnesses that
incapacitated soldiers for extended periods.
What was unique about Treat’s lameness was how it affected Major General
Jacob Brown’s criticism of him. An undetected force of light infantry attacked Treat’s
command of the pickets around Brown's army.49 In the process of linking up pickets
with the larger camp, Treat’s hodgepodge of troops came under fire.50 In a mixed unit
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made up principally of new recruits, many of his troops fled in fear. Treat tried to
rally his soldiers who had returned to camp, recover the casualties, and pursue the
enemy.51 However, Brown relieved Treat instantly for cowardice, but all the officers
present testified to Treat coming into camp to allow an artillery battery attack the
enemy.52 Captain Treat was calm and collected but lame and unimpressive looking.
Brown relieved him for his actions while ill during a small-scale light infantry
skirmish, thereby denying him the battlefield honors he sought despite his wounds
and illness.

Defense of Honor and Denied Glory

The testimony also clearly indicates that although Treat was decisive and calm
under fire, due to his lameness he did not always look the part of an officer. Officers
and non-commissioned officers supported Treat as being “cool and collected under
fire,” with Corporals Gale and Barton, as well as Sergeant Holt, Captain Gilbert, and
Major Biddle all testifying to his disciplined demeanor.53 No one offered testimony
against him. The ugly skirmish that yielded no victor deprived him of his honor of
leading men in the battles that would follow. Brown’s sacking of a cool-headed leader
was an exceptional event on both sides of the conflict.
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In most cases, officers who served under fire were singled out for praise in
dispatches rather than censured and arrested. An excellent example of how the British
valued officers serving while unfit comes in the description of Captain Jenkins, the
commander of a company in the Glengarry light infantry. Captain Jenkins “Fixed
Bayonets & pushed forward, but had not proceeded many paces when his left arm
(which he had since lost) was smashed to pieces with a grape shot.”54 Afterwards his
right arm was “severely lacerated by canister, but he still ran on cheering his men to
attack till his arms dangling useless before him.”55 In the same letter, Lieutenant
Colonel MacDonell provided comparable praise for Ensign Lowrie, who “had left his
sick bed to join his company.”56 In a November 1812 naval battle, a Captain Jacob
James commended a Lieutenant Claxton who was too ill to command his division, but
who “remained upon the deck and showed by his composed manner” with resolution
despite being ill. Claxton’s illness eventually cost him his life, but not his honor.57
Officers were symbols more than fighters, and Captain Treat performed exactly as he
should have to inspire his soldiers. Treat’s performance in a bad situation explains
why he “volunteered and went with his company and carried his musket,” serving as
a private in the following battle to maintain further the honorable conduct of leaving
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his sick bed to command his company.58 His service while ill also explains why his
non-commissioned officers supported him during his court-martial.
The testimony of non-commissioned officers could never overturn the charges
of a Major General in the regular army, so their testimony was less useful for Treat’s
defense than that of officers. But their testimonies do offer insights into how soldiers
perceived their commanders. From his regiment, Corporals Gale, Fellows, and
Barton, as well as Sergeant Holt, all testified to the capability and character of their
commander.59 The court-martial ended after the testimony of two officers, so their
testimony solved little; nonetheless, it provides a rare glimpse into the point of view
of Maine soldiers. Corporal Gale’s testimony was that the attack on the “piquets”
(sic) was very disoriented, and they were not sure who was firing at them in “very tall
grass.”60 Treat had to muster all his energy to rally the men and maneuver his platoon
back to camp to prevent fratricide. Gale also observed that “a significant part of the
guard were new recruits,” who cowered and fled to the nearest American position
despite Treat’s orders.61 Constantly fighting with raw recruits was the nature of the
conflict on a distant frontier, where the most experienced infantry regiment in the
Niagara Campaign was crippled by illness and essentially became a force of
unseasoned and inexperienced recruits. Still, Gales observed how Major General
Brown expected Treat to maneuver his troops as on parade and “march his guard to
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where he had been fired upon,” as if his movement to prevent fratricide in an irregular
skirmish was cowardice in the face of the enemy rather than a textbook battlefield
maneuver. By being present despite being lamed by an injury and sickness, Treat
provided inspiration to his green troops. But that did not match Brown’s perception of
the effective appearance of leadership.62
Perhaps the best example of Treat’s stellar leadership came after his arrest and
removal. His experiences demonstrated that combat and campaign experience was
problematic because sickness tended to deny experienced regiments the service of
their veteran soldiers. In Joseph Treat’s company, illness caused more casualties than
the Battle of Bridgewater. At a time when the company’s ranks swelled with twentyseven newly recruited privates, thirty-one soldiers would be fit for the maneuvers in
Upper Canada.63 On the monthly report, forty soldiers were listed as sick or absent,
twenty-nine of which were related to the Battle of Bridgewater.64 On 11 July the
company, swelled by recruits, had seventy-nine privates present for duty; after the
battle it had only forty-eight.65 By August, Captain Treat’s company was platoon-
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sized (less then forty), despite having ninety-eight soldiers on the roster.66 The
company only lost four killed in action and eight to wounds received at the battle, yet
the force lost half of its effectiveness due to illnesses.67 The 21st Infantry Regiment
fought in nearly every battle of the war, but the men that could hold rifles were
almost always recruits. By the time Brown relieved the company of a seasoned and
respect officer, it had been badly crippled by sickness.
Treat, on the other hand, felt like his denial of leadership at Bridgewater was
the forfeiture of the honor he gained through suffering the greater hardships of
campaigning on a distant frontier. Jacob Brown’s detainment of Treat removed him
from his regiment after two years of failed campaigns, and therefore deprived “him of
all the scenes of glory which awaited his comrades in arms.”68 Treat had suffered the
worst that illness, denial of supplies, and a harsh climate could throw at him, and he
believed he deserved to have the opportunity to fight at Bridgewater and the siege of
Fort Erie. As Treat stated, “I repeat sir, if after these multiplied privations, indignities,
and wrongs.” He was most upset that he could not return to command his company;
he firmly believed that he had earned a chance to lead in battle. 69 The day-to-day
sufferings on the campaign entitled him to his regiment’s greatest honors, and the
only privations he described were his denial of the same.
The irregular nature of the small skirmish preceding the battle of Chippewa
also made Treat’s removal from command so upsetting. Skirmishing claimed as many
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lives from the company in July and August of 1814 as did the Battle of Bridgewater,
and smaller actions represented a significant portion of those killed and wounded.70
However, skirmishing was seldom described in detail in the reports of officers, and
the points of view of soldiers were rarely recorded as it was at Treat’s court-martial.
The non-commissioned officers that testified on Treat’s behalf described an
unwinnable clash that created fratricide, and how Treat’s quick retreat prevented
further unnecessary loss of life. Because of Brown’s firing of Treat, other officers
also described the light infantry battle that occurred before the Battle of Chippewa.
Thomas Sidney Jesup described how Major General Phineas Riall used light infantry
and the support of Native Americans. On the Fourth of July, Jesup described how
“Riall’s light troops were discovered in our neighborhood.”71 Riall would use his
light force to support “a body of militia and indians (sic) in the woods.”72 The light
infantry ambush occurred from concealed positions that made their approach nearly
impossible to detect. This ugly and impossible skirmish negated Treat’s laudable
service in previous battles and prevented his participation in his company and
regiment’s greatest successes.
Corporals Gale, Fellows, and Barton, and Sergeant Holt all testified to the
capability and character of their commander, but they also thoroughly described a
pre-battle skirmish.73 Small-scale clashes were plentiful in the War of 1812. Corporal
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Gale explained how Treat took control of a highly disorganized “picquet” (sic) in the
dark of night with little help from the staff officer who ordered him there.74 Gale
stated that “Treat asked the officer of the watch, Major Orne who gave him charge of
the piquet to go with him and show him where to station it. He told Capt. Treat it was
no use to go; he could find it as well as himself.”75 On the march to Chippewa Treat
became more ill, his injuries more bothersome. He desperately needed a restful night,
but the officer of the watch ignored his unfitness. Corporal Gale made it clear that
“When capt. Treat was on the picquet, he complained and seemed very lame.”76
Nonetheless, Treat struggled to accomplish his assignment, despite inadequate
guidance and his infirmity. Gale described the general confusion: “It being dark, it
was some time before captain Treat could find the sentinels of the picquet (sic). He
placed his sentinels, but they would not reach to the other picquet (sic) which he had
not found.”77 Treat stumbled in the darkness because the former officer in command
of the watch performed an inadequate relief. Thus, it is no surprise that when Captain
Treat’s force was fired on in the morning, it was impossible to determine whether
friend or foe attacked him. A prompt court of inquiry would have acquitted him with
enough alacrity for Treat to have served the remainder of the campaign, but he was
denied that honor without cause.
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Corporal Gale further articulated that the skirmish was a great surprise that
shocked the untrained recruits. When asked about the number of casualties, Gale
stated that there were “three; one of which was accidentally by a bayonet in his leg.”78
Gale was not the only soldier to testify to the utter confusion of the battle. He
described the chaos as follows: “I thought as well as others, that it was the piquet
firing on us.”79 All of the soldiers testified to tall grass concealing the enemy and
being close to the larger fortification, and a link-up with friendly forces is one of the
most difficult of maneuvers to achieve under fire.80 Being so close to the American
position and a U.S. battery, it was clear to most of the soldiers that there was a
significant risk of the fort mistaking them for the enemy. Many of the newer recruits
fled directly to an artillery battery that was located close to the planned assembly
point for the patrol, and according to Corporal Fellows, “upon that, captain Treat
spoke out pretty loudly, to halt and form, several times.”81 In the chaos of concealed
fire – during which it was impossible to determine whether it came from friend or foe
– and being so close to a base, the unit broke in different directions in confusion. The
wounded soldiers were left behind. However, this circumstantially chaotic skirmish
occurred within in the direct view of Major General Jacob Brown, who discovered at
the same time Captain Treat did that he had men left behind. Despite the regiment’s
extensive combat experience, high rates of illness had left the company with
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untrained soldiers who reacted poorly to the more difficult patrol tasks of asymmetric
warfare.
Most of the war that Treat and his Maine Company experienced did not mirror
the glories of a pitched battlefield. They died mostly of illness or ambushes, and in
skirmishes that would never materialize into battle streamers on their regimental
colors. Even battles like Bridgewater put more men on the sick list than were
wounded or killed by wounds. Treat, having suffered illness and injury that made him
officially unfit for duty, then survived an ugly, chaotic, and fratricidal skirmish.
Everyone who testified at the court-marshal noted that Treat had remained cool and in
command.82 The losses and sufferings of the War of 1812 were driven principally by
material forces, including the environment, inadequate supplies, sickness, and
irregular tactics, but the men’s combat motivations were still primarily those of
ideology and a search for honor and glory. Treat and his company had suffered from
the ugly realities of war, and therefore they deserved the battlefield glories that the
regiment received in his absence. Treat’s service in the battle after his relief is
emblematic of a leader who inspired his soldiers, but it also indicated a man who
believed he deserved combat in pitched battles after suffering the privations of years
of campaigning on a distant frontier. His regiment believed in him because, in Treat’s
own words, he “Volunteered my services with a Musket; and on the movement of the
regiment of the flank of the enemy, such was the confidence was placed in me by
Major Vose, who was then the commanding officer of the regiment, that he required
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me to lead a platoon.”83 The soldiers in his regiment understood what they suffered
and how battlefield service was a major motivation, and would not let one contentious
skirmish deny Treat service under fire. That changed when Major General Brown
detained him. Treat’s soldiers persevered significantly better when he was in
command because he was an officer who did all he could to influence their health in a
positive fashion.

Conclusion

Most of the studies of illness and warfare in North American have focused on
the southern regions and climates where the time periods for the transmission of
malaria and yellow fever were longer, or on more well-documented cases of
smallpox.84 This study of one company comprised of Maine-based soldiers illustrates
how illness was a fundamental force in the campaigns in Canada during the War of
1812. When soldiers from what would become Maine volunteered to serve in a
northern climate, they were exposing themselves to a much worse environment for
illness. The harsh winters in the north meant that the campaigns would occur in the
spring, and in the marshy glacial till of Upper Canada and Niagara.85 Since the roads
were muddy for most of the campaign, supplies by land were always unreliable –
even when contracted quartermasters provided the services. Widespread sickness,
mixed detachments that co-occupied garrisons, and the long winter meant that
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soldiers of different towns and cities shared communicable diseases in cramped
tents.86 The border region between the United States and what became Canada was an
ideal environment for the spread of various illnesses that crippled soldiers and made it
nearly impossible for regiments to retain experienced soldiers.
Still, officers prized and sought the glories only found on the battlefield. If
anything, the privations, sickness, and exposure to a harsh climate solidified their
motivation for battlefield exploits. The day-to-day experiences did not match their
ideas of battlefield exaltation. A lack of support betrayed the soldiers of the Northern
Army. When high casualties were reported, the description of the tragedy typically
included language relating to how soldiers were lost to less noble means. They were
denied battlefield glory by infirmity, or they survived great battles only to die of
sickness. Combat motivation was rooted in an ideological drive towards honor, yet
the biggest influences on each company’s active soldiers were material factors such
as the environment, illness, and availability of supplies. The Northern Army felt
betrayed because New England smugglers supplied their enemies while they
starved.87 This generation of veterans became embittered because the harsh realities
of the campaign prevented them from securing the glories of a complete triumph.
The men in Joseph Treat’s Maine Company were from the best possible place
to secure soldiers for a campaign in the frontier between Upper Canada and the
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United States. However, his company was an ever-changing entity with most of its
veterans convalescing in the hospital and recruits filling the ranks. Treat’s company
fought in the bloodiest battles of the war, yet its losses to illness far outweighed
battlefield casualties. Losses to skirmishes that would never draw the collective
acclaim soldiers sought were as common as deaths on the battlefield. War was not
what they believed it would be, but instead of the harsh realities changing their
perspective on war, they clung to a desire to fight great battles. Soldiers of that
generation were not resentful that war did not meet their expectations; instead their
bitterness arose from the fact that they were not supported in such a manner for them
to be able to fight more battles. The early nineteenth century was the era of Napoleon,
constant illness, and few supplies, and ignoble death did little to supplant to the
glories of battlefield courage. A close look at one Maine-based company illustrates
that war, as it was experienced, was close to the harsh fatiguing unreality of the
twentieth century, but this did very little to change the minds of its fighters. The
ideological bias by historical actors was significant. However, this should not
influence the work of scholars, nor turn their attention away from the significance of
material factors on the outcome of the war. The fact that New Englanders fought in
the Northern Army is a vital factor that needs to enrich and perhaps complicate the
historiography of the War of 1812, and a study at the company level reveals the
harsher realities of day-to-day experience despite the penchant of most accounts to
elevate more formal battles. It also illustrates that although the environment claimed
more lives than battle wounds, the policies of officers and the resilience of motivated
soldiers could significantly influence the fit for duty rosters that were central to unit
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effectiveness at the company level. Like the experiences of Joseph Treat’s company
in the 21st Infantry Regiment, an exploration of the Canadian-recruited 104th
Regiment of Foot in the next chapter will offer important insights into the British
Army’s success and failings during the War of 1812.
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CHAPTER 5
WASTED OPPORTUNITIES AND THE 104TH REGIMENT OF FOOT
“Most of them have been brought up in the woods from infancy”1

The 104th Regiment of Foot, one of the most studied units of the War of 1812,
was the only British regiment raised in North America. Like Joseph Treat’s company,
much of the potential of the 104th was wasted by the institutional culture of its leaders. It
benefits from the only national historiography that pays serious attention to the war. For
the United States the war, save for one campaign, was embarrassing; for Great Britain, on
the other hand, it was a sideshow in a broader conflict against Napoleon. The 41st
Regiment of Foot was a regiment with far more significant service in combat, and yet its
less ambitious war record illustrated critical problems with the British military. For much
of the conflict, the 104th Regiment of Foot secured coastal garrisons, only to have its
ranks replaced by invalids as the war progressed. Its arduous march into active
campaigning is legendary, but it mirrored the experience of other regiments that moved
into North America after fighting in Spain and the Mediterranean. The 41st Regiment of
Foot, the most seasoned British infantry unit in the entire conflict, was forced to fight
most of its key actions without adequate support. The largest units of British forces came
in 1814 after daunting service in Spain and were employed at the same time as the 104th
Regiment of Foot. In 1814 they served as separate detachments with various experience
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in light infantry duty until used as standard infantry at the siege of Fort Erie. Due to their
garrison role for two years, most of the service of the 104th was less auspicious.
The 104th Regiment of Foot was formed from the New Brunswick Fencibles in
1811. Fencible units were like militia, however they were employable in broader
conflicts. While militia served in their province, Fencible units could be deployed more
broadly. The formation of the regiment in 1811 occurred before hostilities with America.
However, at the outset there was a rush to purchase newly available commissions. When
drilled, the soldiers in the regiment performed excellently. Yet the officers that purchased
commissions were typically unfit for any meaningful duty in the frontiers where the War
of 1812 was fought. Minus some minor detachments sent to the fighting, the 104th
remained garrisoning in the Maritime Provinces until 1814. In that year the bulk of the
British Army came to North America following their victories against Napoleon in Spain
and Portugal, and the 104th’s final employment comprised a small contingent of a larger
group of reinforcement of the British Army in Upper Canada. The regiment performed
well in light infantry petite guerre, flank company tactics, only after the U.S. Northern
Army reforms led to consistent American victories in major battles. The 104th Regiment
of Foot was relegated to a supporting role for most of the conflict, and only used in the
latter stages of war when their impact and skill in North American warfare mattered the
least.
The hardy British North American fighters were like their American enemies,
skilled at light infantry maneuvers and poor at parade-style grenadier tactics. Being
seasoned to the climate of North American was as essential as combat. Veterans are often
described as combat experienced and or seasoned, but in North America the difference
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between those two attributes illustrate the wasted potential of the 104th Regiment of Foot.
A veteran was experienced in the combat of campaigns and battles, while a seasoned
soldier was fit for the environment. One might assume that the combat veterans were also
seasoned, but not necessarily for the unique North American environment. The units
coming from Europe had more experience in combat but were unprepared for the climate.
The 104th was better adapted to the environment, and being a seasoned unit was more
central to success in the War of 1812. The impressive endurance of the 104th Regiment of
Foot in the closing campaigns of the War of 1812 illustrated how their service in
grarrison for most of the conflict was a waste of resources. The best regiments to help
understand the 104th Regiment were not other Brtish Regiments of Foot, but rather the
foreign regiments composed of Swiss and Spanish soldiers. The majority of the records
of the 104th illustrate the humble role it played for most of the war.
The 104th Regiment of Foot’s most extensive series of records predate their
service in active combat. However, they provide insights into the composition of its
forces. At its formation 104th Regiment of Foot was well soldiered but less than
adequately commanded by long-serving officers who were unfit for an active campaign.
A report on the Captains of the regiments recorded 1,000 soldiers, with officers who
never even made it to their first parade. According to the regimental order book, some
Captains were not fit mentally. One example follows: “Captain Christian is certainly
deranged in his mind, and lame of one leg, he has not done any Duty since his
appointment as Captain in 1803 except Recruiting and is not even fit for that Duty –
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being incapable of keeping Accounts of his (word garbled).”2 Service did not break all of
the officers mentally. Christian’s fellow officers, Captains George von Gereau and
Captain Halles, were either sixty or nearly sixty years of age and had typical infirmities
from long service.3 The leaders were overall old and worn out from long service, and
Maritime Canada was the farthest region from the fight. Perhaps the only young captain
never even made it to the Regiment: “Captain Dennis never joined, reported by the Agent
of the Regiment in a very bad state of health, and not likely to join for a very long time.”4
The soldiers of the Regiment, on the other hand, were probably the most capable British
Force on the Continent for North American light infantry tactics. The Regiment was
“drilled in the light infantry movements” and were “nearly perfect.”5 A war fought on the
frontier of Upper Canada was particularly suited for the hardy backwoodsmen from the
Maritime provinces. According to Major General Martin Hunter, “The men of the 104th
in general are very good Marksmen, and most of them have been brought up in the woods
from their infancy.”6 While the fight between the United States and the Shawnee
Confederation was developing into the first campaign of the War of 1812, unfit officers
led the best soldiers in the British regiment and they were relegated to garrison duty in
the Maritime Provinces.
The Regiment’s records from before the more substantial British shift from war
with Napoleon to war with America, are sparse and utilitarian. However, they are
differentiated from other regimental histories because of their employment of
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unconventional petite guerre tactics. Under constant strain and with heavy losses, most
regiments fighting in the War of 1812 were promoting by ability and merit, albeit due to
necessity because officers without purchased commissions struggled to stay in regiments
after the war.7 The 104th Regiment of Foot’s order book in the spring of 1813 included
minimal reference to conflict, but it spent a great deal of time describing the specifics of
the rates that lieutenants Petit and Rose paid for their commissions. Because this related
to a transfer from the 103rd to 104th regiment, the conflict or misunderstanding was
thoroughly recorded. These two officers overpaid for their Lieutenant commissions into
the 104th, and paymaster of the 103rd advocated and secured their remuneration.8 Other
regiments were actively fighting and were losing officers at a rate that was unsustainable,
yet squabbling officers that purchased commissions commanded the regiment with the
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best fighters for North American backwoods conflict. Because the 104th was commanded
by unfit officers, it could only send small detachments to the active fighting in Upper
Canada.
Although the bulk of the regiment was serving in coastal garrisons in 1812, two
flank companies fought in the active summer season of 1813. Major Moodin served as
the commander of the detachment for the first actions, in and around Fort George. The
104th Regiment of Foot was formed from the New Brunswick Fencibles, which was a unit
composed of volunteers capable of serving at the command of the British regular Army.
In the early stages of the War of 1812, the 41st Regiment of Foot mostly fought alone,
and it is ironic that as a Fencible or militia unit the soldiers of 104th could have supported
the fighting. However, as a newly formed British regiment the bulk of the 104th remained
in garrisons in the Maritime Provinces. The Fencibles followed a command structure that
was much like American volunteer units. The United States Department of War, not state
governors, commanded the volunteers. Similarly, the Fencibles were essentially militia
units controlled by the British Army rather than provincial leaders.
Major Moodin’s letters in the regimental order book contain no descriptions of
named battles. He described his losses of soldiers to desertion and included memorials on
behalf of wounded officers. His account testifies to their service in combat, that consisted
of daily activities rather than a series of set-piece battles. Authors like John Grodzinski
and Austin Squires have not focused on the formative years of the 104th Regiment of Foot
that preceded their combat duty. However, the fact that the British regiment with the best
soldiers for the North American environment was officered almost solely by invalids and
given the lightest duty illustrates the problems the British faced in a broader conflict with
186

Napoleon. The 104th Regiment of Foot was not removed from its garrison duties until it
was relieved by the 10th Royal Veterans Battalion, a unit that was officered principally by
the leaders that previously led the 104th Regiment of Foot.
In its formative stage, the 104th was mostly led by aging men, many with over
thirty years of service. The 41st Regiment of Foot served as the primary regiment in the
conflict with soldiers recruited from Great Britain, and many soldiers with service in the
West Indies carried the diseases that came with such service. The 41st slogged through
every significant battle in 1812-13 and was reformed into a composite battalion through
high rates of attrition, while some of the best backwoods fighters garrisoned the
Maritimes.9 The 104th was relived of its garrison duties after there were enough soldiers
to create veterans battalions composed solely of invalids. John Grodzinski has recently
argued that historians have focused too much on the 104th Regiment of Foot’s arduous
winter march to Upper Canada and have therefore ignored the regiment’s combat
acumen. Grodzinski praised the 104th role in flanking maneuvers during the 1814
campaign, based on an exemplary combat record. However, the fact that the regiment
most skilled at light infantry at the outset of the war was left to garrison duty while
another regiment suffered extreme losses illustrates a wasted opportunity and poor
tactical leadership. The British Army wasted the talents of the 104th because of
institutional insistence on purchased rather than earned commissioning; however, this
would change as the conflict escalated. The 41st Regiment of Foot’s initial victories at
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Detroit and Queenston Heights was followed by more flawed performances in support of
Shawnee and Potawatomi allies who excelled at light infantry tactics.10 The 104th was the
most suitable for such duty, and the soldiers of the 41st suffered significantly without
local fighters who spent their whole lives in the North American backwoods.
The officers who immediately commanded the 104th in 1811 would lead the same
coastal outposts in the 10th Royal Veterans Battalion in 1814. The formation of a new
regiment would not court the best officers, because it was unlikely that the 104th
Regiment of Foot would remain in existence at the end of the Napoleonic War, and a
group of invalid officers prevented the participation of soldiers who were most prepared
for a North American style warfare. A letter on 14 June 1814 described how Captain
George von Gereau, who served as garrison commander at Halifax, had “done duty for
more than nine years with that regiment,” and his long service and ailments placed him in
the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion.11 Captain George von Gereau’s memorial cataloged his
ailments of long service; they also illustrated how the Regiment was manned initially by
infirm officers who often continued to serve as leaders of the Maritime garrisons, only to
later command fellow invalids. The 104th was therefore only able to send a full
complement of soldiers until there were enough losses to illness, age, and injury to man
the coastal garrisons.12 Veterans Battalions were a great idea, but they were used to delay
the employment of an extremely capable light infantry force – the 104th Regiment of
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Foot. Gereau, a German officer with service in Fencible regiments after he survived a
wound in the American Revolution, appeared ideal for a new regiment. Gereau was
highly experienced, even if he was not a prototypical British gentleman. However, after
years of severe service he was only capable of garrison duties. The use of unfit officers to
lead safe garrisons was wise, but it also kept the 104th out of the first years fighting.
Long-serving officer like Gereau were excellent Veteran officers but kept the 104th
Regiment of Foot in garrison when they could have done the most good in an active
combat zone.
In the summer of 1813, the regiment sent individualized flank companies to the
Niagara region. The detachment of flank companies served in the light infantry tasks,
such as scouting, skirmishing in front of line units, and picket duties. In the indirect,
isolated, and independent roles of flank companies, the early combat record noted the
desertion of “fifteen men from the104th Regt.”13 Flank duty was a particularly arduous
duty, so it is no surprise that the previously untested detachments sent to the Niagara
region did not initially fare well. The summer of 1813 was a particularly harsh period
regarding rates of sickness. The regiment had recently lost eighteen soldiers and only
forty-seven percent of soldiers were present for duty. By August only nineteen percent of
men were present for duty.14 The regimental record indicates a small number of casualties
and losses as a result of continuous operations rather than grand actions. A letter from
Kingston on 24 November 1813 described the need to promotes James McLaughlin to
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Ensign because Lieutenant Grave was killed in action at York.15 Like the majority of U.S.
regiments drawn from New England, the Regiment sustained most of its losses because
the fighting occurred during the inclement seasons in marshy Upper Canada, as well as
slow attrition through small-scale skirmishes. McLaughlin’s elevation came because he
was the son of Captain McLaughlin and the regiment was manned primarily by family
groups, often with boys serving in the ranks with their fathers.
The 104th’s transitions from militia, to Fencibles, to British Regiment of Foot
uncovered some unique characteristics – one of which was the extensive service of
children. In February 1814, a return listed forty-four children serving in the Regiment in
an active campaign at the fort at Three Rivers, and ten at Kingston.16 The ages ranged
from ten to sixteen, but ten-year-olds were the largest contingent.17 At the age of ten,
Antoine David already had six years and three months of service; he was three feet seven
inches at his enlistment. Twenty-two ten-year-olds were listed in the regiment.18 Many
were serving with family members, and the records listed one as a noncombatant clerk.19
Geoffrey Worth fought in the 104th with two brothers; one died of wounds and the other
served at the Kingston detachment. John Worth was fifteen years old and Geoffrey was
twelve, and an unnamed brother that was killed in action illustrates that children regularly
served in combat.20 The list itself indicates that there was a realization that the 104th
Regiment of Foot had many soldiers that did not meet the British age requirement of
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fifteen years of age.21 However, because serving in the Regiment was a local and family
affair, British generals were “Satisfied that the 104th Regiment [was] authorized to enlist
Boys at 10 years of age.”22 Fifty-four children serving in the Regiment was a larger
contingent than most companies had in fit-for-duty soldiers; these child soldiers were
ultimately accepted by British Commanders as a necessary. The fact that the 104th
Regiment of Foot actively recruited ten-year-olds, only to serve in garrison duties for
much of the conflict, illustrated a paradox. The British recognized the necessity of
employing ten-year-olds in a locally formed regiment and made exceptions, yet they left
the same regiment in garrison duties for most of the war.
Bringing all the males over the age of ten to combat in Upper Canada created
significant family problems in New Brunswick. The regiment is famous for their rapid
and grueling march from New Brunswick to Niagara, which was a supreme test of
physical endurance. However, the rapid exit from the province created substantial
difficulties for family members who were left behind. Major General Hunter wrote the
Military secretary advocating for the families. According to Hunter, “I felt so much for
the distress of the women, and the families of the other soldiers’ wives belonging to the
104th Regiment, who were left behind when the Corps marched to Canada that I deemed
it my duty to represent their miserable situation.”23 In March 1814, with a massive
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reinforcement of British Regiments following the successful Peninsular campaign in
Spain, simply feeding the families the available rations was a monumental challenge.
Therefore, the Major General requested “permission to go and join their husbands in
Canada…in that case, I beg to know if I may order them rations and passage.”24 Soldiers
in the 104th Regiment fought beside children and left families destitute because of their
rapid movement to Upper Canada. The high rates of desertion are easier to understand in
relation to wives who could not provide for children. Frustration among the troops,
caused by being employed late in the conflict without warning, was widespread. The
deployment of the 104th with the largest contingent of British forces in 1814 meant that
providing rations to families was not a priority.
Child Soldiers and families left destitute were probably exceptional cases specific
to the 104th Regiment of Foot in British North America. However, the necessity of
fighting with twenty-two ten-year-olds was emblematic of the desperate nature of the
fighting in North America. The marshy glacial till of Upper Canada took a severe toll on
the health of soldiers. On 14 May Lieutenant Shaffalisky was medically discharged as
“unfit for military duty…it is understood that he is not to be replaced.”25 The 104th also
lost the active service of Lieutenant C. D. Rankin to parental duties, following the death
of his wife. Rankin simultaneously required a promotion to cover the loss of income
generated by his wife.26 Deceased loved ones at home could often take British officers
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out of the theatre, and even out of North America. As with American units in 1812 and
the Revolution, the adequate clothing of soldiers was a challenge. MacKinnon stated that
“the men had one year’s clothing due, but that he heard they would be very badly off
before the next year comes…the detachment had hardly a coat to wear.”27 Poor clothing
exposed soldiers to cold and made them more susceptible to insect-borne fevers, but also
added to the mental burden of being exposed to the harsh environment. MacKinnon
sought “out the method in which I was to proceed to furnish the men with a covering as
the weather was extremely severe.”28 Exposure to extreme weather without proper
clothing would destroy the regiment’s ability to fight. According to MacKinnon, “I shall
be happy if you have the goodness to direct the steps I am to follow to prevent the detacht
being totally unfit for service.”29 Like the opposing American units, the 104th suffered
from a poor supply of uniforms. Unfortunately, British leaders squandered one of its best
regiments for two years, and when the 104th was finally deployed in force, poor supplies
caused a dramatic loss of soldiers due to preventable illnesses.
As the conflict escalated, the 104th Regiment of Foot served in conventional
military operations. In a rare incident in British accounts, the acting regimental Major R.
Leonard singled out a non-commissioned officer for praise in leadership despite his
injuries. In a letter that recommended Sergeant Richard Smith for an officer’s
commission, Leonard stated that Smith was wounded five times yet did not succumb to
his wounds in the face of the enemy. Leonard noted: “I have only to add that he received
five wounds, three of which, he got in coming off, after the attack that completely failed,
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so determined was he not to fall into the hands of the enemy.”30 Smith escaped captivity
with three wounds. Major General Drummond testified to Smith’s intrepid service and
verbally communicated the need to reward valor with promotion to officer rank. When
used as line infantry soldiers the 104th Regiment of Foot performed well, but Fort Erie
was the last battle of the war in the Northern theatre. The Regiment’s record in combat
was impressive, but unlike New England regiments in the U.S. Army, the Maritime-based
104th was underemployed. To be uniquely capable of operating in the North American
frontier, yet sidelined for much of the conflict, was demoralizing for the regiment. Their
meritorious combat record late in the war speaks to their resolve.
Smith’s injuries would make it impossible for him to serve actively in the 104th,
yet he did meet the requirements in the Veterans Battalion, due to “loss he has sustained
by his determination and gallantry.”31 Smith was a perfect soldier for a Veterans
Battalion because of his exemplary service in the ranks. Additionally, his gallantry
caused his disabilities. Like other boys in the regiment, he joined the “New Brunswick
Regt in June 1805 at the age of fourteen.”32 At the start of the war, Smith was a sergeant
and was the colors sergeant during the 104th service in Upper Canada. His major actions
occurred at Sackett’s Harbor and Fort Erie, but serving in the “right division” under
Gordon Drummond meant that he would have been present for multiple smaller repeted
skirmishes.33 Smith was wounded three times at Fort Erie, and one caused the
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“amputation of his right arm.”34 The Veterans Battalion eventually replaced the 104th
Regiment of Foot, and it was composed of invalids. A unit of disabled soldiers took over
the garrison role in the Maritimes. Smith’s petition for a pension provided some of the
best evidence for the 104th Foot’s misuse for most of the War of 1812; after five combat
wounds and an amputation, Smith sought a transfer into a Veterans Battalion and a return
to garrison duties. Smith could perform the tasks he did in the 104th for two years while
being significantly disabled. The War 1812 was a conflict when the British Army needed
to use their gallant amputees, yet military leadership kept a fit and capable light infantry
garrisoned an area hundreds of miles away from the fight.
During the height of the fighting season in the summer of 1814, the bulk of the
104th remained in garrison until relieved by invalids. Edward Baynes ordered the
regiment’s main body into the fight late in the conflict, along with reinforcements from
the Spanish Campaign of the Napoleonic Wars. According to Baynes, “two Companies of
the 10th R.V.B. (Royal Veteran Battalion) for the purpose of relieving the 104th Regt. at
Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton.”35 For most of the conflict, the second battalion
of the 8th Regiment of Foot and the 41st Regiment of Foot – supplemented by militia units
– fought the bulk of the actions. Most of the 1812 reinforcements were veterans of the
Peninsular Campaign’s asymmetric fighting. However, despite their experience, they did
not have a stellar record in the northern theatre of the conflict. The 1814 reinforcements
were so large that they included two Swiss Regiments. The highly expeirenced Swiss
regiments in the British Army recorded losses at the battles of Plattsburgh, Chippewa,
34
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Lundy’s Lane, and the Siege of Fort Erie. The environmental effects of the frontier
limited to their ability to support larger contingents, but unlike the U.S. Army, the British
excelled at logistics. However, veterans of warfare in Spain and the Mediterranean
brought both experience and large numbers of invalids. Adjutants filled their records with
officers who sailed to North America hoping to be fit for duty, only to be unable to serve
actively. The British Army employed the 104th in 1814, when the British Army was at its
largest, after two years of being outnumbered significantly. Arthur Wellesley’s army
embraced the use of terrain and light infantry tactics, so the British had an example of
those dynamics that predated the charge of the light brigade.36 But at the time a regiment
formed on the periphery of the British empire was not taken as seriously as other military
units, and its capability and fortitude in the North American climate and courage under
fire was underappreciated by commanders.
The administrative processing of soldiers who were unfit for duty based on the
previous service in Europe and the Mediterranean dominated the regimental records of
units that arrived in British North America in 1814. The 103rd Regiment of Foot listed
one soldier and one officer unfit based on their previous service. Private Charles Dimond
suffered a debilitating rupture, which could run the gamut of ailments from an untreated
and unhealed wound to an infection called cellulitis, which is common today in elite
military units. Punishing labor, poor cleanliness, and calorie depletion make it a condition
common among Ranger soldiers, but these conditions were universal in early modern
conflict. The old soldier was no longer capable of contributing. In his memorial Charles

36

Philip Haythornthwaite and Steve Noon, British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics: 1792-1815 (New York:
Osprey Pub., 2008).

196

Dimond said, “Your petitioner is on the verge of 50 years of age & from his rupture,
which daily gets worse often confining him to bed for days together, he considers himself
a burden on the service.”37 When Dimond moved to a Veterans battalion, his rupture
improved and only precluded all service to something, “which occasionally prevents his
doing duty.”38 The full articulation of Dimond’s condition was rare, but ruptures in longserving soldiers occurred often, and the war’s low rations and poor sanitary conditions
meant that soldiers had infections so severe that they caused open festering wounds. An
aggressive regimen of antibiotics would be used to treat those kinds of wounds today.
The 103rd Regiment of Foot struggled to retain and replace officers while carrying
convalescents. Captain Bowie was “ordered lame” and “from the very weak state of his
intellects, and the incapacity to fulfill ever the duties of his situation as Captn in the Regt
.”39 Bowie was given orders at half pay in 1815 after the conflict was over and two
capable officers commanded his company. Major William Smelt noted the following:
“Captn Gardiner who from having received five severe wounds on the mourning of the
15th of Augt 1814.”40 Furthermore, he observed that “Lieutenant Charleston would be
the best replacement” but “was unfortunately killed on the mourning of 15 Augt 1814.”41
This brief exploration of the sister 103rd Regiment of Foot illustrates how the
employment of the 104th Regiment of Foot, regardless of its lack of formal combat
experience as a British regiment, was badly needed. It might well have outperformed

Charles Dimond, “Memorial of Charles Dimond to Lieutenant General George Prevost,” Regimental
Order Book for the103rd Regiment of Foot, PANB, 5.
38
Letter from Doctor R H Armstrong to George Prevost from New Brunswick Hospital 11 October 1814,
103rd Order Book, 8.
39
Letter from Major William Smelt to Captain Noah Freer, from Quebec 4 January 1815, and Letter from
Smelt to Freer from Quebec 1 April 1815, 103 rd Order Book, 9, 19.
40
Letter from Smelt to Freer, from Quebec 1 April 1815, 103 rd Order Book, 19.
41
Letter from Smelt to Freer, 20.
37

197

other regiments, yet it was consigned to a marginalized role. The best comparative
regiments were therefore not the standard British Regiments. Instead, the regiments
composed of foreigners offer the best comparative lens.
Two units that fought in the 1814 campaign alongside the 104th Regiment of Foot
were Swiss regiments that were commissioned as supplements to the British Army. Many
of the soldiers in the Swiss regiments were recruited in Switzerland, but guerillas serving
beside Arthur Wellesley’s command in Spain replenished their ranks. The Swiss
Regiments, like the 104th, consisted of marginalized soldiers that were denied the best
duties and honors. Its officera were often transferred to Regiments that remained active
after the war. The Regiments of de Meuron and de Watteville served in garrison roles in
the Mediterranean and at Gibraltar, much like the 104th Regiment of Foot’s duty in the
Maritime provinces. Like other 1814 reinforcement regiments, and unlike the 104th, the
veterans of European conflict brought soldiers unfit for combat. Lieutenant Casper
Brewer in de Meuron’s Regiment was deemed unfit for service before going to North
America, but he decided to travel in the hopes of recovering. He was never of any use to
his regiment, and despite four years of wartime service, Brewer was deemed by
Lieutenant de Meuron Boyan as “totally useless to it (his regiment), on account of ill
health, and also in my opinion by want of sufficient zeal and acting for the good of the
Regiment.”42 Rather than praising his character for shipping out to an active war zone,
British officers questioned Brewer’s fortitude because he remained unfit for duty.43
Brewer, like many of the foreign soldiers in the Swiss regiments, later settled in
42
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Drummondville, Upper Canada. These German, French, and Spanish soldiers struggled
as foreigners in Upper Canada. When the British paid the Swiss with “Spanish Pillar
Dollars that are distinguished from Spanish Dollars by not having pillars stamped on
them, and consequently are refused the same value,” the foreignness of the Swiss
Regiments was solidified.44 The British cynically offloaded worthless script left over
from Spanish Peninsular campaign to pay the multicultural soldiers of the Swiss
Regiments, as if it was an acceptable currency on the distant Upper Canadian frontier.
The Regiment de Watteville was a similar force composed of Swiss soldiers, and
their records are far more extensive than those found in De Meuron’s order books. Major
General Louis Watteville described how his subordinate struggled to keep men in the
ranks. Lieutenant Colonel Fisher was distressed by the situation “under which he [found]
himself placed.”45 Without much action in the conflict in North America, sickness
crippled this veteran Swiss regiment. His distress was caused by “the reminiscing of sick
men, as many will become entitled to their discharge for having complete their period of
service.”46 The tougher service on the remote frontier caused contention, and like the men
in De Meuron’s force, the British did not treat them as equals. Local non-regular
Fencibles were offered larger enlistment bonuses for shorter service. The British denied
Swiss soldiers’ entrance into traditional British regiments because they were
“Foreigners.”47 Their duties, like those of the 104th, would be light infantry assaults on
Oswego and defense of small outposts. Moreover, the Regiment de Watteville’s postwar
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records indicate that officers, infirm from wounds, struggled to receive just
compensation.
The Regiment de Watteville functioned like the 104th before 1814. Lieutenant
Everett commanded a detachment of de Watteville’s force while he retained a
commission in the 10th Veterans Battalion.48 Like Fisher, he described the problem of
retention because the soldiers in the regiment went unpaid. The use of an invalid officer
illustrates how the Regiment was also shifting its invalids into garrisons that faced little
threat. The 104th guarded the Maritimes until replaced by invalids of the 10th Veterans
Battalion. The regiment later saw service primarily in flank company duties and other
light infantry tasks, such as attaching blockhouses and supply depots. Likewise, the
Regiment de Watteville would suffer most of its losses while attacking Oswego. That raid
that occurred in support of the siege of Fort Erie, and, like the 104th Regiment, De
Watteville’s Regiment served as light infantry supplements to the British Army.
Light infantry tactics were what decided the outcomes of 1814, yet they did not
bring the same accolades and advancement. Ensign J. Harmon requested promotion
because he took command of a more significant force as a result of the death of an officer
in “which your Memorialist was employed.”49 Captain “Ledingingtoningo… received a
wound from a Musket Ball” and lost his finger.50 Injuries illustrated the irregular nature
of the fighting on both sides. Captain “meholer Mittelholzer” also “received two Wounds on
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by a Buck Shot in his left Arm, the other by Musket ball” in his “left side.”51 It is also
important to note that Mittelholzer’s injury was made worse by the environment. In his
memorial Mittelholzer states that “he occasionally feels the effects of the latter Wound,
particularly in Change of Weather.”52 Buckshot was typically used in irregular warfare,
and Mittelholzer’s injuries illustrate how soldiers in marginal units typically fought in
petite guerre roles. Still the effects the environment influenced the wounds, and the battle
for calories was waged against nature and the enemy. The officers of De Watteville’s
Regiment served an army that could not even understand (and perhaps pronounce) their
names. Yet De Watteville’s soldiers fought and were wounded, and their memorials of
disability were hastily compressed in one form that failed to secure adequate pensions.
The British Army needed the service of regiments that they felt were marginal, but that
did not mean that those regiments enjoyed the same privileges and accolades.
John Grodzinski recent regimental history of the 104th Regiment of Foot argued
that the march on snowshoes had had too much attention in the record, at the expense of
the Regiment’s combat record.53 He demonstrated that they performed well in non-linear
light infantry fighting, such as raids on small logistical posts and flank companies.
However, the long march on snowshoes is the best illustration of the 104th Regiment of
Foot’s fitness for the light infantry fight. Drummond’s adjutant wrote a letter criticizing
the use of the bayonet in such a densely wooded and rugged frontier.54 British leaders
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recognized the unique nature of the region of North America, yet they resigned their only
North American-raised regiment to a supporting role.
If success occurred primarily due to the consistent success of crack regulars in
battle, then it would be appropriate to dismiss the famous march of the 104th. Yet keeping
soldiers healthy during the 1814 campaign season was the most significant challenge.
Battlefield victory gained little save for accolades to the victors. The grueling winter
march placed the 104th in excellent company. Adam Walker from the U.S. 4th Infantry
Regiment described the journey from New England to northern Ohio as the hardest
aspect of his regiment’s service, and the unit’s order book is full of the names of soldiers
who fell out.55 John Rabdy is the best example because he was left on the road, destitute
without food or money, only to be court-martialed in New York after a harrowing
journey to earn enough money to eat and travel home.56 Governor Isaac Shelby, still a
combatant in his sixties, led Kentucky militia troops; he was complimented by Major
General William Henry Harrison for keeping up with the cavalry.57 The 4th Infantry
Regiment and Kentucky militia, under Thomas Shelby, were amongst the best light
infantry backwoods fighters in the world, and the 104th Regiment of Foot’s march on
snowshoes placed them in the same fraternity.58 Moreover, the 104th Foot shared the
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characteristics of light frontier fighters as well as the formidable discipline of British
regulars. The 104th was in many ways superior to comparable U.S. infantry regiments in
its general fitness and ability to withstand the punishing environment of North America’s
interior.
George Ramsay’s account of the march from New Brunswick combines the
descriptive language of nature with data that notes the daily distance traveled. Ramsay’s
description illustrates how difficult it was to supply the larger British Army. As the
previous chapter on “The War for Calories” demonstrated, supplying the British Army in
the frontier border region was extremely difficult. Ramsay’s account meticulously listed
each day that supply wagons could not follow the light troops on their march. The 104th
was rapidly demonstrating that as a light force they could operate without the support of
supply animals. The 104th Regiment of Foot marched 353 miles to the conflict, and then
walked 283 miles on its return home in 1815.59 Their movement over harsh terrain in the
winter would have crippled most regiments. Most losses in the War of 1812 were not
incurred in battle; they were caused by exposure to a harsh environment. The 104th Foot’s
ability to function after its exhausting march illustrated its fitness for conflict in the
Upper Canadian frontier border region, even after years of sitting in garrison.
Ramsay’s account is more than an eloquent description of human endurance; it is
one of the best descriptions of the gritty challenges of the conflict. Like other regimental
records it was a day-to-day description of events, and like most accounts, the more
significant problems involved the struggle of human bodies versus nature. Again, it is
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hard to find an account of the War of 1812 that described the horrors of combat in
anything but matter of fact tones. Yet Ramsay used emotional language to describe his
unit’s route. For example, he noted “A wretched road at all time” that was narrow and
“just passable for a horse and in many places that is difficult.”60 Occasionally the 104th
marched through a settled area “cleared of the timber,” but life in the Maritimes prepared
the men of the 104th for the harsh, unsettled terrain of the Niagara region. The
parsimonious landscape is a persistent theme in Canadian geographical history, and the
most common experience for soldiers on both sides was the daily struggle in an austere
environment. Sir Arthur Wellington gained notoriety leading British troops in the
wilderness region of India, but he did so with unlimited sources of labor.61 Backwoods
Canadians, like their American counterparts, were more capable of fighting in remote
areas away from supply wagons. The 104th Regiment of Foot’s long winter march gained
notoriety; it is one of the few episodes in the war’s story where historians celebrate the
day-to-day struggles of soldiers.
The 104th’s rate of march was impressive but it was also a vital indication of their
fitness to operate in an unforgiving land. When on good roads, the 104th marched
upwards of thirty miles a day. The regiment made their most extended movement from
Petite River to Cheston, logging forty-one miles. They were able to make formidable
progress because the “the road for this distance is by far better.”62 In a previous stretch,
they covered twenty-six miles because of a good route. The route was “good [for] all but
two miles” until “Mack’s Mill to Petite River” where it was “bad all but two miles.”63
“Memoir of George Ramsay,” 2.
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The regiment covered major distances in all but the worst conditions, which were most
legs of the march. From Port Mouton to Liverpool the 104th covered only twelve miles.
Ramsay stated that “this is an open country and about half the road is very fair / the
remainder very bad not / very (sic) hilly.”64 The open, unsettled country had poor roads
that men could only use at a rate that slowed their pace significantly. Moreover, it often
prohibited the movement of supplies via wagons. Light infantry was a category
determined by a supply system that used pack horses, rather than wagons, and required
heavier loads for soldiers. The 104th proved it could march in a land with bad roads harsh
terrain. The most challenging feature of the war was operating in the wilderness, and the
winter march of the 104th demonstrated their skill in petite guerre wilderness warfare.
The most significant historiographical influence of Ramsay’s short descriptive
account of day-to-day marches from Fredericton to Quebec relates to the Canadian
environment. The history of the War of 1812, studied more broadly, supports the critical
theories of Canadian environmental history. Parsimony, staples theory, and the slow
transition from rural first nature to settled second nature are significant themes in
Canadian environmental history that Ramsay’s account serves to confirm.65 His
manuscript’s description of the march route testifies to the viability of theories that are
predicated on the unsparing Canadian environment. This dissertation connects emphasis
on daily environmental management in military history to geographical realities.
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Supplying troops in the wilderness regions of North America was one of the most
significant challenges from the colonial period until the American Civil War. The
struggles of commanders and soldiers in 1812 mirrored events described in David
Preston’s latest book. Preston recontextualized Major General Edward Braddock’s defeat
at Monongahela as a result of the critical challenges of wilderness isolation.66 Lisa Brady
illuminated the manner in which Union officers such as Ulysses S. Grant and William
Sherman used scorched earth tactics to turn portions of the South into a wilderness.67
Kathryn Meier explored the idea that militia and volunteer soldiers were more apt to
survive in the Shenandoah wilderness during the Civil War, primarily because they could
return home when sick and practice self and family care.68 Likewise, the 104th’s
performance illustrates the ability of a local unit to operate in the wilderness because of
its soldiers’ lifetime spent in pre-settlement “first nature.”69 The frontier environment
presented one of the most significant challenges of the War of 1812. Surviving nature
was the only way to even set foot onto a battlefield. Remarkably, the environment has yet
to play a central role in historical interpretations of the war.
Conclusion
As was the case with American units, the 104th Regiment of Foot’s most
significant challenges came from the environment. For most of the conflict, one of the
British units most capable of enduring the frontier guarded the unthreatened Maritime
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region. The 104th Regiment of Foot’s proven endurance of the harsh North American
environment set them apart. Its fitness for the environment might have made it one of the
most storied units in the conflict, yet the 104th played a relatively small role in the
conflict. When it became militarily active in the final year of the war, it was employed as
one regiment in a sea of reinforcements that came to North America after the war against
Napoleon shifted in the British favor.
British military commanders often adapted to the harsh environment far more
astutely then their American counterparts. However, the British Army was still a rigid
military hierarchy that held a unit of provincials in lower esteem than other regiments.
Wellington may have been pioneering light infantry tactics and the use of rifles in
Europe, but a provincial unit expert at light infantry was still not the same as more
traditional British Regiments. Its provincial status made the soldiers of the 104th
extremely capable, but it was also the factor that kept them in garrison for much of the
conflict. Their daunting march to Upper Canada and military performance in 1814 were
impressive, but they occurred long after the regiment could have made a significant
impact on the war’s outcome.
Moreover, like American frontier units, the 104th Regiment of Foot was composed
of human beings with weaknesses and frailty. The endurance they showed on the march
could not fully inoculate the regiment from common ailments; nor could it overcome the
persistent paucity of supplies in a distant frontier. When they were employed in the 1814
campaign against the better prepared U.S. Army, the unit lost most of their forces from
sickness. Their combat record was quite good, and they were the most capable of serving
in the less heralded light infantry attacks on U.S. lines of supply and communication. The
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104th kept the only tactically proficient U.S. force on the battlefield away from the supply
lines. Their service underpinned victories at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie. Had
the 104th Regiment of Foot been used earlier in the conflict when the tribal alliances with
the British were stronger, the war’s outcome might well have been different.
The 104th’s decline in health was much like the best frontier units on the
American side. Their success in 1814 overshadowed their human weaknesses, and the
failure of British commanders to grasp their unique fitness for frontier conflict is perhaps
one of the most significant blunders in the War of 1812. That is why the Swiss regiments
offer the best comparison. The Swiss troops – like the 104th – were necessary, but
commanders relegated them to a secondary role in the shadow of established British
regiments. Moreover, they were employed late in the conflict and never earned the
respect they deserved. In many ways, the 104th was more like the U.S. 4th or 21st Infantry
Regiments. Both have been singled out because they were recruited in nearby New
England. The 104th and New England-raised regiments excelled at light infantry tactics.
Although the 21st struggled under poor commanders for two years, it enjoyed major
military successes in 1814. Similarly, the 4th Infantry Regiment compiled victories in
every major engagement until William Hull ordered its surrender. Their record further
illustrates what a tactical waste it was to keep the 104th Regiment of Foot in garrison so
long. The 104th Regiment of Foot illustrates the profound connections between the War
of 1812 and North America’s environment. The War of 1812 is best understood by a
human portrayal of its combatants, because keeping soldiers healthy and in the ranks
profoundly shaped its outcome.
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CHAPTER 6
SICKNESS AND OPERATIONAL MILITARY HISTORY:
A HUMAN-CENTRIC CONCLUSION

It is widely known, almost to the point of a cliché, that sickness and disease are
the highest known causes of death in early modern armies. However, there is little
explicit work on the management of soldier health, especially from an operational
perspective. The northern theater of the War of 1812 illustrates just how significant
illness was to the outcome of the conflict. Moreover, the soldiers and officers were not
passive actors subject to the accident of illness.1 Officers and soldiers did much to
overcome the environmental disadvantages of the Upper Canadian frontier. The sheer
belief that they had control over their health meant that soldiers and officers who were
proactive were more likely to overcome the challenges of illness on a distant frontier.
Health research should not solely be understood as medical history; it was also a critical
aspect of operational military history. War of 1812 commanders who adapted to the
challenges of a harsh frontier environment became the leaders that won the most battles,
largely because they kept more soldiers on their fit for duty rosters. Military
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professionalism was also not simply a matter of regulars versus volunteers and militia; it
was about the previous experience in frontier warfare.
For the Americans, the best commanders, save for Winfield Scott, all came out of
state militias. Commanders who learned their trade in the frontier militia excelled at the
management of health. Militia leaders learned the hygienic and tactical measures
necessary to maintain the health of their soldiers. Commanders like William Hull, who
viewed health as unmanageable, failed, whereas commanders who allowed their soldiers
to continue to fight while ill or injured were successful. There was also a correlation
between petite guerre irregular tactics and larger volumes of soldiers fit for duty. Light
infantry tactics relied on logistics drawn from foraging and more dependable and
versatile pack horses. Conversely, commanders that relied on wagons for logistics could
not supply their forces, or worst, became tethered to their fortifications and engaged in
few offensive actions.
A key disadvantage of American military culture in the War of 1812 was the
Revolutionary heritage. There was a shared corporate identity in warfare as characterized
by suffering and privation. The tradition of unsupplied soldiers serving in tattered
uniforms connected soldiers to their Revolutionary forefathers but did not create an
identity around competent logistics. The Continental Army succeeded through defensive
survival against a more powerful opponent, but during the War of 1812 the U.S. Army
was the aggressor and thus required competent logistics to succeed. The effective light
infantry tactics of leaders such as William Henry Harrison secured the Old Northwestern
Territories, but the American Army could not maintain a campaign long enough to seize
all the provinces of British North America (present-day Canada).
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The regiments that were best disposed to succeed in the Northern campaign of the
War of 1812 were drawn from regions where the war was fought. Political divisions in
America made the war extremely problematic. The Democratic-Republicans who called
for the War of 1812 were strongest in the southern states but were forced to keep most of
their regiments in the south to protect against a slave revolt supported by the Royal
Navy.2 The borderlands New England and the mid-Atlantic states provided the best
regiments in the War of 1812. Perhaps ironically, these states were heavily influenced by
Federalists who opposed the war. A case study of the 21st Infantry Regiment reveals
soldiers who suffered failure after failure early in the conflict only to be denied victory
during the 1814 campaign. In 1814, after numerous reforms, the U.S. Northern Army
won all its engagements but was forced to abandon its offensive action because of
inadequate logistics. For the New England soldiers of the 21st Infantry Regiment, the
failure of logistics occurred simultaneously with the smuggling of New England supplies
to the British Army. This represented a particularly galling betrayal of their years of
suffering privation on a distant frontier. The flaws of a divided slave-based and free
country led to frustrating failures in the northern campaign, making the suffering of
privation far more onerous.
The British use of a locally drawn Regiment of Foot was frustrating for reasons
far more connected to problematic institutional culture in the British Army. The 104th
Regiment of Foot was drawn from New Brunswick and excelled at light infantry tactics
from its inception. However, the unit’s commissions were all based upon purchase, and
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most of the officers who commanded in the 104th had to grapple with invalids who could
not physically handle active campaigning. The Regiment defended unthreatened coastal
fortifications for most of the War of 1812. The best light infantry fighters in British North
American languished in garrison duties while a small force of British regulars struggled
with a larger U.S. force in the Upper Canadian frontier. The 104th Regiment of Foot
remained in coastal garrison duties until the volume of invalids from the fighting in
Upper Canada was large enough for invalid Veterans Battalions to relieve them.
The 104th Regiment of Foot deployed to the fighting during the 1814 campaign
along with large reinforcements that came to North American following the Duke of
Wellington’s victory in the Peninsular Campaign. By that time, there were so many
British Regiments in North America that Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond had to
pull units out of combat duties because his forces exceeded his ability to supply
provisions. The unit’s quick winter march to the fighting theatre illustrated the 104th
Regiment of Foot’s unique fitness for the conflict. Moreover, it attested to their wastage
for the duration of the conflict. The best regiments for a comparison to the 104th
Regiment of Foot did not consist of fellow British units; rather, they were the “foreign
regiments” drawn from Swiss Allies. The 104th Regiment of Foot performed well in
combat, and it is appropriate that they have been so celebrated in Canadian history.
However, military leaders squandered them in garrison duties for most of the conflict
because they were a provincial regiment. This dynamic represents one of the biggest
mistakes in the War of 1812. The 41st Regiment may have been the most experienced
regiment on the continent, but the 104th was the most prepared to meet the environmental
challenges.
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The resources of commanders and soldiers were often grossly inadequate to take
control of their health in an austere environment. Morale and health were inextricably
linked and speak to John Lynn’s three types of soldier motivation: the motivation to
serve, combat motivation, and sustained motivation.3 Alcohol was a means to secure both
combat and sustained motivation and, as such, became a method of managing illness on
both sides of the War of 1812. Before combat, soldiers drank a pint of hard alcohol, and
often that improved their combat effectiveness. There were also references of liquor used
to fortify soldiers in the harsh environment, with American soldiers receiving extra
rations after harrowing stream crossings and British soldiers receiving extra rations in
isolated outposts. Alcohol use to help soldiers stay healthy and in good spirits was so
widespread that individuals on both sides shared alcohol. While the shared experience of
alcohol could unite soldiers on both sides, it further alienated Native Americans. Most
records about Native American alcohol use pertained to Shawnee confederate and
Potawatomi tribes and served to exacerbate differences. Alcohol, when used by Native
Americans in the same manner as white soldiers, was interpreted as something that
furthered the purported animal nature of Shawnee and Potawatomi fighters. Alcohol was
an imperfect device that offered soldiers and officers some measure of control of their
health in a harsh environment. The flawed nature of the solution of alcohol illustrates the
perniciousness of the War of 1812’s environment and the desperate nature of day-to-day
survival in the Upper Canadian frontier.
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In a conflict on an isolated frontier, food and logistics became the most important
factors for survival. Soldiers today suffer from the same health problems as soldiers in
the War of 1812, and people die with similar conditions in the undeveloped world.
Modern medicine helps soldiers survive; however, malnutrition is a leading factor in high
rates of sickness. Robert Sapolsky’s extensive research on the neurochemistry of stress
and trauma places more emphasis on food insecurity than specific instances of violence.4
While scholars of human experiences focus on the emotional impact of violence,
scientific research concentrates more on the role of stress and general illness. A focus on
the military campaign of 1814 underscores an essential point: there was an extremely
high correlation between illness and periods of low rations. American officers chaffed
under a system of unaccountable civilian contractors. After the reforms of Major General
Jacob Brown and Brigadier General Winfield Scott, the Americans began to gain
dominance on the battlefield. However, American commanders gained little lasting effect
in the outcome of the campaign, save for increased reputation, by winning battles at
Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie, because they failed to support their forces
logistically for future operations. British Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, who
was born in Quebec, was a veteran of fighting in the Netherlands and Egypt. Because he
possessed local knowledge, he developed a logistically feasible strategy. Drummond’s
reforms had already taken place when Arthur Wellesley addressed similar problems with
the British Army in Portugal by establishing a Commissary-General.5
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The British used civilian contractors who faced the same problems as their
American counterparts. However, they employed an accountable general officer who was
responsible for the distribution rations. In 1814 Drummond received significant
reinforcements from the Peninsular Wars in Spain and Portugal. However, he limited the
size of his force so that the commissariat could keep up with demand. He also embraced
the citizen-soldier model of part-time soldiers that returned home during the harvest.
Native American tribes, including the Six Nations, Chippewa, Mississauga, Ottawa,
Wyandot, and Delaware, were deployed as irregular forces that required far less logistical
support. Drummond lost many battles but gained the most because he could supply his
forces, and he used Native American allies and militia to cut the American army’s lines
of supply. He lost the traditional battles but consistently won the light infantry fight.
Attention to logistics and the supply of adequate rations were crucial features of a
successful campaign that brought few classic battle victories.
The War of 1812 is well understood as a conflict in which the British and
American forces both considered themselves victorious, even if Native Americans gained
very little for their fighting.6 Approaching the war from a lower-level operational
perspective helps to clarify the key characteristics that led to successful military behavior.
In the early years of their dominance, the British failed to employ the best regiment for
the frontier conflict: the 104th Regiment of Foot. The U.S. Army experienced a slower
process wherein successful frontier militia officers gained federal general officer
commissions. At the company level, New England and mid-Atlantic soldiers filled the
ranks. These soldiers came from states that opposed the War of 1812 politically. Officers
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at the lowest level of U.S. command often desired the experience of bloody combat as a
reward for suffering on a distant frontier. Additionally, low supplies and exposure to a
harsh frontier environment meant that commanders at the company level (typically 100120 soldiers) rarely had half strength of regular soldiers. As a result, they were forced to
heavily rely on recently added recruits to amplify their numbers on fit-for-duty rosters.
The best commanders exerted some level of control by prudently rationing alcohol and
food. After being raised in Quebec, Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond possessed
local knowledge and military experience. In 1814 he succeeded by emphasizing the role
of the militia and Native American allies that were skilled light infantry tactics.
Drummond may have always served in regular British regiments, but like the American
militia generals he possessed local knowledge.
More classic environmental histories such as Black Rice and the Columbian
Exchange argued for an environmentally deterministic theory of history.7 In the War of
1812, success for operational leaders was rarely accidental, and commanders who took
responsibility for the health of their soldiers in a frontier border region outperformed their
peers. Honor has been criticized significantly by authors such as Alan Taylor and Joanne
Freeman, but it served as a fundamental factor in the hardiness and resilience of War of
1812 fighters.8 Moreover, leaders often used extremely problematic measures, such as a
high rate of alcohol consumption, to manage the health of their soldiers. Even measures
like moving to stagnant water and filth trenches were accidents of early nineteenth-
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century humoral theory. Anyone who believes they have control of their own health is far
more likely to recover from survivable illness and injury than individuals who
characterized illness and injury as fixed invalidity or disability. Events like the charge of
cowardice for William Hull’s surrender of Detroit are best understood in the context of
the impact of environmental factors that dramatically shaped the human body’s ability to
overcome invalidity. Officers such as Zachary Taylor, who allowed their soldiers to fight
rather than succumb to illness, succeeded because environmental hardiness was
connected to the founding Revolutionary Army’s tradition of being clothed in rags with
negligible provisions.
In his book The War of 1812: in the Age of Napoleon, Jeremy Black argues that
expeditionary forces were weakened because of the lack of lasting strategic results from
battlefield victories.9 However, the historiography has yet to shift away from decisive
battle interpretations of the War of 1812. A focus on the day-to-day management of
illness reveals that the most consequential factor in the northern theatre was the
management of the environment. Additionally, commanders who believed they could
control the health of their soldiers performed better in battle. An approach to the War of
1812 from a daily management perspective illustrates the most important environmental
factors that shaped the war; it also improves our understanding of how commanders
succeeded in battle.
At the close of the northern campaign, the British army performances of
environmental management far exceeded those of the American Northern Army.
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However, the American army learned far more as the 1814 campaign unfolded. The Duke
of Wellington’s victories in the Peninsular Wars and at Waterloo reinforced the dynamics
of the British purchase system, and the result was the British army’s extremely poor
performance in the Crimean War. On the other hand, the American army changed
dynamically after the War of 1812. Commanders like Winfield Scott, Thomas Sidney
Jesup, and Zachary Taylor learned the hard lessons of a flawed logistics system in the
campaign of 1814. They developed a much better approach to logistics and
environmental management that led to successful campaigns in the Blackhawk War,
Seminole Wars, and Mexican American War. Moreover, these officers had direct
relationships with Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman. John Grenier has argued in
The First Way of War that the military experiences from the colonial period to the War of
1812 shaped Sherman’s brutal technique of targeting of the will of civilians.10 However,
“the march to the sea” was also a campaign that focused on destroying the environment
of the American South. The small peripheral wars between the War of 1812 and the Civil
War developed on distant frontiers under the command of veterans of the 1814 campaign.
While the commanders endured a broken logistics system in the War of 1812, they
changed the institutional officer culture as the nineteenth century unfolded. While there
are certainly problems with today’s reliance on government contractors for logistics, the
American army will probably never experience the dramatic supply problems that it did
in 1814. Learning from military failure can be more valuable than success, and the small

10

John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).

218

core of U.S. army officers who fought well in the War of 1812 created a system of reform
the remains to the present day.
Battle narratives dominate the study of warfare by military historians, while
environmental studies typically lack military operational depth. By studying the
operational management of the environment, we gain a much clearer picture of the ways
that officers and soldiers shaped their own experiences in harsh situations. Studies of
military operational histories that do not account for the experience of war will often
view soldiers as objects on maps. Importantly, the soldiers’ experience and adaptation to
their environment were as central to the outcome of the War of 1812 as the placement of
regiments in key engagements. Frontier innovations in health management and tactics led
to the most lasting success in the War of 1812 and illustrate that it is not enough to excel
on the battlefield; it is also important to do the most to preserve the size and effectiveness
of armies. Soldiers seek battlefield notoriety, but there are far more cases of dysentery
and malaria than there is glory in war. As this dissertation has demonstrated, those who
best managed the suffering, the filth, and the unromantic aspects of war prevailed.
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